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ABSTRACT 
The Iranian economy during the 1953-77 period is the subject of 
this thesis where the implications of oil revenue allocation for the 
country's economy is examined in detail. 
The development of the all-important oil sector is studied in 
depth and its inter-action with the newly-established modern 
industrial sector and the rest of the economy is assessed. The 
relationship between investment in industry and agriculture and oil 
revenue is examined. The overall economic development of the country 
is reviewed, especially the progress of the strong traditional sector 
and the relatively new modern sector. Having analysed these various 
aspects of the economy it was possible to establish whether any 
linkages existed between the oil industry and other sectors of the 
economy. 
Iran was an excellent case to study as it displayed many of the 
characteristics of an under-developed economy, yet it had its 
financial constraints suddenly removed as a result of increased oil 
revenue. However, due to its inadequate infrastructure the Iranian 
economy faced considerable problems and the level of economic 
development that had been hoped for did not materialise. 
vi 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a study of the Iranian economy during the 1953-77 
period with specific emphasis on the implications of oil revenue 
allocation for the country's economy. 
The objective of this study is to explore the inter-action 
between the foreign-orientated and all-important oil sector and the 
other sectors of the Iranian economy. Investment in industry and 
agriculture in relation to oil revenue will be examined in detail in 
chapters four and five respectively. The development of the oil 
industry itself will be discussed in chapter three. The question will 
be addressed of whether the increases in oil revenue, as a result of 
the oil price rises of 1973-74, led to greater investment and 
development of the economy. Chapter six deals with economic 
development under dualistic conditions, that is in an economy with a 
strong traditional sector and a newly-established modern sector. The 
chapter will discuss whether linkages existed or were established 
between the different sectors of the economy as a result of increased 
oil revenue expenditure and the establishment of the modern sector. 
Iran presents an excellent case of a developing country which, 
having been deprived of the beneficial effects of its oil sector for 
several decades, found ~ way to make up for the past and use the oil 
industry as a direct and indirect instrument to enhance its 
development. As compared with other oil producing countries in the 
Middle East, Iran has a very large population (35 million) and 
considerable development potential. The population was reasonably 
well educated and its physical resources were considerable. It is 
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therefore quite clear that Iran had a great advantage over many other 
developing countries not only in terms of having fewer financial 
constraints but also in terms of its human and physical resources. So 
why is Iran not more developed than other developing countries with 
fewer resources and financial constraints? Some tentative answers to 
this question are suggested in the thesis. 
Iran has a very strong traditional sector with the carpet weaving 
industry a major activity. In the sixteenth century the city of 
Esfahan had more workshops than Paris, Europe's most populated and 
developed city. Hence why did Iran fall behind Europe, given its 
historical strengths? One possible answer could be that Iranians have 
always had a small business mentality which was strongly influenced by 
Islamic values. The Prophet Mohammed was a small trader himself, and 
this mentality still remains. Iran had greater development potential 
than Japan, which did not have any significant resources. Other 
governments, such as that of Japan, developed large enterprises and 
pushed forward economic development, with their nations support. The 
Iranian nation did not give the Shah, in his develoment drive, such 
full support. Many believed that his policies were unsuitable for the 
Iranian economy. No advantage was taken of the country's vast human 
resources but instead highly capital-intensive industries were set up. 
These did not encourage the production of intermediate goods or any 
technological transfers. 
During the 1953-77 period there was a lack of capital 
accumulation in the Iranian economy. Those with private funds were 
often unwilling to invest in their own community simply because they 
lacked faith in the economy and distrusted the authorities. Therefore 
the Iranian government had to act alone as the main financier of 
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development. In this thesis a study will be made of whether the 
government allocated its resources in the most appropriate direction. 
Did the allocation assist in the country's development or was there a 
degree of withholding of the available resources? Iran is an 
interesting case study because during the latter part of the 1953-77 
period the time and conditions seemed to be right for the take-off 
stage of the country's development and self-sustained growth. Capital 
was available although encouraging capital accumulation independently 
of the oil sector was difficult. The reasons why the authorities were 
unsuccessful in translating once and for all oil revenue expenditure 
into self-financing development will be explained in the thesis. 
In writing this thesis on the Iranian economy one was confronted 
with the problem of the availability and consistency of quantitative 
data. However, the data that was available was utilised and some 
estimates were made to fill in the gaps where necessary. How accurate 
the data is it is difficult to comment on, but the data used was to 
give some indication of the economic trends during the period. 
Another problem was that of the lack of data on many occasions for the 
overall period. In spite of these difficulties it was possible to 
analyse the overall development of the different sectors of the 
economy. The trends shown are essentially correct but caution must be 
exercised in interpreting data in any exact sense. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER TWO 
OIL REVENUE 
Oil has a prominent place in the Iranian economy. It is 
important in terms of government revenue and the country's foreign 
exchange earnings. High oil revenue was the main reason for Iran's 
remarkable growth during the years of the Shah's rule. The oil 
revenue is divided between the Treasury General and the Plan 
Organisation. The share of oil revenue in development expenditure in 
Iran increased from 59 per cent in 1963 to 80 per cent in 1972, which 
indicated its significance for the government's industrialisation 
programme. However, after the 1973 oil price increases, the share of 
oil revenue allocated to development planning declined. This decline 
did not mean a change in government priorities but rather showed the 
inability of the infrastructure of the country to absorb such a large 
inflow in such a short period of time. Simultaneously, defence 
expenditure increased dramatically and a series of social policies 
were undertaken by the government through its current budget. 
In order to understand the development and achievements of the 
Iranian oil industry over the 1953-77 period it is necessary to 
briefly look at the industry's history. This will enable an anlaysis 
to be made of the role the Iranian government played in the industry's 
development and achievements. 
The Iranian oil industry was nationalised in 1951 after a serious 
dispute with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and the British 
government who owned a 51 per cent share in AIOC. Prime Minister 
Mossadegh, in his attempt to nationalise the industry, was prepared to 
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compensate AIOC, but the British government doubted Iran's ability to 
pay full compensation. Mossadegh also pledged that 'the specialists, 
employees and workmen of the former oil company, Iranian as well as 
foreign, shall continue in employment as before and shall be regarded 
from this date as employees of the National Oil Company of Iran'. [1] 
The British government went as far as the International Court of 
Justice, in 1951, to request an injunction to prevent Iran from 
seizing the AIOC property. They were unsuccessful in their request. 
The dispute accelerated further and by the end of 1951 the British 
government adopted a new course of action which the British Foreign 
Office called 'economic measures designed to protect the United 
Kingdom's economy'. This new course of action included the withdrawal 
of privileges previously held by Iran to convert sterling into 
dollars. Meanwhile, Iran suffered from a lack of oil revenue due to 
an economic blockade organised by the oil companies. In spite of 
this, however, the Iranian government was able to have a balanced 
budget for the first time since 1948. Having said tha~imports fell 
considerably and the government received its revenue mainly from its 
export earnings other than oil. The Iranian government began to take 
counter-action against Britain. 
The dispute escalated even further. Mossadegh stood firm in his 
belief that the oil issue was an Iranian internal affair and no 
international body had the right to interfere. Diplomatic relations 
with Britain were withdrawn on 12th January 1952. Even though the 
economic measures taken by Britain against the Iranian government were 
ineffective, the organised boycott of Iranian oil had a greater impact 
on Iran's social and political stability. In this first attempt to 
take over control of production levels from the oil companies and 
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hence revenues, Iran was not as successful as Mossadegh had hoped for 
in his bid to nationalise the oil industry. Iran was unable to attain 
this objective until 20 years later. 
With the assistance of the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was restored to power in the 
summer of 1953. This marked a new era in Iran's relations with the 
foreign oil companies. An agreement was signed on 29th October 1954 
with the eight major oil companies forming the Oil Consortium. The 
Consortium was given the right to explore, produce, refine, transport 
and sell oil from the so-called Agreement Area, located in southern 
Iran. The role of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which was 
established at the time of nationalisation, was obviously diminished 
with this agreement. NIOC was now more a company registered on a 
piece of paper rather than actually being involved in direct 
operations. This was far from the idea Mossadegh had in mind. The 
1954 Agreement may have been regarded as a good agreement on behalf of 
the foreign oil companies but as far as the Iranian economy was 
concerned, it did not bring the benefits it could have done. The 
Iranian oil industry was once again in the hands of the foreign oil 
companies. The industry expanded considerably over the 1953-77 period 
but it was not until 1973 that NIOC took control over the Consortium's 
operations and therefore controlled for the first time in the history 
of the oil industry, the level of production. [2] 
Now that a brief history of the Iranian oil industry in the early 
1950s has been given, the contribution of oil revenue to the Iranian 
economy can be addressed against this background. Firstly, the 
relationship between production and revenue will be discussed. 
Secondly, the relationship between prices and revenue will be 
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examined. Thirdly, the relationship between production and foreign 
exchange will be considered. Fourthly, and finally, the relationship 
between prices and foreign exchange earnings will be discussed. 
2.2 PRODUCTION AND REVENUE 
During the 1953-77 period Iran, unlike some Arab producers such 
as Kuwait and Algeria, did not adopt a conservation policy to preserve 
its exhaustible asset, oil, for a longer period of time. Iran instead 
pushed for more oil lift by the major oil companies, the Consortium 
group, in order to finance its large-scale economic and military 
plans. The Shah's aim was to transform the country, through rapid 
industrialisation, into a regional economic and military power before 
the country's reserves were exhausted. It was hoped that by that 
time, the country would have reached the stage of development where 
growth would be self-generating and self-sustaining. 
During the period 1953 to 1978 the number of oilfields increased 
from five to 35 respectively. Both production and export facilities 
were expanded greatly. Kharg Island was linked by a series of 
pipelines to the various oilfields, and it became the world's largest 
oil loading terminal. The major oil producing region is based in the 
south western part of Iran, which, in the late 1970s, accounted for 
90 per cent of Iranian crude oil production. [3] 
Production of oil increased progressively over the 1955-77 
period. According to the Iranian crude oil production statistics 
shown in Table 2.1, from an annual production of 120.8 million barrels 
in 1955, output rose constantly reaching 1,231.8 million barrels in 
1969. By then Iran had become the largest producer of crude oil in 
the Middle East as it accounted for 27.3 per cent of total production 
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of crude oil in this region. The output of crude reached its peak in 
1974 when 2,197.8 million barrels were produced but production fell by 
11.2 per cent in the following year. 
TABLE 2.1 
IRAN'S CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION AND OIL REVENUE, 1955-77 
Year 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
197 4 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Annual 
production 
of crude 
oil 
(million 
barrels) 
120.8 
195.5 
263.4 
301.4 
338.8 
385.7 
431.9 
479.9 
538.1 
618.7 
688.2 
771 .2 
947.7 
1 ,042.2 
1 ,231 .8 
1,399.7 
1,656.9 
1,838.5 
2,139.3 
2' 197.8 
1 '952. 7 
2' 153.0 
2,050.9* 
* estimated figure 
Annual 
rate of 
increase 
(%) 
63.5 
33.4 
14.4 
12.4 
13.8 
12.0 
11.1 
12.1 
15.0 
11.2 
1 2.1 
22.9 
10.0 
18.2 
13.6 
18.4 
11.0 
16.4 
2.7 
-11 • 2 
10.3 
- 4.7 
Oil 
revenue 
( 1970 
prices, 
billion 
rials 
1 0. 1 
14.3 
20.0 
24.2 
24.9 
26.6 
26.7 
30.9 
34.5 
41.9 
43.4 
51.9 
63.9 
70.6 
72.4 
84.7 
133.1 
163. 1 
238.2 
992.5 
828.9 
892.0 
727.0 
, Annual 
rate of 
increase 
(%) 
41.6 
39.9 
21.0 
2.9 
6.8 
0.4 
15.7 
11.7 
21.5 
3.6 
19.6 
23.1 
10.5 
2.5 
16.9 
57.1 
22.5 
46.0 
316.7 
-16.5 
7.6 
-18.5 
SOURCE National Iranian Oil Company and Bank Markazi, Iran, 
Annual Reports and Balance Sheets, 1955-77 
Revenue 
per 
barrel 
(rials) 
83.6 
72.4 
75.9 
80.3 
73.5 
69.0 
61.8 
64.4 
64.1 
67.7 
63.1 
67.3 
67.4 
67.7 
58.8 
60.5 
80.3 
88.7 
111 . 3 
451 .6 
424.0 
414.3 
354.5 
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It should be noted at this point that even though production 
increased during the 1955-73 period the increase was not as great as 
the Iranian government wanted. They wanted to expand production in 
order to increase oil revenue but during this period the government 
was not in control of the production level. As already indicated the 
Corsortium was in control and they were unwilling to expand production 
any further. Despite this situation there was not necessarily a 
conflict of interest between the Consortium and Iran as far as 
production was concerned but there was a conflict of interest 
regarding prices. This will be discussed in section 2.3. The 
Consortium was happy to expand production to the level shown in 
Table 2.1 as they believed it would keep down world prices to some 
extent and encourage demand. Iran, although the Shah could be 
troublesome, was regarded as a stable source of supply, and some oil 
companies, BP in particular, were heavily dependent on supplies from 
Iran to maintain their world market share. Iran did, however, gain 
control in 1973 when NIOC took over the whole of the Consortium's 
operations. [4] 
Altogether in the 23-year period, 1955-77, more than 23,700 
million barrels of crude oil were produced from Iranian on-and-off 
shore reservoirs. As Table 2.1 shows 10,500 million barrels of oil 
were produced during the last five years of the period, which is a 
26 per cent greater output than was produced in the whole of the 
1955-70 period. This vast output of limited oil reserves had an 
incalculably negative impact on reservoir pressure. Although dramatic 
and alarming pressure drops were reported in these years, output was 
increased instead of being reduced. It should be noted at this stage 
that reservoir pressure is directly related to the amount of 
recoverable 'oil in place', and by reducing reservoir pressure too 
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rapidly as a consequence of excessive production, future reservoir 
efficiency is jeopardised. Hence as a result of excessive production 
during the 1973-77 period not only were available oil reserves 
depleted at an uncommensurate pace but also future recovery potential 
was irrepairably impaired. [5] 
The question of whether there was any need for such a substantial 
output within such a short period of time, as the 1973-77 period, can 
be raised. During the period Iran's oil revenue increased 
considerably as a result of the 1973-74 oil price increases, and in 
these circumstances it might have been worthwhile to reduce production 
significantly. The Shah was however anxious to develop the Iranian 
economy as soon as possible before the oil resources were exhausted. 
But paradoxically the policy he carried out brought exhaustion closer. 
The Shah believed that he had to take advantage of the oil price 
increases that took place in the 1973-74 period, hence he pushed for 
as much output as possible. The moment had come for Iran to increase 
its oil revenue within a relatively short period of time which would 
enable the Shah to enhance the country's development fairly quickly. 
The Shah may have realised that this situation was not to last for 
long. He was faced with conflict between the opportunity of high 
prices on one hand and the detrimental effect on oil levels on the 
other. He decided on the first choice. 
This sudden increase in oil revenue had both advantages and 
disadvantages. The advantage was that the terms of trade improved 
greatly at the beginning of the 1973-77 period. The disadvantage was 
that the rate of inflation increased considerably and, as stated in 
the introduction above, the economy was unable to absorb such large 
inflows within such a short period of time due to its limited 
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infrastructure and supply bottlenecks. It may have been more 
advantageous if the same amount of revenue had been obtained over a 
longer period of time. The rate of inflation would most likely have 
been lower and the oil revenue would have been used more effectively 
for the development of the country. 
One can also speculate at this stage what actions would have been 
taken if Mossadegh had been in power. There is no doubt that pricing 
pressures would have come sooner than 1973 and production levels may 
have been deliberately varied in a bid to influence prices. 
Production levels may have been lower over the period as a whole. 
This may have been due to conservation policies by Mossadegh himself, 
or perhaps because of continued resistance by the Western oil 
companies to the marketing of Iranian oil. If the companies had been 
able to substitute other sources of supply for Iranian oil, then 
Mossadegh's supply limitations to raise prices would not have worked. 
These speculations can raise the issue of whether the nationalisation 
of the industry was necessary after all in terms of control of 
production levels. As far as the Shah was concerned if prices had 
risen earlier, the situation would have been taken advantage of by 
increasing production even further than was actually the case. This 
would have brought exhaustion of oil reserves even closer. 
The 1973-74 period when crude oil production was at its highest 
was perhaps one of the most signficiant years in the 1953-77 period of 
the Iranian oil industry. Oil revenue increased from Rials 238.2 
billion in 1973 to Rials 992.5 billion in 1974, or by 316.7 per cent 
as Table 2.1 shows. Oil revenue had been increasing steadily over the 
1955-73 period but the vast increase during the 1973-77 period was 
unexpected. How great was the need for increased government revenue 
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in this period? The government was running a slight budget surplus in 
1969 and 1970 but in 1972 and 1973 the government was running a budget 
deficit. The need for greater revenue was clear, especially if the 
development of the country was to be enhanced. Nevertheless the 
actual revenue increase over the 1973-74 period was much greater than 
what was actually needed, and production could have been at a 
substantially lower level and a balanced budget still maintained. 
How great a contribution did production make to this increase in 
oil revenue? Table 2.1 shows that the increase in production 
contributed a great deal to the continuous increase in revenue up to 
1973. This indicates that oil prices played a minor role in 
determining oil revenue until that year. This trend, however, seems 
to change in the 1973-74 period when the production of oil slowed down 
whilst there was a boom in oil revenue. Oil revenue increased by 
316.7 per cent but the production of oil increased by a mere 
2.7 per cent. Hence this increase in oil revenue can be attributed to 
the oil price increases of 1973-74 which will be discussed in the 
following section. 
2.3 PRICES AND REVENUE 
Iran's role as an oil producer has been increasing over the 
years. Table 2.2 shows Iran's share in the crude oil production of 
the Middle East, OPEC and the World over the 1955-76 period. 
Iran became a member of OPEC in 1962. OPEC was initially created 
as an instrument for the stabilisation of crude oil prices. It was 
regarded from the outset as a prototype for an international commodity 
agreement for exporters of raw materials from the Third World. As has 
been noted, there was a conflict of interest with regard to prices 
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between the oil companies and Iran during the 1955-73 period. OPEC, 
which was formed to prevent price falls and ultimately raise prices, 
was ineffective in its objective until 1973, the year Iran took 
control of its production levels. During the 1955-73 period the 
Consortium had wanted lower prices in order to sell more, whereas Iran 
wanted higher prices - an argument for conservation could be raised 
here. When prices did increase, however, in 1973 it was argued that 
these price rises would eventually curtail demand. By 1976 when 
prices were high, and Iran was in control of its production levels, 
the country could not market its oil. Price rises had indeed 
curtailed demand as the oil companies feared. 
SOURCE 
TABLE 2.2 
IRAN'S SHARE OF CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION OF THE 
MIDDLE EAST, OPEC AND THE WORLD 
(%) 
Year Middle East OPEC World 
1955 10.3 2.0 
1956 15.8 3.0 
1957 20.7 4.0 
1958 19.6 4.4 
1959 20.5 4.6 
1960 20.2 4.8 
1961 21.3 5.1 
1962 21.6 13.3 5.2 
1963 21.7 13.4 5.6 
1964 22.3 13.9 6.0 
1965 22.7 14.2 6.2 
1966 22.8 14.8 6.4 
1967 26.1 16.5 7.3 
1968 25.5 16. 1 7.4 
1969 27.3 16.6 7.9 
1970 27.7 17.3 8.1 
1971 28.2 18. 1 9.2 
1972 28.1 18.9 9.6 
1973 28.0 19.0 10.3 
1974 27.8 19.6 10.5 
1975 27.6 19.8 9.9 
1976 26.9 19.3 10.2 
British Petroleum Statistical Yearbook and NIOC 
14 
The first step toward increasing OPEC power and influence was the 
1971 Tehran Agreement whereby there was a signficant shift of power 
from the companies and consumers to the producers. The international 
oil market ceased to be a buyer's market. The Tehran Agreement was, 
however, a negotiated agreement with the Shah representing the Persian 
Gulf nations. This agreement broke down in 1973 when OPEC decided to 
increase its prices. The Tehran Agreement was a complex agreement 
which for the first time provided for compensation to producers for 
the loss of the purchasing power through inflation and dollar 
fluctuations. In money terms it meant a major 30 per cent per barrel 
increase, rising over a five year period to 50 cents. The unilateral 
price increases, however, decided by OPEC, with Iran being the main 
advocate of these price increases, were implemented in two stages in 
the last quarter of 1973 and these were followed by continuous price 
increases in 1974. This meant that the 1971 Tehran Agreement was 
broken. The result of these price increases was that the government 
take per barrel of 85 cents in 1970 rose to $10.12 by 1975- a 
twelvefold increase in the span of five years. [6] Table 2.3 shows 
crude oil prices in Iran over selected years. 
To test whether the demand for oil is responsive to price, 
elasticities were estimated. The price elasticity of demand for 
Iran's oil was calculated by using the following formula: 
Q = aPb 
and then put into the following logarithmic form: 
log Q = log a + b log P 
Table 2.4 shows the results: 
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TABLE 2.3 
CRUDE OIL PRICES IN IRAN BY TYPE OF CRUDE AND GRAVITY 0 API 
AT KHARG ISLAND 
1954 
1957 
1959 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
(US$ per barrel) 
Year 
(29 October) 
(28 May) 
( 13 February) 
( 1 August) [a] 
(16 August) 
( 12 November) [a] 
(14 November) 
( 15 February) 
( 1 June) 
(20 January) 
( 1 January) 
( April) 
( June) 
( July) 
( August) 
( 1 October) 
( 16 October) 
( 1 November) 
( 1 December) 
( 1 January) [b] 
( 1 November) 
( 1 October) 
( 14 February) 
( 9 June) 
( 1 January) 
Iranian Light 
(34.0-34.09) 
1 .860 
1 .990 
1 .810 
1. 790 
2.170 
2.274 
2.467 
2.579 
2.729 
2.884 
2.940 
3.050 
2.995 
5.341 
5.401 
5.254 
11.875 
11.475 
12.495 
13.774 
Iranian Heavy 
(31 .0-31 .09) 
1 .670 
1 .800 
1 .620 
1 .670 
1 .630 
1. 720 
2.125 
2.228 
2.417 
2.527 
2.674 
2.826 
2.881 
2.989 
2.936 
4.991 
5.046 
5.006 
11 . 635 
11.235 
12.360 
12.258 
12.183 
13.430 
[a] Initial posting, prior to this date posted at Abadan. 
[b] From 1 January 1974 to 30 September the gravity differentials 
are 0.5 cents per barrel per 0.1° API above or below gravity 
range shown. 
SOURCE OPEC Statistic Unit, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1978, p 124 
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TABLE 2.4 
PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR IRAN'S OIL 
PERIOD log a b log P R2 
1957-67 9.468 -6.484 p 0.4168 
(7 .298) (-2.536) 
1967-77 7.021 0.267 p 0.674 
(68.34) ( 4.314) 
1957-77 6.174 0.632 p 0.487 
(33.257) ( 4.251 ) 
Note: a is the intercept parameter, b the price elasticity of 
demand, Q the quantity demanded, and P the price. R2 is 
the coefficient of regression - figures in parenthesis are 
t values. 
The results show that for the 1957-67 period the price elasticity 
of demand was -6.484. Hence as price fell the demand for oil 
increased. This shows the case the Consortium tried to make in this 
period. They believed that by keeping prices down demand for oil 
would increase. It should be noted, however, that an R2 of 0.4168 
shows that fluctuations in prices can only explain 42 per cent of the 
fluctuations in demand hence the remaining 58 per cent must be 
explained by other factors. The results for the 1967-77 period on the 
other hand point to different conclusions. In this case a price 
elasticity of demand of 0.267 shows that there is not a trade-off 
whereby one would expect demand to fall as the price rises. In this 
latter period demand rose irrespective of increased prices. The price 
elasticity of demand for the whole of 1957-77 period showed similar 
results to that for the 1967-77 period, i.e. not a trade-off 
situation. 
Of course price elasticities may reflect supply as well as demand 
factors. Price can influence demand levels, but equally supply 
rationing may influence prices. The Shah's government, however, 
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tended to disregard the latter possibility. If the Shah had 
controlled the level of production in the 1957-67 period, the output 
would have most likely been considerably higher and prices even lower. 
In contrast as already indicated if Mossadegh had remained in power 
the most likely situation would have been that prices would be higher 
and production lower than it actually was. Production may have been 
held down to boost prices, and conserve oil resources for future 
generations. 
As a result of the 1973 oil price increase, oil revenue increased 
greatly. Output, as mentioned in section 2.2, contributed to a 
greater extent to revenue up to 1973. After 1973, however, the price 
increases led to the oil revenue increase since the world demand for 
oil began to fall. As Table 2.1 shows, revenue per barrel was fairly 
steady during the 1960s apart from a slight fall in 1969 but then 
began to rise rapidly and by 1975 it reached Rials 424.0 per barrel 
which was an increase of 685 per cent since 1970. However, in 1976 
revenue per barrel began to fall again. Table 2.1 indicates that oil 
revenue increased as a result of increased production before the 1970s 
but the sharp rise in revenue per barrel in the 1970s was a result of 
the oil price rises. 
In 1974 the various components making up the price of crude oil 
were subject to some changes within OPEC that led to an increase in 
income per barrel for the oil exporting countries. One of these 
changes was the rate of royalty payments. In order to make uniform 
the royalty rate paid by the oil companies to OPEC, it was decided to 
increase the payments from 12.5 per cent to 14.5 per cent as from 
1st July 1974. This caused an increase of 11 cents in the government 
income from each barrel of Iranian light crude. The second change 
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that took place at OPEC's 41st Conference in Vienna in September 1974 
was that the royalty payments were increased to 16.67 per cent and 
this led to a further increase in revenue per barrel of light crude 
for the Iranian government. [7] 
Both income tax and royalty payments from the oil operating 
companies provided the Iranian government with a considerable amount 
of revenue. For instance in 1969 royalty payments were Rials 16,704 
million, in 1971 they had risen to Rials 29,691 and by 1973 they had 
increased to Rials 49,680 million, i.e. within four years they had 
increased by 297.4 per cent. "The royalties from the oil companies to 
the Iranian government have in a sense provided an enormous supply of 
'painless' savings which could not have been generated in the non-oil 
sector. As a result, there has been no need for domestic consumption 
to be curtailed or restricted. Both consumption and capital stock 
have managed to grow simultaneously. Sizeable additions to the stock 
of national capital have therefore taken place without the kind of 
belt-tightening and forced saving frequently suggested in the 
literature on economic development as the key for economic progress." 
[8] But what should be noted is that the excess demand in the Iranian 
economy created problems that belt tightening might have avoided. 
This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
It can therefore be said that the price increases that began in 
1973 led to an increase in oil revenue both directly and indirectly. 
Directly in the sense that income from exports and rising domestic 
consumption increased greatly; indirectly in the sense that both 
royalty payments received from the oil operating companies as well as 
the income tax (business tax) rose as a result of the price increases. 
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2.4 PRODUCTION AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS 
It was as early as the 1960s that Iran wanted increased oil 
revenue, through raising production levels in order to finance its 
development plans that were based on imported technology on a large 
scale. In 1968 Iran demanded that the rate of production should be 
according to the developmental needs of the country and population 
rather than other criterion. 
Oil has been Iran's main export item for many years. The oil 
industry's export of crude oil has contributed enormously to the 
country's foreign exchange earnings, especially since 1970 when the 
world demand for oil increased drastically and Iran ranked as the 
leading exporter in the world oil industry. But that position was not 
to last long. Soon after 1970 Saudi Arabia took the lead. Table 2.4 
shows how high a share the oil industry had in foreign exchange 
receipts. 
Export facilities are on a huge scale in Iran with Kharg Island 
being the main crude oil export terminal. The oil produced at all the 
major inland fields flows through land and off-shore pipelines to the 
Kharg marine export terminal on the eastern side of the island. The 
largest export jetty provides ten berths for supertankers up to 
250,000 dwt, in addition a sea island provides two berths for mammoth 
tankers of the 500,000 dwt class. In 1969 the first of a series of 
what were then the largest oil storage tanks in the oil industry were 
completed, each with a capacity of over one million barrels of crude. 
Since then the major tank farm on the island has grown in increments 
of millions of barrels of storage capacity. While Kharg Island is 
used as the export outlet for the production of Iran's major inland 
oilfields, at various points on the mainland shore, on o·ther islands, 
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and in the sea itself there are export terminals for Iran's off-shore 
production. Major export facilities for refined products are locted 
at Bandar Mah Shahr terminal on the Khor Musa inlet of the Persian 
Gulf. [9] 
The Consortium dominated Iran's oil exports. The share of the 
Consortium out of the total exports was 100 per cent in 1956, 
98 per cent in 1964 and by 1974 it was 87 per cent. During the 
1968-73 period all the operators experienced a high rate of growth but 
exports had slowed down by 1974-75 due to the increase in oil prices 
and a worldwide economic recession. 
As Table 2.5 shows the share of oil revenue in foreign exchange 
increased from 49.1 per cent in 1959 to 89.2 per cent in 1975. This 
large share has obviously made the Iranian economy more sensitive to 
outside effects, in particular to developments in western economies. 
This large share of foreign exchange has, however, alleviated the 
constraining influences on development that are normally exerted by 
the scarcity of foreign exchange in most developing countries. 
However, there are some disadvantages from having an abundant supply 
of foreign exchange. A favourable balance of payments can have 
drawbacks, especially for the exchange rate. In Iran's case there was 
an increase in the market rate of exchange for the rial above that 
warranted by the efficiency and the international competitiveness of 
the non-oil sector. These factors gave rise to an exchange rate which 
was too high for the domestic economy to be able to compete 
effectively with foreign producers under relatively free trade 
conditions. 
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TABLE 2.5 
CONTRIBUTION OF OIL REVENUE TO IRAN'S 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS 
Year Foreign Exchange Earnings Share of oil 
in foreign 
From oil % change total exchange, % 
(million (million 
rials) rials) 
1959 244.9 499.0 49. 1 
1960 258.7 5.6 501 .5 50.7 
1961 285.2 10.2 528.1 54.0 
1962 291 . 1 2.1 538.7 54.0 
1963 437.2 50.2 626.3 69.8 
1964 470.8 7.7 618.8 76.1 
1965 479.9 1.9 714.8 67.1 
1966 512.1 6.7 817.3 62.7 
1967 591.5 15.5 940.8 62.9 
1968 857.4 45.0 1 '175. 5 72.9 
1969 958.5 11.8 1,325.1 72.3 
1970 1 ,099 .0 14.7 1,518.7 72.4 
1971 1 '268. 4 15.4 1,690.1 75.1 
1972 2,114.1 66.7 2,733.5 77.3 
1973 2,460.0 16.4 3,337.2 73.7 
1974 4,945.0 201 .0 6,232.0 79.3 
1975 18,654.0 377.2 20,922.0 89.2 
1976 19,074.0 2.3 21 ,972.0 86.8 
1977 20,671.0 8.4 24,404.0 84.7 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Report and Balance 
Sheet, 1959-77 
As Table 2.6 shows the exports of crude oil rose steadily during 
the 1955-76 period, but exports of refined products grew at a slower 
rate during the same period and began to fall in 1972. The fall was 
from 110.3 million barrels in 1971 to 78.2 million barrels in 1976. 
This reduction in exports of refined products can be accounted for by 
the increased domestic demand as well as price factors. The increase 
in prices of refined products was more modest than that for crude oil 
as will be seen in section 2.5. If it had not been for oil exports 
there would have been a balance of trade deficit. The share of oil 
exports in total exports increased from 90.8 per cent in 1973 to 
97.3 per cent in 1977. One could argue, however, that the trade 
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deficit would not necessarily have been enormous even if oil had been 
less significant. It is quite possible that traditional industries 
could have been developed further and new light enterprises 
encouraged. If this had been done imports on large scale may not have 
been necessary. What appears to have taken place is a neglect and 
almost a destruction of traditional industries while the government 
concentrated on developing the oil industry and other heavy industries 
which did not necessarily benefit the domestic economy. 
TABLE 2.6 
IRAN'S EXPORTS OF OIL, 1955-76 
(Million Barrels) 
Year Exports of Oil % increase 
Crude Refined Total 
1955 54.7 40.5 95.2 
1956 102.6 68.6 171 .3 79.9 
1957 139.4 95.8 235.2 37.3 
1958 176.3 92.9 369.2 57.0 
1959 212.3 90.6 302.9 -18.0 
1960 246.3 99.8 346.1 14.3 
1961 306.4 83.8 390.2 12.7 
1962 340.7 101 . 2 441 .9 13.3 
1963 393.6 102.7 496.2 12.3 
1964 469.9 100.5 570.5 15.0 
1965 534.8 1 01 . 7 636.5 11.6 
1966 619.1 102.4 721 .5 13.4 
1967 783.3 103.8 887.1 23.0 
1968 859.7 107.4 967.1 9.0 
1969 1 '093 .3 113.5 1,152.8 19.2 
1970 1,205.9 115.5 1 ,321 .4 14.6 
1971 1,452.3 110.9 1 ,563 .2 18.3 
1972 1,646.4 110.3 1 '756. 7 12.4 
1973 1 '926. 6 100.4 2,027.0 15.4 
1974 1,959.8 102.0 2,061.8 1.7 
1975 1,705.4 102.2 1 ,807 .6 -12.3 
1976 1,903.6 78.2 1 ,981 .8 9.6 
SOURCE National Iranian Oil Company 
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Domestic consumption of oil increased considerably during the 
period of industrialisation. Refining capacity had to be increased to 
serve domestic requirements and several refineries were set up to 
fulfil this task. Those factors contributing to this increase in 
demand were the demands of the new heavy industries, expansion of the 
distribution and transport network, a stable political system that 
attracted foreign and domestic capital to set up petroleum-based 
industries, population increase, urbanisation, per capita income 
increase and finally the relatively steady prices held by NIOC. [10] 
Table 2.7 shows that during the 1957-74 period domestic consumption of 
oil increased at an annual rate of 12.1 per cent while the average 
annual population growth rate, during the same period, was about 2 per 
cent. Hence the latter can only explain part of the increase in 
consumption. The remaining 10 per cent must be explained by the other 
factors mentioned above. Rising domestic consumption, however, meant 
that less oil was available for exporting, as most refining was for 
the domestic market rather than for exports. Domestic consumption was 
however only a small proportion of total production of crude oil as 
Table 2.7 shows. 
The income elasticity of demand for oil was calculated in the 
same manner as the price elasticity of demand exercise already 
outlined. The following formula was used in the calculation: 
DC = aYb 
where DC is domestic consumption, Y income, a the intercept parameter 
(in logarithmic form) and b the income elasticity of demand for oil) 
and then put into the following logarithmic form: 
log DC = log a + b log Y 
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TABLE 2.8 
PERIOD log N b log Y R2 
1957-67 -1.473 1. 628 y 0.97 
(-2.374) ( 15.92) 
1967-77 4.652 0.678 y 0.98 
(20.96) (21. 93) 
1957-77 2.735 0.939 p 0.95 
(8.17) ( 18.68) 
The hypothesis in this case would be that the income elasticity 
of demand for oil would be higher in the 1970s because of the type of 
industrialisation the Shah pursued, i.e. heavy industry which implied 
an energy intensive development strategy. This was, however, not the 
case and the hypothesis is rejected. The income elasticity of demand 
for oil was lower in the latter period. In other words, although the 
absolute amount of 'oil consumed domestically increased greatly, the 
rise was not as much as might have been expected from the growth of 
income. 
TABLE 2.7 
TOTAL DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF VARIOUS OIL PRODUCTS, 1957-74 
Year Total domestic Production % increase 
consumption of crude in domestic 
(million barrels) (million barrels) consumption 
1957 16.0 263.4 
1958 18.0 301 .4 13.0 
1959 21 .0 338.8 20.0 
1960 24.0 385.7 14.7 
1961 27.0 431.9 10.3 
1962 28.0 479.9 4.6 
1963 29.0 538.1 4.8 
1964 34.0 618.1 15.5 
1965 37.0 688.2 9.3 
1966 42.0 771 .2 13.3 
1967 48.0 947.7 15.2 
1968 54.0 1 ,042 .2 12.4 
1969 61.0 1 ,231 .8 12.3 
1970 67.0 1,399.7 9.7 
1971 74.0 1,656.9 11.1 
1972 82.0 1 ,838 .5 10.4 
1973 97.0 2,139.3 18.0 
197 4 108.0 2 '197 .8 11.7 
SOURCE Statistical Office of the Distribution Department, Iran 
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2.5 PRICES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS 
The increase in Iran's foreign exchange earnings during the 
1973-77 period is mainly due to the oil price increases of 1973-74. 
The reason for this is that exports did not increase to any great 
extent. In 1975 when foreign exchange earnings from oil were 
US$ 18,654 million, an increase of 377.23 per cent from the previous 
year, export volume fell by 12.3 per cent compared with the same year. 
Prices, however, had increased by about 126 per cent from 1st December 
1973 to 1st January 1974 and from 1974 to 1975 prices increased by 
8.9 per cent. [11] Therefore this increase in foreign exchange 
earnings in the 1975-77 period can almost certainly be accounted for 
by the oil price increase. 
As stated in section 2.4 (Table 2.6) the exports of refined oil 
products fell to 78.2 million barrels by 1976 due to increased 
domestic demand as well as the increase in the prices of refined 
products. Table 2.9 shows index numbers of posted prices of refined 
products for the major exporting port, Bandar Mah Shahr. The table 
shows the large price increases of refined products in the 1974-77 
period in particular. These increases, although impressive, were less 
than those for crude oil, the prices of which were posted by OPEC. 
Export of refined products became less profitable vis a vis exports of 
crude oil. 
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TABLE 2.9 
INDEX NUMBERS OF POSTED PRICES OF REFINED 
PRODUCTS FOR THE MAJOR EXPORTING PORT 
BANDAR MAH SHAHR, 1961-1977 
Year 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Gasoline 
( 1964 = 100) 
103.8 
102.7 
1 01 . 1 
100.0 
99.8 
100.4 
100.9 
101 . 3 
100.8 
100.6 
108.4 
112.3 
138.0 
324.2 
392.2 
415.6 
437.7 
All products 
( 1964 = 1 00) 
101 . 8 
101 . 9 
101 . 7 
100.0 
96.5 
96.7 
96.0 
95.5 
94.2 
94.1 
107.0 
112.5 
139.3 
366.5 
420.3 
454.0 
479.6 
SOURCE Annual Statistical Bulletin, OPEC Statistics Unit, 
September 1979 (p 145) 
Refining capacity was increased to serve the domestic 
requirements and several refineries were set up to fulfil this 
task. By having its own facilities to serve the domestic market, 
considerable foreign exchange savings were made. Some oil 
producing countries would export crude, and for its domestic use 
they had to import the various petroleum products as they lacked 
domestic refining facilities. [12] The refineries were therefore 
a considerable advantage to Iran. The foreign exchange saved 
could be utilised to finance capital goods imports for 
development although in practice much was spent in other ways. 
Defence expenditure, for example, was greatly increased but 
Iran's need to import necessities continued. What appears to have 
happened was a saving of foreign exchange took place in one sector 
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which was utilised in another. Whether this was effective or not is 
difficult to judge. Instead of developing industries and agriculture 
to serve domestic needs, the Shah developed heavy industries that were 
much too sophisticated for the Iranian economy and society and foreign 
skilled labour had to be used. Many traditional industries suffered 
and some went into liquidation. Agriculture also suffered as will be 
shown in Chapter Five, and it has not, even now, recovered. The Shah 
also insisted upon making Iran into a major military power and 
purchased a large amount of the latest military equipment. However 
due to its sophistication, there were many instances when there was a 
lack of skill to operate the equipment. 
Before the quadrupling of oil prices, the trade deficit could not 
be offset by the oil sector. In 1969 the goods and services account 
of the balance of payments registered a $543 million deficit. Iran 
was forced to borrow all that amount in the international market. By 
1972 the external trade deficit was $5.9 billion. However, the 
subsequent rises in oil prices changed this position totally and a 
goods and services surplus emerged of $400 million. This position did 
not last long. By 1975 the overall balance of payments in Iran showed 
a deficit of nearly US$ 13.9 million. The cause of this was that 
exports other than crude oil did not grow as quickly as imports. The 
high level of oil earnings was not sufficient to balance the import 
surge that took place. As stated earlier in this chapter, Iran's 
growing dependence on imported food, large imports of arms and 
ammunitions, the fast growth of the gross domestic capital formation 
caused by the heavy internal investment programme which was 
particularly import consuming, the emergence of the newly rich middle 
class and the changing pattern of demand that favoured import of 
consumption goods, were all responsible for the upsurge of Iran's 
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import bill. The same year, 1975, foreign reserves declined by 
exactly $991 million - a figure that was close to the most pessimistic 
forecasts put forward six months earlier. During the two subsequent 
years the balance of payments account registered small surpluses. 
However, these surpluses were well below what the country could have 
achieved. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Given the importance of the Iranian oil industry for government 
revenue and foreign exchange earnings, it can be concluded that if it 
had not been for oil, Iran would not have achieved the economic growth 
it did over the 1960-77 period. 
The Shah's aim was to transform the country into a major economic 
and military power as soon as possible, especially before the 
country's reserves were exhausted. In order to achieve these great 
plans he called for an increase in the production of oil. Output 
increased steadily during the 1955-77 period. However, although there 
was a steady increase in production up to 1973 the increase was not as 
great as the Iranian government wanted. The reason for this was that 
the Consortium was in control of the production level and they were 
unwilling to expand production any further. Iran did gain control in 
1973 when NIOC took over the whole of the Consortium's operations and 
by 1974 oil production was at its peak but fell by 11.2 per cent the 
following year. The Shah's policy of increasing production at such a 
rapid pace meant that exhaustion of the country's reserves was being 
brought forward. However, the Shah believed that he had to take 
advantage of the oil price increases that took place in the 1973-74 
period. The sudden increase in oil revenue during the 1973-77 period 
had its advantages and disadvantages. One advantage was that the 
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terms of trade improved greatly. Disadvantages were that the rate of 
inflation increased considerably and the economy was unable to absorb 
such large inflows within such a short period of time due to its 
limited infrastructure and suppl1 bottlenecks. 
The production of oil contributed a great deal to the continuous 
increase in revenue up to 1973 and oil prices played a minor role. 
This trend, however, was reversed in the 1973-77 period when the 
production of oil began to slow down whilst there was a boom in oil 
prices and revenue. The oil price increases of 1973-77 were the main 
reasons for the increases in Iran's foreign exchange earnings during 
the 1973-77 period. The reason for this is that the volume of exports 
did not increase to any great extent while foreign exchange earnings 
increased enormously. 
The estimates for the price elasticity of demand for Iran's oil 
indicated that the hypothesis that the demand for oil is responsive to 
price was accepted for the 1957-67 period. When the price of oil 
fell, the demand for oil increased. During the 1967-77 period, on the 
other hand, demand rose in spite of increased prices. Similar results 
to that for the 1967-77 period were obtained for the whole of the 
1957-77 period. 
Oil was Iran's main export item for many years. The industry 
contributed enormously to the country's foreign exchange earnings. 
This was to Iran's advantage because of its increasing need to import 
both for its ambitious industrialisation programme and to meet the 
increasing demand for food and other consumer goods which were not 
sufficiently, if at all, produced domestically. The share of oil 
revenue in foreign exchange increased from 49.1 per cent in 1959 to 
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89.2 per cent in 1975. This large share made the Iranian economy more 
sensitive to external influences especially from Western economies. 
At the same time the substantial foreign exchange earning from oil 
have alleviated the constraining influences on development that are 
normally exerted by the scarcity of foreign exchange in most 
developing countries. 
The income elasticity of demand for oil was calculated and the 
hypothesis that the income elasticity of demand for oil would be 
higher in the 1970s because of the type of industrialisation the Shah 
pursued, was rejected. The income elasticity of demand for oil was 
lower for the 1967-77 period than for the previous decade. That is, 
although the absolute amount of oil consumed domestically increased 
greatly, the rise was not as high as might have been expected from the 
growth of income. 
The development of the Iranian oil industry during the 1953-77 
period has resulted in enormous increases in oil revenue and foreign 
exchange earnings. This in turn has enabled the Iranian government to 
press ahead with its ambitious development plans although, as will be 
seen in later chapters, these were not as successful as the planners 
envisaged. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
OIL REVENUE AND THE IRANIAN ECONOMY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the 1960s and 1970s the Iranian economy experienced rapid 
growth with per capita income increasing considerably. The purpose of 
this chapter is to show the contribution of oil revenue to the Iranian 
economy over the 1953-77 period. The division of oil reserves by the 
government, between the Treasury General and the Plan Organisation, 
shows the attitude the government had toward development planning. 
More than half of the revenues went to the ordinary budget in the 
1950s, whilst over three-quarters of the oil revenue was allocated to 
the development budget in the 1960s. 
The increasing emphasis on investment expenditure rather than 
current spending might be expected to raise the rate of economic 
growth. In reality it is difficult to measure how effective 
investment was, however, in promoting growth. Although the growth 
rate was 9 per cent per annum on average over the 1963-70 period and 
30 per cent per annum over the 1971-75 period, this rise merely 
reflected developments in the oil sector. Oil output accounted for an 
increasing proportion of GNP, and it was the value of the oil output 
itself, rather than the revenue from oil, that raised the growth rate. 
One aim of this thesis is to demonstrate how this in fact was the 
case. 
The Iranian government tried to use its oil revenue to achieve 
the following goals: developing the economy so that it will eventually 
become self-reliant and independent of events and developments in the 
oil sector; increasing the standard of living of the majority of the 
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population; increasing the country's national security; increasing the 
country's influence in international affairs, and maintaining, as well 
as strengthening, the country's institutional and political 
organisation. In order to achieve these goals the oil revenue needed 
to be channelled into at least four main areas, these being: 
1. Domestic investment in either private or public projects with 
positive rates of return had to be increased. 
2. Private and public consumption had to be increased in order to 
raise standard of living over a time. 
3. Discretionary expenditure by the government was needed (e.g. 
military expenditure). It was realised that this would not 
directly raise the country's productive capacity but it was 
however regarded as desirable on non-economic grounds. 
4. Investment abroad needed to be increased, as this provided 
non-oil revenue, and could be used to secure Iranian control 
over market outlets for its oil. 
In this chapter an examination will be made of whether Iran 
channelled its oil revenue into these areas and if the government was 
effective in achieving their goals. Firstly, the relationship between 
oil revenue and government expenditure will be discussed by looking at 
the state's current expenditure and capital expenditure. Secondly, 
the relationship between oil revenue and private expenditure will be 
considered, the examination covering both consumption and investment 
spending by the private sector. Thirdly, the overall effect of oil 
revenue on gross national product will be discussed. Fourthly, and 
finally, the problem of inflation in the Iranian economy will be 
looked at in the context of the earlier discussion. 
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3.2 OIL REVENUE AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
3.2.1 Government Current Expenditure 
The government has two broad options in determining the level of 
domestic expenditure financed by oil revenue. The first option is to 
develop the human infrastructure and the second is to develop the 
physical infrastructure. The latter involves capital expenditure, but 
the former often has a high current expenditure on salaries etc. The 
Shah did not strike the optimum balance between the two types of 
expenditure. There was overspending on the physical infrastructure 
which by itself was insufficient, and underspending on human 
infrastructure. A good example of this is in the field of education. 
More schools were being built and school enrolments increased 
considerably. However, quantity did not necessarily mean quality. 
There was a shortage of teachers and those who were qualified had to 
deal with a large number of students at a time. This obviously meant 
that individual students did not get sufficient attention, hence the 
quality of their education was not as good as it should have been. An 
attempt was made to do too much with insufficient resources. More 
spending on teachers salaries would have raised current expenditure, 
but this may have been useful from the growth point of view as the 
additional capital expenditure. 
Table 3.1 shows government current expenditure during the 
1960-77 period at 1970 constant prices. The table shows that 
government consumption increased on average by 12.36 per cent per 
annum during the 1960-69 period whereas during the 1970-77 period it 
increased on average by 21.36 per cent per annum, which is a 
considerable increase even by Middle Eastern standards. The greatest 
increase was in 1974 when consumption increased from Rials 260.5 
billion in 1973 to Rials 430.0 billion, i.e. by 65.1 per cent. The 
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reason for this increase is most likely due to the increases in oil 
prices which in turn led to increased oil revenue to be spent. 
TABLE 3.1 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE 
(1970 Constant Prices, Billion Rials) 
Year Government % change 
consumption 
1960 39.9 
1961 40.8 2.3 
1962 41.6 2.0 
1963 47.0 13.0 
1964 54.7 16.4 
1965 72.4 32.4 
1966 82.4 13.8 
1967 95.4 15.8 
1968 109.3 14.6 
1969 124.6 13.4 
1970 141 . 6 13.6 
1971 178.6 25.8 
1972 225.1 26.3 
1973 260.5 15.7 
1974 430.0 65.1 
1975 512.0 1 9. 1 
1976 583.8 14.0 
1977 533.2 -8.7 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Reports 1960-78 
Iran's current expenditure requirement was constantly on the 
increase during the period. The country's expenditure amounted to 
Rials 560 billion or 27 per cent of the general budget and 12 per cent 
of GNP. Much of this, however, was on military spending. Few 
countries not at war had such a high defence expenditure. The 
official government justification for such a big military build-up was 
that since the nation had almost 35 million people and was in the 
process of becoming an industrial power, it required powerful armed 
forces, both acting as a reflection of the country's own importance 
and as a means of safeguarding national security. 
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Another of the Shah's objectives was to raise the standard of 
living over a period of time. If greater facilities for education and 
health were provided it could lead to an increase in the rate of 
literacy and numeracy, the level of public consciousness would be 
raised, an increase in skilled manpower could therefore take place and 
a reasonable standard of health for the working population would be 
maintained. All of these factors would contribute to higher 
productivity, innovation and/or absorption of new techniques and 
values. 
The strategy used for the expansion of the Iranian education and 
health system appears to have been quite reasonable. In the ten year 
period between 1962-72 the total number of secondary school students 
increased at an annual average growth rate of 14 per cent from 260,000 
to 1.4 million. By 1978 this figure had increased by almost a million 
to 2.3 million. [1] The trend was the same throughout the whole of 
the education system. The state's expenditure on education began to 
rise with oil revenue and had priority over the rest of the social 
services. 
Public sector savings have almost always been the main source of 
finance for domestic investment activity in developing countries. 
However, towards the latter part of the 1960s, increases in public 
sector investments were not matched by increases in public sector 
savings - owing to large consumption expenditure outlays - with the 
result that foreign borrowings were substantially increased. This 
trend changed however in 1971 when oil revenues began to rise. 
Table 3.2 shows the division of oil revenue between the Treasury 
General and the Plan Organisation over the 1963-73 period. Oil 
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revenue was insufficient to fulfil the government's capital 
expenditure requirement, hence foreign borrowing had to be relied on. 
An example of this enormous increase in government consumption, in 
spite of increased oil revenue, is that foreign borrowing for the 
general budget was expected to be $1.2 billion or more in 1976, i.e. 
42 per cent of total revenues. It was as early as 1975 that Iranian 
official circles acknowledged that Iran could become a net borrower on 
the international money market, yet this was only one year after the 
quadrupling of oil prices. 
Year 
TABLE 3.2 
DIVISION OF THE OIL REVENUE BETWEEN THE 
TREASURY GENERAL AND THE PLAN ORGANISATION, 1963-73 
Oil revenue Share of Share of 
Treasury General Plan Organisation 
(billion (billion (% of (billion (% of 
rials) rials) totals) rials) totals) 
1963 34.5 14.2 41.2 20.3 
1964 41.9 16.2 38.7 25.7 
1965 43.4 10.8 24.8 32.6 
1966 51.9 14.6 28.1 37.3 
1967 63.9 17.1 26.8 46.8 
1968 70.6 17.2 24.3 53.4 
1969 72.4 15.2 21.0 57.2 
1970 84.7 17.8 21.0 66.9 
1971 133.1 30.1 22.6 103.0 
1972 163.1 33.4 20.5 129.7 
1973 238.2 69.1 29.0 169.1 
5th Plan 
( 1973- 6,732 2 '125 32.0 4,607* 
78) 
* Estimated by assuming that 100% of Plan Organisation's 
requirements in the 5th Plan came from oil 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Reports 1963-74 and the 5th 
Development Plan of Iran (revised), Plan and Budget---
Organisation (Tehran, 1975) 
58.8 
61.3 
75.2 
71.9 
73.2 
75.7 
79.0 
79.0 
77.4 
79.5 
71 .0 
68.0 
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In order to quantify the relationship between government 
consumption (current expenditure) and oil revenue, simple regression 
analysis was adopted. By using a simple Keynesian consumption 
function the government's marginal propensity to consume was estimated 
in relation to oil revenue. Table 3.3 shows the results. 
b 
s(b) 
t 
R2 
D.W. 
where 
TABLE 3.3 
THE GOVERNMENT'S MARGINAL PROPENSITY TO 
CONSUME (MPCG) IN RELATION TO OIL REVENUE 
DURING 1960-77 
0.52 0.52 
(0.04) (0.06) 
( 12.43) (8.84) 
0. 91 0.84 
1.47 1.62 
b = MPCG 
Gt = government's consumption 
Rt = oil revenue 
0.19 
(0.04) 
(4.80) 
0.61 
1 .25 
A marginal propensity to consume of 0.52 indicates that as oil revenue 
increases, government consumption rises by over half as much. This 
ratio, however, is not as high as one expected. Private consumption, 
which will be discussed later in this chapter, increased even faster 
and investment fastest of all. An average propensity to consume of 
0.79 was also estimated. [2] The APC is the proportion of oil revenue 
that is actually consumed. These results are in accordance with the 
Absolute Income Hypothesis forwarded by Keynes. He stated that the 
proportion of income consumed declines as income rises and that the 
APC will always have a greater value than the MPC, which is the case 
in this analysis. [3] It should be stressed at this point that 
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government consumption is related to oil revenue instead of national 
income. 
The results show that there is no increase in the b coefficient 
when oil revenue is lagged, demonstrating that government expenditure 
adjusts only slowly to changes in oil revenue. This is confirmed in 
the third and final result where a MPCG of 0.19 has been estimated. 
This shows that any sudden change in oil revenue has only a minor 
immediate effect on the level of government consumption. These 
results have illustrated the importance of oil revenue in determining 
the level of government expenditure, consumption in this case. 
The choice between present and future compensation is the same 
as the choice between consumption and investment in the present. How 
much investment should be made in the present is dependent on the time 
interval over which society wants to maximise consumption and how it 
values future consumption as compared with present consumption i.e. on 
the rate at which it discounts future consumption gains. Having 
examined the first choice, present consumption, above, the second 
choice, investment, will now be discussed. 
3.2.2 Government Capital Expenditure 
Early during the post-war period mostly infrastructure 
investments were made. These contributed significantly to the 
country's development drive by virtue of the scale of investment and 
the support thereby given to the directly productive activities. 
The heavy and continued reliance by the government on an easy 
and abundant income from oil has had it advantages and disadvantages. 
By enabling taxes to be kept at a modest level costs were kept low and 
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incentives were greater. On the other hand, however, an adequate tax 
system was not really in force, hence the government was very 
dependent on oil revenue, which in turn made Iran very vulnerable. 
During the 1955-73 period the Iranian economy was very vulnerable to 
the Consortium's actions, whereas during the 1973-77 period the 
Iranian economy was vulnerable to international oil market conditions. 
The stagnation of oil revenues over the 1976-77 period intensified the 
government's efforts towards restructuring the tax system. Less 
revenue from oil was expected at the end of the 1970s and considerably 
more from taxes and levies. 
Table 3.4 shows the contribution oil revenue made to the first 
five development plans during the 1949-78 period. The table also 
shows how the Plan Organisation increasingly had to rely on other 
sources of revenue than oil to finance their development budget. The 
government increasingly relied upon sources such as foreign and 
domestic loans - due to its oil reserves the Iranian government had no 
problems in obtaining credit facilities both domestically and abroad -
and in the 5th Development Plan taxes had increased as a source of 
finance. Direct taxes amounted to Rials 350.5 billion and indirect 
taxes to Rials 438.1 billion by the time of the 5th Development Plan. 
These figures are classified under other sources in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.5 shows gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) over the 
1960-77 period. GFCG increased on average by 9.9 per cent annually 
over the 1960-69 period as compared with an average growth of 12.4 per 
cent for government consumption expenditure over the same period. 
However, the average rate of increase of investment appears to have 
been much higher during the 1970-77 period at 25.5 per cent as 
compared with an average rate of increase for government consumption 
TABLE 3.4 
SOURCE OF REVENUE TO FINANCE THE 
FIVE DEVELOPMENT PLANS, 1949-78 
Development Plan Oil % share Government Foreign % share Others Total 
revenue bonds and domestic revenue 
loans 
(billion (billion (billion (billion (billion 
rials) rials) rials) rials) rials) 
1st Development Plan 7.8 ( 37.1) 1 .0 11 . 2 (53.3) 1 • 0 21.0 
( 1949-56) 
-1> 
0 
2nd Development Plan 60.8 (66.4) 30.8* 91.6 
( 1956-62) 
3rd Development Plan 153.0 (67.0) 14.0 57.0 (25.0) 5.0 229.0 
(mid 1962-67) 
4th Development Plan 413.0 (53.8) 131 .0 202.0** (26.3) 22.0 768.0 
(March 1968-March 1973) 
5th Development Plan 1,577.4 (47.2) 54.5 433.4** ( 13.0) 1 ,278. 7 3,344 
(March 1973-78) 
* Foreign and domestic loans and credits etc. - separate figures not available 
** Foreign loans only 
SOURCE Plan Organisation, Iran, Development Plan Reports for the first five plans (1949-78) 
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of 21.4 per cent for the same period. This increase in investment 
reflects the Shah's strategy of making Iran into a major industrial 
power and therefore investing in heavy industries with massive 
investments in capital goods. In reality most of the industries 
established were capital-intensive. Without oil revenue Iran would 
have been unable to invest so heavily. Even though the oil revenue 
did not cover the finance required for these investment plans oil 
revenue contributed greatly, and as Table 3.4 shows, oil revenue was 
the most significant source of finance in the development plans. 
TABLE 3.5 
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
(Billion Rials) 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
GFCF 
69.6 
66.7 
52.3 
59.1 
73.5 
90.4 
101 . 4 
131.2 
147.2 
163.3 
167.3 
204.1 
256.2 
290.9 
384.7 
675.7 
859.7 
909.6 
% increase 
- 4.2 
-21 .6 
13.0 
24.4 
23.0 
12.2 
29.4 
12.2 
10.9 
2.5 
22.0 
25.5 
13.5 
32.2 
75.6 
27.2 
5.8 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Reports 1960-78 
Foreign and domestic loans played an important role in financing 
the development plans although admittedly the share of these loans in 
total revenue fell in the 5th Development Plan to 13 per cent. In 
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real terms, however, there was an increase of 114.6 per cent from the 
previous five year plan. Iran became less dependent upon foreign 
loans when the increase in oil revenue took place during the 1973-77 
period, but still a considerable number of important loans were 
obtained. Table 3.6 provides a summary of major loans made to Iran 
for the purpose of directly and indirectly financing various projects 
during the 1973-74 period. 
Year 
1973 
1974 
TABLE 3.6 
VARIOUS LOANS MADE TO IRAN DURING 1973-74 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPMENT 
Lender 
International Finance Corporation 
Group of US Banks 
Syndicate of Japanese Banks 
IBRD 
World Bank 
US Consortium 
Ex - IM Bank 
1 BRD (transmission and gas 
turbine project) 
(Bandar - Shahpur expansion) 
(Agricultural Development 
Bank of Iran) 
(IMDBI) 
(Industrial Credit Bank) 
(Small and large scale industries) 
Amount 
$ 25 m 
$ 44 m 
$ 75 m 
$ 7 m 
$453 m 
$ 58 m 
$ 65 m 
$ 40 m 
$ 75 m 
$ 25 m 
SOURCE Economic Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review 
(QER), Iran (1973-74) 
It should be stated at this point that Iran also granted loans to 
various LDCs and provided aid for countries like Afghanistan. 
The investment expenditure of the state placed particular 
emphasis on the urban sector; especially investment in construction; 
heavy industries, such as steel, machine tools etc; modern service 
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activities like banking and insurance; and the latest type of 
investment in modern technology - capital-intensive as well as 
skill-intensive. Discrimination against agriculture resulted in 
agricultural stagnation, a shortage of food and agricultural products 
on the supply side, an increased widening of the urban-rural gulf, and 
growth of peasant migration to towns and cities. Was the state's 
investment strategy the most efficient one? Was Iran able to operate 
such sophisticated industry when most of the capital had to be 
imported and even labour had to be imported since the domestic labour 
force did not have the appropriate skills? The answers to these 
questions is that the Iranian population as a whole did not benefit 
greatly even though part of the economy may have. An alternative 
investment strategy may have been preferable where greater investment 
in labour-intensive industries would have taken place in order to 
utilise the factors of production such as the semi-skilled labour 
already available in the economy. This might have reduced imports 
rather than increased them, thus making the domestic economy more 
self-sufficient. This in turn might have saved oil revenue that was 
being spent on imports, hence making oil revenue available over a 
longer time span. 
Table 3.7 shows planned and actual investment by sectors in the 
first four development plans. The table indicates that investment in 
agriculture during the first three plans was fairly constant but by 
1968 when the 4th Development Plan was drawn up, only 8.2 per cent of 
total investment was to be allocated to agriculture. 
In the 5th Plan the planners used three basic criteria for 
allocating investment finance among the various sectors of the 
economy. 
. 'ty was given to industries that were involved with Top pr1or1 
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the country's relatively abundant resources. Hence, oil, gas and 
petrochemical industries were singled out for the largest share of 
funds. Relatively large sums were also given to steel and machine 
tool manufacturing and copper mining activities. Another top priority 
was infrastructure development especially of ports, communication 
systems and roads. The investments were made by the planners in order 
to overcome existing or anticipated physical bottlenecks. As far as 
the agricultural sector is concerned investment was still low in 
relation to other sectors, during the 5th Plan, although the level of 
investment in the sector was slightly raised. The third and final 
part to stress about the 5th Plan was the high priority given to 
social investment - housing, education, health, regional development 
and environmental protection. 
The total investment by the oil industry has constituted a 
significant share of the total gross domestic capital formation in 
Iran since 1955. Table 3.8 shows the capital expenditures of the 
Iranian oil operating companies during the 1954-72 period. The amount 
invested in exploration and drilling was one of two major areas of 
investment. The other was the investment in basic fixed assets. One 
can assume that these early investments were an absolute necessity for 
the development of industry. Lower investment in industry would 
undoubtedly have meant less development. The Iranian government must 
have benefited in the long run from these investments although the 
initial cost meant less revenue in the short run. This is a prime 
example of a choice being made between present and future consumption 
i.e. between consumption and investment. 
The government's marginal propensity to invest (MPI0 ) was 
estimated with the following result: 
TABLE 3.8 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE OF THE IRANIAN OIL OPERATING COMPANIES IN IRAN'S OIL INDUSTRY 
~-
- ----·-($ millions) 
Year Fixed Assets Movable Kharg Exploration Other Total 
Basic* Non-basic** assets installations and drilling investments investments 
1954-55 2.2 2.5 3.4 - - - 8.1 
1956 4.7 5.9 5.0 - - - 15.6 
1957 10.6 11 . 2 9.5 3.9 - 0.8 36.0 
1958 19.0 10.9 11 . 8 25.8 - 0.8 68.3 
1959 12.9 8.4 3.9 38.9 - 0.8 64.9 
1960 12.6 3.9 9.2 18.2 
-
0.8 44.7 
1961 16.2 1 0. 3 7.3 1.9 - 0.8 36.5 
1962 17.9 8.7 6. 1 0.3 32.8 0.6 33.7 
-1> 
1963 13.7 6.2 3.6 - 31 . 4 0.0 53.7 (]'\ 
1964 9.0 4.5 2.0 15.4 19.6 0.6 42.1 
1965 20.4 3. 1 2.5 65.0 1 5. 1 1 . 1 102.5 
1966 41.7 3.6 4.5 6.7 14.6 0.0 66.0 
1967 33.6 4.2 3.1 0.3 22.1 0.0 58.6 
1968 39.6 2.6 2.6 - 27.1 0.0 67.4 
1969 69.1 1.7 2.2 - 26.9 0.0 97.7 
1970 25.7 1.7 1.9 - 29.0 0.0 58.3 
1971 80.0 1 .2 1.7 
-
28.1 0.0 111 . 6 
1972 63.6 1 . 4 1 . 4 - 41 . 7 0.0 108.2 
* Basic refers to activities relating to oil production, refining, exploration, drilling etc. 
** Non-basic refers to activities leading to preparation, provision, maintenance and management of housing, 
sanitation, education, transport, etc. 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Reports 1965-69, 1971, 1973 
b 
s(b) 
t 
Rz 
D.W. 
where 
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TABLE 3.9 
THE GOVERNMENT'S MARGINAL PROPENSITY TO 
INVEST IN RELATION TO OIL REVENUE, 1960-77 
0. 70 0.81 
( 0.10) (0.06) 
(7.24) ( 13.0) 
0.77 0.92 
1.36 2. 01 
b = MPIG 
It = investment 
Rt = oil revenue 
-0.002 
(0. 10) 
(-0.02) 
0.0 
0.77 
The results indicate that when oil revenue increases the 
government's investment expenditure increases by 0.70 of that amount, 
which is quite considerable. Investments take time to implement, 
however, and the relationship between oil revenue and investment was 
stronger when the former was lagged one period. As far as any 
immediate change in the level of investment when oil revenue changes 
slightly is concerned the results are negligible. This is most likely 
due to the long term nature of investment. These results confirm 
Iran's dependence on oil revenue for the extensive investment plans 
undertaken during the 1960s and 1970s. The average propensity to 
invest was estimated to be 1 .04, which means that the finance from oil 
revenue alone was insufficient. This explains the reasons for Iran's 
need to borrow abroad as well as obtaining other sources of finance. 
The Iranian government was not the only party to invest in Iran. 
Over the years various foreign parties have invested in several key 
industries. In July 1973 it was announced that the Iran Overseas 
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Investment Bank Limited had been established. This new investment 
bank was set by the Industrial Mining Development Bank of Iran 
(IMDBI), Bank Melli Iran, Barclays Bank, Midland Bank, Deutsche Bank, 
The Industrial Bank of Japan, Manufacturers Hanover and Societe 
Generale. The bank was located in London and one of its prime 
functions was attracting foreign investment to Iran and financing 
schemes within the Iranian development field from overseas 
sources. [4] 
Throughout the 1955-77 period Iran continued to invest abroad 
but on a considerably lower scale than some of the Arab oil exporting 
countries such as Kuwait. Iran's population is the highest in the 
Middle East, apart from Egypt, hence there was a need for the 
immediate use of oil revenue. The investments made abroad were mostly 
short term asset holdings (US Treasury Bills, commercial bank deposits 
etc.) which could easily be cashed. The longer term investments made 
largely promoted Iran's internal or regional investments. Iran 
invested in KRUPP, the armaments manufacturing concern in West Germany 
and in a chain of retail petrol stations also in West Germany. This 
secured an outlet for Iranian oil. 
Both government current and capital expenditure are sensitive to 
fluctuations in oil revenue. However, government current expenditure 
can be more easily altered and changed than in the case of investment 
although those changes are likely to be resented since wages and 
salaries of workers are involved. The Shah implemented some highly 
ambitious investment projects, which once started, could not be 
cancelled without wasting considerable sources. Hence it can be said 
that investment is less sensitive to fluctuations in oil revenue than 
current expenditure is. 
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Now that public sector expenditure has been discussed in 
relation to oil revenue, private sectors expenditure in relation to 
oil revenue will be discussed next. 
3.3 OIL REVENUE AND PRIVATE EXPENDITURE 
In this section the relationship between oil revenue and private 
expenditure will be analysed. Table 3.10 shows private consumption 
and oil revenues over the 1960-77 period. 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
197 4 
1975 
1976 
1977 
TABLE 3.10 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION AND OIL REVENUES 
IN THE IRANIAN ECONOMY, 1960-77 
(1970 Price, Billion Rials) 
Private 
consumption 
282.9 
295.7 
309.7 
322.3 
332.6 
359.0 
390.0 
420.9 
448.9 
483.2 
537.3 
533.8 
603.3 
704.3 
771.9 
834.5 
891.5 
1 ,072. 9 
% change 
4.52 
4.73 
4.07 
3.20 
7.94 
8.64 
7.92 
6.65 
7.64 
11 .20 
-0.65 
13.02 
16.74 
9.60 
8. 11 
6.83 
20.35 
Oil 
revenues 
26.6 
26.7 
30.9 
34.5 
41.9 
43.4 
51 . 9 
63.9 
70.6 
72.4 
84.7 
133.1 
163.1 
238.2 
992.5 
828.9 
892.0 
727.0 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Reports 1960-78 
% change 
0.4 
15.7 
11.7 
21.5 
3.6 
19.6 
23.1 
10.5 
2.5 
16.9 
57.1 
22.5 
46.0 
316.7 
-16.5 
7.6 
-18.5 
It has been a great concern of many economists, planners, and 
international agencies, that although many LDCs have experienced rapid 
growth of GDP over the past 20 years this has not benefited a 
substantial portion of the population of these countries. In the case 
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of Iran this has also been the case. What is interesting in the case 
of Iran is that when comparing rural and urban private consumption as 
is done in Table 3.11, there is a considerable difference between the 
two areas. 
TABLE 3.11 
DISTRIBUTION OF CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE 
AMONG VARIOUS CATEGORIES 
Selected Years 
('000 m Rials) 
1962-3 1967-8 1971-2 1972-3 1977-8 
Urban consumption 122.9 187.2 293.0 590.3* 1 ,052.5* 
2 Rural consumption 11 0. 5 143.4 158.4 290.0* 370.0* 
3 Total private 
consumption 
( 1 + 2) 233.4 330.6 451.4 880.3 1 '422. 5 
4 State consumption 31.5 73.6 159.3 354.2 786.0 
5 Aggregate 
consumption 264.9 404.2 610.7 1,234.5 2,208.5 
* estimates 
SOURCE Based on data published by Bank Markazi, Iran (Annual 
Reports, various years) and the Statistical Centre of Iran 
The population of rural areas in the year before the oil revenue 
explosion was about 60 per cent of the total, whereas consumption in 
these areas only amounted to 35 per cent of tctal private consumption. 
It should be stated at this point that the government confined 80 per 
cent of its expenditure to the urban sector. These two facts stress 
the vast difference in real consumption per capita between the two 
sectors. In spite of this, the World Bank classifies Iran under the 
moderate income inequality group where the share of the lowest 40 per 
cent was 12-17 per cent. In 1968 Iran had per capita income of $332 
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where the lowest 4 per cent had 12.5 per cent of national income, the 
middle 40 per cent had 33 per cent, and the top 20 per cent had 54.5 
per cent. [5] 
During the 1963-73 period the major factor that did not change 
was the income distribution. The first move toward fairer 
distribution of income was made in the 1973 budget where a specific 
provision was made for an increase in minimum wages to Rials 7,600 per 
month. Per capita income began to show a considerable increase early 
in the 1973-77 period. Table 3.12 shows per capita income over 
selected years. 
Year 
1968 
1972 
1974 
1976 
TABLE 3.12 
PER CAPITA INCOME IN IRAN 
(US$) 
Per capita income % change 
332 
429 
815 
2,000 
29.2 
90.0 
145.4 
SOURCE Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review, 
1972-76 
This data does not however, give any indication of whether the 
internal distribution of income was fair or not. No such data is 
available. The urban population does, however, appear to be better 
off in terms of having basic amenities such as piped water, 
electricity, cars, radio, television, refrigerators, telephones etc. 
These amenities are more readily available in urban than rural areas. 
However, this does not mean that everybody living in urban areas was 
well off. Only a small minority of the urban population have a 
western standard of living. During the White Revolution (1963), the 
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Shah allocated land to farmers which, in many cases, was in the desert 
and impossible to irrigate. This was one reason for the great influx 
of rural people into the urban areas in search of a better life. Many 
had difficulty in finding adequate employment and instead ended up in 
shanty towns such as those south of Tehran. 
On the whole most Iranians were better off in 1977 than a decade 
earlier and by then there were indications that the benefit of growth 
had begun to penetrate deeply enough to reach most Iranians. This 
shows that in the absolute sense most people were on a higher 
income/consumption level than previously - even though the relative 
gain by various group varied widely. 
In the wake of the oil price increases the extension of free 
education, health care, broader coverage of social security, 
transportation and food subsidies, low cost housing etc, were designed 
not only to enhance the absolute standard of living of the low income 
strata in Iranian society but also to narrow the relative gap between 
the urban and rural sector. The gap, that had been reduced slightly in 
the 1959-65 period, worsened significantly during the 1965-76 period. 
These results show the inevitable consequences of rapid economic 
development under dualistic conditions, whereby the modern urban 
sector is likely to 'take-off' much faster than the rural sector. 
These results could support Lewis' model (1954) where he states that 
income is to be redistributed in favour of the class that saves and 
invests in order to ensure capital accumulation and growth. [6] Lewis 
re-emphasised the connection between growth and inequality in 1976 by 
stating 'Development must be inegalitarian because it does not start 
in every part of the economy at the same time'. [7] He maintains that 
growth occurs in enclaves within the LDC and this process can cause 
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inequalities both between the enclave and the traditional sector and 
within the enclave itself. 
As mentioned above then the urban areas benefited to a greater 
extent from the increased oil revenue of the economy than the rural 
areas did. Rural to urban migration increased considerably during the 
1953-77 period- people moved to urban areas in search of work. As 
far as savings are concerned households with low incomes normally save 
less than those with high incomes. Therefore the inequality in the 
distribution of income will generally be greater than the inequality 
in the distribution of expenditure. 
Lewis' orthodox view that inequality was essential for growth 
has been vigorously challenged by Gunnar Myrdal (1968, 1971) who holds 
the view that quite the opposite was the case. He argued that greater 
equality was in fact a required pre-condition for more rapid economic 
growth. 
' ... inequality and the trend towards rlslng inequality stand 
as a complex of inhibitions and obstacles to development and 
that, consequently there is an urgent need for reversing the 
trend and creating greater equality as a condition for speeding 
up detection.' 
(Myrdal, 1971, pp 63-66) [8] 
One can speculate at this point whether Iran's growth and 
development would have been greater and more successful than it 
actually was, for the whole of the population, had the distribution of 
income been more equal. The answer to that question is possibly that 
had the distribution of income been more equal it is quite likely that 
it would have been at the expense of growth. Savings, which are 
usually high when distribution of income is unequal, would have been 
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lower. As Table 3.13 shows then national savings in Iran increased by 
295.5 per cent from 1968-69 to 1973-74 and by 44.9 per cent from 
1973-74 to 1974-785. These large increases are explained partly by 
the uneven income distribution in Iran and the high marginal 
propensity to save of the higher income earners. 
TABLE 3.13 
IRAN'S NATIONAL SAVINGS 
(1959-60 Prices, Million Rials) 
1959-60 1963-64 1968-69 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 
National 
Savings 44.4 59.8 89.0 352.0 510.0 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Reports and Balance Sheet, 
1959-77 
572.2 
The upper and middle income groups are more likely to consume 
imported goods, however, or import intensive domestically produced 
goods, as well as indulging in wasteful expenditure (including the 
export of capital) instead of living frugally, saving and investing a 
substantial part of their income. Iran would have benefited a great 
deal if the upper and middle income groups had invested more in local 
industries that could have produced the required consumer goods. 
As stated in section 3.2 on government consumption, it appears 
that private consumption increased faster than government consumption 
expenditure. Table 3.14 below shows the estimated MPC for the 
private sector. 
b 
s(b) 
t 
R2 
D.W. 
where 
55 
TABLE 3.14 
THE MARGINAL PROPENSITY TO CONSUME OF THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR IN RELATION TO OIL REVENUE, 1960-77 
0.59 0. 61 -0.01 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06) 
(7.09) (6.66) ( -0.19) 
0.76 0.75 0.0 
1.17 0.99 0.84 
b = MPCP 
ct = private consumption 
Rt = oil revenue 
p An MPC of 0.59 shows that for every increase in oil revenue, 
private consumption increases by well over half of that increase. The 
APC for the private sector was estimated to be 2.12 which is very high 
indeed. These two results therefore prove Keynes' Absolute Income 
Hypothesis although in this case oil revenue is being used instead of 
disposable income. The APC for the period 1960-69 was estimated to be 
7.9 with a relatively low oil revenue (Rials 462.8 billion) whilst 
during the 1970-77 period, the APC was 1.5 with a much higher oil 
revenue (Rials 4,059.5 billion). These results also confirm Keynes' 
hypothesis that the APC, the portion of income consumed, declines and 
that the APC will always have a greater value than the MPC 
(APC > MPC). 
Lagging oil revenue raises the slope parameter (MPC) slightly as 
the estimate of 0.61 indicates, but the difference is insignificant. 
The final result of whether a slight change in oil revenue has any 
immediate effect on the level of private consumption is negligible. [9] 
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These results emphasise the importance of oil revenue on the level of 
private consumption. 
There was a rapid expansion in private investment after 1956. 
This expansion showed that provided finance was available, this trend 
would continue. However, there was a problem attached to this 
expansion. Much of the investment consisted of imitative 
entrepreneurship representing the expansion of existing industries. 
The problem in this area was to prevent over-investment in certain 
industries and the total lack of investment in others. In the Jrd 
Development Plan an estimate had to be made for the more important 
industries, of how much capacity was required to meet demand during 
the five and a half years of the plan. Formidable difficulties were 
involved in trying to obtain reasonably good figures in the estimation 
of future consumption. 
Private investment expenditure increased at an annual rate of 
about 7.5 per cent during the 1959-72 period. This rate of growth 
rose to 10 per cent during the 1962-74 period. By 1975-76 the rate of 
growth of private investment in plant and equipment had increased by 
157 per cent and in construction 60 per cent. Private expenditures in 
construction had increased more rapidly than investment in plant and 
equipment over the years. During the 1959-62 period when aggregate 
investment fell, real private expenditures in construction actually 
increased by an annual average rate of 9 per cent. With both 
increased public works projects and a shortage of construction 
materials, private construction activities slowed down as compared 
with the public sector in the latter part of the 1953-77 period. 
The reason for this expansion in private investment is partly 
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due to the high level of economic activity and partly due to the 
improved investment climate coupled with appropriate investment 
inducing policies on the part of the government - in particular the 
5th Development Plan where one of the policy aims was to encourage 
private investment in small scale labour-intensive industries such as 
construction. The Shah's other atten1pt to encourage private 
investment was when he insisted upon selling 99 per cent of 
state-owned manufacturing companies shares to the public in 1975. The 
same year the Ministry of Economy and Finance established a financing 
organisation to provide credit to workers wishing to purchase shares 
in the company in which they were employed. 
Most of the private investment went into the urban sector which 
left the rural areas without any chance of improvement. The Shah's 
unsuccesful land reforms, which will be discussed in a subsequent 
chapter, did not leave the rural population much option. The average 
ratio of private savings to private investment for the 1966-70 decade 
is estimated to be greater than one, which shows that generally the 
private sector was self-sufficient in meeting its own needs. 
Now that the three main components of GNP have been discussed in 
some detail, we shall proceed our discussion of the overall effects of 
oil revenue on GNP. 
3.4 OIL REVENUE AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
Until the 1950s the oil sector played only a minor role in terms 
of its contribution to GNP and government income. However, since then 
the magnitude of receipts from oil has risen steadily both due to the 
increase in the level of production and later because of substantial 
improvements in the terms of trade. 
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Table 3.15 shows the relative significance of the oil sector's 
share in GNP. During the 1960-70 period the share of the oil industry 
in GNP fluctuated from 6.9 per cent to 9.6 per cent but by 1971 that 
share had increased to 13.1 per cent. In 1974 it increased to a peak 
of 46.4 per cent and then began to fall again to 27.4 per cent in 
1977. 
SOURCE 
TABLE 3.15 
OIL REVENUE AND ITS SHARE IN GNP 
(1970 Constant Prices, Billion Rials) 
Year GNP Oil Revenue Share of oil 
revenue in GNP 
(%) 
1960 383.7 26.6 6.9 
1961 401 .6 26.7 6.6 
1962 408.9 30.9 7.6 
1963 438.0 34.5 7.9 
1964 458.2 41.9 9.1 
1965 516.8 43.4 8.4 
1966 566.9 51.9 9.2 
1967 623.7 63.9 10.2 
1968 680.7 70.6 10.4 
1969 802.3 72.4 9.0 
1970 884.1 84.7 9.6 
1971 1,015.6 133. 1 13.1 
1972 1,157.4 163.1 14. 1 
1973 1 ,467 .3 238.2 16.2 
1974 2' 138.3 992.5 46.4 
1975 2,231 .3 828.9 37.1 
1976 2,659.4 892.0 33.5 
1977 2,655.4 727.0 27.4 
Bank Markazi, Iran and OPEC Statistical Office, 
Annual Reports, 1960-78 
This overwhelming significance of oil for Iranian economy is 
both its strength and its weakness. Oil bestows enormous benefits 
such as an abundant supply of foreign exchange, and it leads to 
increases in gross capital formation, high rates of growth in the 
economy and means credit facilities become available on favourable 
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terms. However, oil revenue also brings disadvantages. The dominance 
of oil revenues in the economy can imply structural weakness. The oil 
industry did not provide much employment for the nation because of its 
high capital-intensitivity. This means that oil revenue is not earned 
as a result of factors engaged in a productive process but as a return 
on the national ownership of a scarce natural resource. This 
structural weakness may have some serious implications for economic 
behaviour. The other shortcoming is that oil is a depletable 
resource. Despite outward expressions of confidence the oil exporting 
countries feel vulnerable to possible changes in fortune. 
During the 1960-77 period Iran's economy has been among the most 
buoyant in the world. Apart from a short period in the early 1960s, 
and the 1975-76 world-wide recession, the economy has achieved 
remarkable rates of growth, attaining its highest rates during the 
1973-75 period. Oil revenues, being the main source of government 
finance, have helped to increase both public consumption and public 
investment expenditures. Government demand, in turn, has exerted a 
multiplier effect by means of credit expansion and liquidity 
injections on total private spending. 
As a result of this disproportionate growth rates among the 
different sectors, the composition of the economy and relative 
sectoral contributions to GNP have drastically changed. Due to its 
slow growth, for example, the share of agriculture in GNP dropped 
about a quarter, from 33.6 per cent in 1959-60 to 9.8 per cent in 
1975/76. Once the largest single contributor to the Iranian economy, 
the agricultural sector became totally dwarfed by the other sectors. 
The marcinal propensity of aggregate income in relation to oil 
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revenue was estimated to be as Table 3.16 shows. 
b 
s(b) 
t 
R2 
D.W. 
where 
TABLE 3.16 
THE MARGINAL PROPENSITY OF AGGREGATE INCOME 
IN RELATION TO OIL REVENUE, 1960-77 
2.2 2.17 
( 0.19) (0.28) 
( 11 . 56) (7. 75) 
0.89 0.80 
1.25 1.63 
b = MPY 
yt = GNP 
Rt = oil revenue 
0.76 
(0. 13) 
( 5.81 ) 
0.69 
1.03 
An MPY of 2.2 indicates very strongly that aggregate income 
increases by more than oil revenues. This is most likely to be a 
result of multiplier effects in the economy. The action of the 
multiplier can be illustrated by the sequence of events that follows 
the initial injection, which in Iran's case is from the country's oil 
industry. The increase in oil revenue adds to incomes which in turn 
are partly spent on other goods and services. In turn this means that 
those who produced the goods have also enjoyed a rise in income and 
they subsequently spend part of it, and so the chain continues with a 
smaller sum of income being passed on at each stage. The extent of the 
eventual increase in income is determined by how much income is passed 
on at each stage, i.e. by the MPC of the parties to this sequence of 
events. In the case of Iran the size of the multiplier is: 
K = = 1 = 2.4 [10] 
- MPC 1 - 0.59 
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There is an even stronger relationship between oil revenue and 
aggregate income when the income is lagged. There is a considerable 
change in income when oil revenue changes slightly as the MPY of 0.76 
indicates. These results are a strong confirmation of how important 
the oil industry is to the Iranian economy. 
The growth of the Iranian economy has not been without its 
problems, one being inflation. This will be discussed in some depth 
in the following section. 
3.5 OIL REVENUES AND INFLATION 
During most of the 1960s, economic development in Iran was 
accompanied by remarkable price stability (see Table 3.17). The 
reason for this price stability is partly due to the existance of 
under-utilised capacity, as a result of the recession of the 1950s and 
early 1960s. Also, it was partly because of the limited magnitude of 
oil income itself. However, as the former began to shrink and the 
latter grew in quantum jumps, inflationary pressures were intensified. 
Government spending made a significant contribution to 
inflation. Iran's rate-of inflation at the end of the 1970-77 period 
was higher than the rest of the worlds. It was not an imported 
inflation as one may have expected as a result of increased import 
prices, but a self-inflicted inflation due to the country's buoyant 
demand. The governme~t's defence spending was the single largest item 
in the budget. Spending on wages and salaries for the armed forces 
and security services increased disposable incomes but not productive 
capacity. Spending on military equipment was, however, less 
inflationary, as it was mostly imported. 
62 
TABLE 3.17 
VARIATION IN WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX 
AND OIL REVENUE 
Year Wholesale price Rate of Oil revenue Annual 
index change ( 1970 prices rate of 
( 197 0 = 1 00) billion change 
(%) rials) (%) 
1953 65.0 0.03 
1954 76.6 17.9 2.1 
1955 67.3 -12.1 1 0. 1 380.9 
1956 79.7 18.4 14.3 41.6 
1957 80.4 0.9 20.0 39.9 
1958 77.3 - 3.9 24.2 21.0 
1959 79.7 3.1 24.9 2.9 
1960 81 .2 1.9 26.6 10.8 
1961 82.8 2.0 26.7 0.4 
1962 83.6 1.0 30.9 15.7 
1963 83.6 0 34.5 11.7 
1964 87.0 4.1 41.9 21.5 
1965 89.7 3.1 43.4 3.6 
1966 88.8 - 1.0 51.9 19.6 
1967 89.0 0.2 63.9 23.1 
1968 91.5 2.8 70.6 10.5 
1969 96.5 5.5 72.4 2.5 
1970 100.0 3.6 84.7 16.9 
1971 106.2 6.2 133. 1 57.1 
1972 112.2 5.7 163.1 22.5 
1973 124.9 11.3 238.2 46.0 
1974 146.1 17 .o 992.5 316.7 
1975 157.7 7.9 828.9 - 16.5 
1976 171 . 9 9.0 892.0 7.6 
1977 201.4 17.1 727.0 - 18.5 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Reports 1957-78' and OPEC 
Statistical Office Reports 
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Another important factor that contributed to inflationary 
pressure was the increased demand for food. With an increased money 
supply and an obvious improvement in living standards of the Iranian 
people, there was an increased demand for food in terms of both 
quantity and quality. 
This increase in demand in turn led to an upward push on food 
prices. It was, however, retail margins which increased rather than 
farm gate prices, hence the rising prices did not induce greater 
supplies. Whilst the demand for food seemed to have increased at an 
average rate of 10 per cent per annum, the domestically produced 
supply of these foodstuffs was growing at about half that rate. To 
supplement local production, imports of foodstuffs increased at rapid 
rates. These averaged 200 per cent per annum for grains, 45 per cent 
for dairy products and 50 per cent for sugar. This increase in the 
demand for foodstuff was partly due to the government's subsidy 
programme which aimed to maintain relatively stable and low prices. 
Ironically as this policy stimulated demand without increasing local 
supply, the underlying inflationary problem was only aggrevated. It 
could be argued that the funds spent on subsidies might have been 
better spent on investment in domestic agriculture. However, there 
would be some time before the domestic agricultural sector could meet 
the demand and in the meantime this demand would have to be met by 
imports. 
The marginal propensity to import in relation to oil revenue was 
estimated for the 1960-77 period with the following results. 
b 
s(b) 
t 
R2 
D.W. 
where 
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TABLE 3.18 
THE MARGINAL PROPENSITY TO IMPORT IN 
RELATION TO OIL REVENUE, 1960-77 
0.40 0.46 
(0.05) (0.03) 
(8.07) ( 14.60) 
0.80 0.93 
1.62 2.14 
b = MPM, the marginal propensity to import 
Mt = imports 
Rt = oil revenue 
0.03 
(0.07) 
(0.39) 
0.01 
1.27 
The results show that there was a considerable import leakage in 
the system but not as high as expected considering Iran's increasing 
need to import in the 1970s. The relationship appears to be slightly 
stronger when oil revenues were lagged as the MPM of 0.46 shows 
compared with earlier result of 0.40. However the level of imports 
does not show any immediate change with a slight change in oil revenue 
as the MPM of 0.03 indicates. It can therefore be concluded that oil 
revenue is a significant factor in determining the level of imports. 
The high level of imports places a considerable constraint on the 
balance of payments. This constraint would only have been minimised 
if the level of imports had been reduced and domestic production of 
import substitute goods established. 
The major problem the Iranian government was faced with when 
inflation accelerated in 1973-77, was one of devising a set of 
policies that could effectively utilise oil revenues to optimise real 
increases in GNP. At the same time its objective was to contain 
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inflation at levels that were socially and politically acceptable. 
The government had already undertaken a number of policies at the end 
of the 1953-77 period in order to prevent further increases in the 
rate of domestic inflation. Each of these policies was designed to 
control price increases in the various sectors of the economy. 
Theoretically speaking these policies should be successful in 
overcoming the problem of inflation, but the Iranian government's 
success in this field has been mixed, and in general unsatisfactory. 
Monetary and income (or price control) policies were used. 
Monetary policy aimed at increasing supplies and directing investments 
into productive channels. Monetary policy was used to raise interest 
rates on deposits and advances and to restrict credit availablility to 
the private sector without diverting credit from productive 
investment. Monetary policy was also used to reduce private sector 
liquidity by issuing attractively priced securities. 
In its attack against inflation the government used incomes 
policy to control wage and price increases. Several organisations 
were used to administer this policy. The government's aim was to roll 
back prices as quickly as they possibly could to rates of increase 
10-20 per cent below the 1975 level, i.e. to levels that were more 
manageable but without deflationary pressures that would squeeze 
company profits. They were not successful in their task and by 1977 
the rate of inflation was 17.1 per cent according to the wholesale 
pric~ index as shown in Table 3.17. 
It is clearly seen in Table 3.17 how closely related the 
increase or decrease in oil revenue is to the changes in the level of 
inflation. If one looks at the 1973-77 period, for instance, then it 
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is evident that when oil revenue increased from Rials 238.2 billion in 
1973 to Rials 992.5 billion in 1974, or by 316.7 per cent, the rate of 
inflation increased from 11.3 per cent to 17.0 per cent, and when oil 
revenue fell in 1975 by 16.5 per cent the rate of inflation fell to 
7.9 per cent. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
It can now be concluded, having discussed in considerable depth 
both the public and private sectors in relation to oil revenue, that 
the Iranian economy is very heavily dependent upon its oil revenue. 
This has some advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are that 
it has led to considerable growth in the economy. Per capita income 
increased from $332 in 1968 to $2,000 by 1976, which is a remarkable 
growth. In spite of this growth not everyone benefited. Admittedly, 
there was an increase in public expenditure on various social services 
such as education, housing, health, etc. which undoubtetdly improved 
people's standard of living. However, this applied mainly to those 
living in urban areas. There was a considerable degree of 
discrimination against rural areas which resulted in agricultural 
stagnation and a shortage of food and agricultural products. In order 
to meet the increased demand for these goods Iran became a substantial 
importer of basic necessities. It is believed here that a lot of 
Iran's problems can be traced to this negligence of the agricultural 
sector. 
Investments in heavy industries increased greatly during the 
1970-77 period. Investments were primarily directed towards 
capital-intensive industries whereas Iran may have needed more 
labour-intensive industries with its relatively abundant supply of 
labour. A lot of the industries set up were highly sophisticated and 
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skilled labour from abroad had to be imported. The skills of the 
domestic labour force were not appropriate for these new industries. 
Of the various estimates made in the chapter, the most 
significant result was that for the MPY which illustrated Iran's heavy 
reliance upon oil revenue as a source of income. This was also the 
case when the MPC of the public and private sectors were estimated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY 
In this chapter investment in Iranian industry will be the focus 
of discussion especially its funding, its success, and its priorities. 
Industry in Iran developed rapidly during the 1953-77 period and could 
be considered as the backbone of Iran's future economy. 
In the post-war period Iran's industrial policy emphasised the 
broadening and intensifying of the industrial base as an impetus to 
increasing productivity and more important as a potential source of 
non-oil exports. Secondly, industrial activities were to be used as a 
ground for training a new class of semi-skilled and skilled workers 
which was essential for adopting and implementing modern technology. 
Thirdly, emphasis was placed upon utilising the comparative advantages 
of the domestic endowments, especially in sources of energy, minerals 
and metals. Finally, attempts were made to make industrial goods 
competitive both in price and quality in international markets. 
The state's industrial strategy emphasised investment in some 
heavy industrial plants such as steel and machine tools and the 
promotion of import-substitution in modern consumer durables such as 
motorcars and home appliances. In the latter part of the 1953-77 
period the petrochemical industry was established and an attempt was 
made to promote traditional arts and crafts. However, before 1973 the 
development of large scale industries was relatively slow but this 
changed after the 1973-74 oil boom. 
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4.2 FUNDING OF INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY 
In the period before 1957 most new industrial projects were 
carried out by entrepreneurs investing their savings, supported by 
some fixed investment loan facilities which were provided by a fund 
established by the government. There were also credit facilities 
which were mostly in the form of a working capital, provided by the 
existing commercial banks. 
In order to strengthen the industrial financing network and 
enhance industrial development several financial institutions were set 
up during the 1956-73 period. Entrepreneurial savings and the fixed 
investment loan facilities that were previously used to develop the 
industrial sector provided insufficient funds for the ever-growing 
projects undertaken in this sector. 
The Industrial Credit Bank (ICB) was inaugurated by the Iranian 
government in 1956. The ICB was 100 per cent state-owned and its 
activities included extension of industrial loans and equity 
participation in industrial projects. 
The second financial institution that was established was the 
Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran (IMDBI) in 1959. The 
IMDBI was privately owned with a large number of foreign bank as 
shareholders. The role of the bank was to provide long-term and 
medium-term loans as well as providing project management and 
services. Although the ICB and the IMDBI both provided finance for 
industrial development in Iran there was a clear difference in their 
operations. The ICB actually invested its funds in viable projects on 
a regional basis i.e. aided more regional development programmes 
rather than lending on an individual industrial development project 
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basis as the IMDBI did. Another point to be emphasised is that with 
its strong foreign connections the IMDBI was less likely to have been 
particularly concerned with where its finance would be going as long 
as repayment of the loan was ensured. As far as the ICB is concerned, 
however, the national/regional interest was of great importance since 
it was state-owned. 
Table 4.1 shows the industrial loans approved by the ICB and the 
IMDBI over the 1962-75 period. As the table shows there was a 
considerable increase in loans from these two industrial development 
banks over the period, the IMDBI in particular. 
TABLE 4.1 
INDUSTRIAL LOANS APPROVED BY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
(Million Rials) 
Year Industrial Credit Bank Industrial and Mining 
Development Bank of Iran 
(IMDBI) (ICB) 
% increase % increase 
1962 599 41 
1963 583 - 2.7 165 302.4 
1964 1 ,076 84.6 158 - 4.2 
1965 1 ,828 69.9 268 69.6 
1966 2,005 9.7 264 - 1.5 
1967 1 '984 - 1 .0 1 ,517 474.6 
1968 3 '132 57.9 1 ,809 19.2 
1969 4,568 45.9 1 ,360 -24.8 
1970 4,523 - 1.0 1 '31 5 - 3.3 
1971 6,823 50.9 2,864 117.8 
1972 8,117 19.0 3,547 23.9 
1973 17,373 114.0 8,229 132.0 
1974 24,205 39.3 18' 954 130.3 
1975 37,249 53.9 19,493 2.8 
SOURCES Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran and 
Industrial Credit Bank Annual Reports, 1962-75 
71 
During the 1962-69 period approved loans for industrial purposes 
by the IMDBI increased on average by 37.8 per cent whereas during the 
1970-75 period the average increase was 46 per cent. These figures 
show that industrial development accelerated as the govermnent revenue 
from oil increased with the oil price boom of the 1973-74 period in 
particular. 
Although the IMDBI is not state-owned, this relationship can be 
explained in terms of the increased willingness of the finance 
institutions to lend knowing that the increase in oil revenue meant 
increased economic prosperity that would lead to a better insurance of 
repayment. This relationship is even stronger in the case of ti,e ICB, 
which is fully state-owned. As Table 4.1 shows its lending expanded 
rapidly during the 1973-74 period when more state finance was made 
available. 
Both these lending institutions were strongly supported by the 
government through the provision of easy credit, and in addition there 
were guarantees for their borrowings from international financial 
institutions. 
The Development and Investment Bank of Iran was set up by private 
sector interests in 1973 with 79 per cent of the shares held by 
Iranians and the remaining 21 per cent being held by foreign banks. 
It~ ~stablishment was an attempt to strengthen even further the 
industrial financing network and to meet the ever growing demand which 
was generated through the increased pace of industrial development. 
The increases in government revenue had enabled the government to push 
for industrialisation at a quicker pace than before and caused a 
multiplier effect on the system. 
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The bulk of industrial investment during the 1967-77 period was 
undertaken with the assistance of these financial institutions. At 
the same time these institutions with their expertise and experience 
have been able to assist the government in their decisions on 
industrial targets and the formulation of new industrial policies. 
The commercial banking sector in Iran has never been strong and 
has never been a major source of industrial finance. The commercial 
banks were not involved in any long-term lending. Hence the 
government established the above-mentioned industrial lending 
institutions. In spite of their advantages, the establishment of 
these lending institutions only benefited the larger firms in need of 
finance for further development. The smaller entrepreneurs could only 
borrow from family circles, if at all, as they did not have any easy 
access to other sources of finance. 
The question of what promoted industrial development remains to 
be answered. Was it easy finance that promoted the development of 
industry as neo-classical economists would suggest or was it the level 
of demand in the economy that played a more crucial role as Keynesians 
believe? In the case of Iran the former seems to be the more likely. 
Finance was far from being a constraint during the 1973-77 period for 
the development of the industrial sector. Demand was, however, 
stimulated by oil revenues but development finance was directed more 
into heavy industries rather than industries producing goods to meet 
the increased domestic demand. Hence, those industries that actually 
were developed were not established as a result of increased domestic 
demand for them. Thus the Keynesian view that the level of demand in 
the economy was the crucial factor in industrial development is not 
appropriate in Iran's case. It could be said that increased demand 
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was a consequence of, rather than a cause of, industrial development. 
Since 1960 the oil sector has provided large amounts of capital 
for Iran's economic expansion. In 1963 there were very few large 
industrial establishments in Iran. By 1972 there were 6,000 large 
establishments and 220,000 small establishments. Out of the 6,000 
large establishments there were 95 that employed more than 500 workers 
and 37 with 7,000 or more. 
The Iranian bourgeoisie can be regarded as the second agent of 
industrialisation. 'The government's promotion of industry and the 
land reform programme motivated a significant number of the 
bourgeoisie to participate in the industrialisation programme. 
However, their investment was channelled into the less demanding 
section of the economy such as housing and light industry and left 
other ventures to the state'. [1] 
The third and final agent in Iran's industrialisation has been 
foreign investment. 'The only significant foreign investment prior to 
1950 was within the oil sector. The first step taken to encourage 
foreign capital in other sectors of the economy was in 1953 when the 
Shah had been reinstated in power. The Centre for the Attraction and 
Promotion of Foreign Investment (CAPFI) was set up in 1955. The aim 
of CAPFI was to channel foreign investment into areas where Iranian 
expertise was lacking. Hence, the main areas of foreign investment in 
the 1960s were in rubber, chemicals, building materials and mining. 
By the 1970s these were extended to include automobile manufacturing 
steel production, armaments and agribusiness.' [2]. Table 4.2 shows 
foreign investment through CAPFI according to type of activity during 
the 1962-77 period. 
TABLE 4.2 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN IRAN THROUGH THE CENTRE POR THE ATTRACTION AND PROMOTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
ACCORDING TO THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY, 1962-77 
(Million Rials) 
Year Rubber Phannaceutical Elect:"ical and Metallurgy Building Petrochemical Transportation Food Motor oil Mining Hotels Others 
and chemical electronic materials and equl.pment refining 
construction 
1962 5 38 - 9 301 - 33 - - 63 - 10 
1963 - 87 32 15 37 - 19 3 - 64 
1964 52 64 63 18 40 - 5 - - 27 
1965 376 126 34 28 29 - 19 50 - 146 - -
--.J 
1966 256 203 78 95 30 67 17 2 97 113 - 30 .c-
1967 70 204 20 66 1,7 52 35 7 8 159 
1968 502 223 153 128 38 37 86 19 60 274 50 13 
1969 118 274 176 283 64 2,097 77 32 10 103 30 
1970 331 21•8 244 263 77 - 245 36 64 297 95 418 
1971 155 351 276 118 74 64 76 24 22 140 55 117 
1972 118 114 195 171 23 - 99 119 2 146 63 166 
1973 233 79 191• 11 64 1 '121 1 ,027 144 - 274 24 415 
1974 1 ,209 11•0 511 1•22 201 1 ,337 22 9 - 109 52 456 
1975 654 253 251 273 169 911 675 10 - 12 14 491 
1976 244 172 1,81 1 '733 - 2,309 111 86 - - 152 1 ,2'•8 
1977 277 321 358 1 ·'•78 205 2 ,521• - 242 - 230 53 660 
SOURCE Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance Iran, Annual Financial Reports, 1962-77 
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Iran's aim was not to obtain investment finance from 
multi-national corporations as so many Third World countries aimed to 
do. Iran had plentiful supplies of capital itself. Its aim was to 
bring about technological transfers. The government set up strict 
terms for the investors. The foreign firms were only allowed to 
operate through joint ventures with an Iranian partner, either private 
or state-owned, and were only allowed to have a minority holding in 
these ventures. [3] However, in spite of only having a minority share 
the foreign firms had a managerial and technological monopoly which 
gave them more power. This was in practice much greater than their 
formal legal holding. 
The Iranian state became very dependent on these muilti-national 
firms for its industrialisation programme as it was the only means by 
which equipment could be installed and run for the development of the 
medium and heavy sides of industry. A prime example of this type of 
joint venture was Iran's co-operation with the German steel 
manufacturers Krupp. 
Credit policies favoured large enterprises and better-off 
Iranians as well as the foreign firms participating in the joint 
venture enterprises. The large enterprises benfited from subsidised 
rates considerably below the market price of money whilst small 
shopowners and crafts people were deprived even of unsubsidised bank 
credit, as their plants did not provide sufficient collateral for 
banks. They were in general not eligible for normal bank rates of 
about 12 per cent and had to borrow in the bazaar at rates of 25 to 
100 per cent. 
Now that the funding of investment in the industrial sector has 
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been discussed actual investment will be considered next. 
4.3 ACTUAL INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE 
It was not until the late 1950s that the Iranian government 
started a fairly extensive investment programme of infrastructural 
facilities as well as some consumer goods and building material 
industries. The government was hoping that its investment would 
encourage the private sector to invest. 
However, modern industrialisation did not materialise until the 
mid-1960s when a new socio-economic framework was created which was to 
lead to massive investment by both the public and private sectors. 
This new framework emphasised rapid industrialisation and the building 
up of a diversified and self-sustaining industrial base in order to 
broaden the economy's productive capacity. 
'In the 1960s whilst private investment began to rise in the 
industrial sector the government began to divest its holdings in the 
consumer goods industries by selling its shares to the private sector. 
At the same time the government was redirecting its investment towards 
large-scale industries such as integrated steel mills and other metal 
smelting, petrochemicals, heavy engineering, machine tools, tractors, 
pulp and paper and electronics.' [4] 
Table 4.3 shows capital investment in industry and mines by the 
government and the private sector. The table shows that private 
investment in industry has been considerably higher than government 
investment since 1968. Whilst private investment increased at an 
average rate of 32.7 per cent over the 1968-74 period government 
investment increased at an average rate of 29.5 per cent. Government 
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investment, however, fluctuated greatly during this period and 
actually decreased during the 1970-72 period. In 1974 there was an 
increase in government investment of 133.3 per cent from the previous 
year which is most likely due to the increase in oil revenue recorded. 
TABLE 4.3 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY AND MINES, 1961-74 
(Million Rials) 
Year 
3rd Plan 
(1961-67} 
4th Plan 
( 1968-72} 
( 1968} 
( 1969} 
( 1970} 
( 1971 } 
( 1972} 
5th Plan 
(Projected} 
(1973-78} 
( 1973} 
( 1974} 
Private 
(30.5} 
( 183.6} 
22.7 
31.7 
36.2 
46.6 
46.4 
57.0 
109.0 
2 
Government 
(34.5} 
( 116.4} 
16.6 
22.3 
28.5 
25.8 
23.2 
23.4 
54.6 
3 
Total 
(65.0} 
(300.0} 
39.3 
54.0 
64.7 
72.4 
69.6 
80.4 
163.6 
2 to 3 
% 
(53. 1} 
(38.8} 
42.2 
41.3 
44.0 
35.6 
33.3 
29.1 
33.3 
SOURCE Iran Past, Present and Future, Aspen Institute/Persepolis 
Symposium, 1976, p 106 
Table 4.4 shows in some detail the sectors of industry in which 
the government invested. It is clearly seen that emphasis has been 
placed upon investment in heavy industries such as metals (steel}, 
chemicals and mining. Less attention has been given to the food 
industry, handicrafts and the electric and electronic industries. 
This could partly explain Iran's increasing need to import goods that 
otherwise could have been produced domestically if further investments 
would have been made in these areas. 
TABLE 4.4 
GOVERNMENT DISBURSEMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING AND MINING 
(Million Rials) 
Year Food Chemicals and Non- Basic Mechanical Transportation Electric Handi- Wood Other Technical Industrial Mining 
petrochemicals metallic metals industries industries and crafts works industries aid credit 
minerals electronic 
industries 
1968 992* 5,759 - 4,525 1 ,458** 205 164 2,244 251 
1969 1 ,260 8,102 - 9,414 2,644 196 176 1 '100 231 
1970 1 ,228 6,007 - 1 ,664 3,006 142 161 1 ,094 223 
1971 1 ,383 2,178 - 15,668 2,026 180 294 1 ,697 358 
1972 993 2,200 - 13,237 1 ,598 209 1•24 2,372 858 
1973 317 2,419 510 10,404 1 ,558 424 271 30 899 165 1 '750 6,500 --.1 
1974 1 ,059 6,119 2,000 14,718 2,552 3' 154 1 ,000 246 3,763 420 28,770 15,201 OJ 
1975 1 ,520 18,347 3,504 22,696 6 '155 4,248 2,410 1 ,006 4,752 404 20,000 18,353 
1976 3,791 8,333 4,702 31 '189 5 '711 5,716 1 ,650 3,708 6 '175 512 10,750 11 ,820 
* 1968-72 figures include tobacco 
** Separate figures for these three categories for 1968-72 not available, i.e. mechanical industries, transportation industries 
and electric and electronic industries. 
SOURCE Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, Annual Reports, Tehran 
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However, the government increased its assistance to the private 
sector as the data for industrial credit indicates. It is interesting 
to see how investment in each sector increased in 1974 after the 
1973-74 oil price boom. It is quite obvious that increased oil 
revenue has had a significant impact on the level of investment in 
industry. 
Table 4.5 shows investment in machinery and industrial and mining 
equipment. The data indicates that Iran was heavily dependent on 
imports of machinery as the domestic market was only able to produce a 
fraction of the machinery and equipment that was required for the 
newly-established industries. The consequences of these imports will 
be later discussed in section 4.5 on investment priorities. 
To emphasise the extent of the diversification of the Iranian 
economy it is necessary to look more deeply into each sector. In 
industry a host of new industrial goods, ranging from automobiles and 
home appliances to sheet glass, were being produced. 
In 1965 the Iranian and Soviet governments signed an agreement 
which led to the inauguration of the country's first steel mill. 
Since then the agreement has been extended to include aluminium and 
copper, in addition to iron and steel as well as machine tools and 
other sophisticated equipment. Iran's largest steel mill is located 
at Esfahan, with a capacity of eight million tonnes per year in the 
late 1970s. The plant was equipped with converters as well as 
continuous casting and rolling mills to produce annually a variety of 
steel products including bars, plates, rails and sections, wire etc. 
During the 1967-77 period further mills were established to meet the 
increasing demand, in particular from the construction and automobile 
industries. 
TABLE 4.5 
INVESTMENT IN MACHINERY AND INDUSTRIAL AND MINING EQUIPMENT 
(Million Rials) 
Year Imports Domestic Investment in % change Total investment Ratio of 
production machinery and in machinery and column 3 
industrial and work equipment to column 5 
mining equipment % 
1963 4,417 118 4,535 -22.3 16 '331 27.8 
1964 5,966 203 6' 169 36.0 22,574 27.3 
1965 10,665 465 11 '1 30 80.4 29,860 37.3 OJ 
1966 13,433 642 1 4 '075 26.5 36,087 39.0 0 
1967 21 '971 725 22,696 61 .3 48,314 47.0 
1968 24,710 784 25,494 12.3 54,596 46.7 
1969 27,720 903 28,623 12.3 61,712 46.4 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Reports, 1963-69 
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With assistance from Czechoslovakia the Tabriz Machine Tool 
Company, with a production capacity of 8,000 tonnes, was built. The 
plant produced a variety of machine tools such as compressors, 
electromotors and high pressure valves. Another machine tool plant 
was built at Arak with the assistance of the Soviet Union with a 
capacity of 30,000 tonnes. This plant produced during the 1975-76 
period more than 9,000 tonnes of heavy engineering equipment such as 
mining cars, industrial boilers, castings, cranes and conveyors and 
pressure vessels. Finally the Ahvaz Pipe Manufacturing Company should 
be mentioned. An affiliate of NIOC, it was set up with the assistance 
of the International Finance Coporation, its capacity being 360,000 
tonnes of pipes per year. The Ahvaz mill was used to produce the 
pipes for the gas trunkline from the oilfields in the south of Iran to 
the Soviet Union. 
'The Iranian automotive industry was established in 1945 when a 
truck and bus body plant was set up to offset the dwindling foreign 
supplies brought about by World War II. All automobiles were imported 
until 1958 when foreign manufacturers were given licenses for the 
manufacture or assembly of automobiles in Iran. By 1976, there were 
ten major plants in Iran employing about 20,000 workers and producing 
90,000 passenger cars, 2,400 buses, 10,500 trucks, 30,000 vans and 
5,400 mini-buses, stationwagons and ambulances. The key components 
were imported but over half of the required parts were domestically 
produced such as the chassis, bodies, tyres, radiators and 
batteries.' [5] 
The automobile industry is Iran's largest private industrial 
undertaking with over $3 billion of investment but it never met 
domestic demand. The rapid growth of the industry has however created 
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a number of other industrial activities for the production of the 
various components, spare parts and related services. [6] 
The NIOC and government officials began to make plans in the 
mid-1960s to establish a petrochemical industry in order to create a 
reasonable export sector for the future. This was a very costly 
project which required extensive technological know-how and a vast 
amount of capital. What was not realised however was the time 
required to become a serious contender in the world petrochemical 
market turned out to be much greater than expected. By 1977 the 
petrochemical industry had not established itself as a major market 
force. [7] 
Over the 1963-78 period the state invested a considerable amount 
in water and power although that amount was only a small proportion of 
the government's total investment. Expensive hydro-electric dams were 
built, and conventional power stations were imported and put into 
operation. Large nuclear power stations were ordered but only partly 
installed and never put into use - another wastage of the state's 
funds. [8] 
Iran's oldest and most extensive light industry is the textile 
industry. In 1960 there were 57 medium size textile mills and a large 
number of smaller ones. 'Approximately 99 per cent of the factories 
were privately owned but the handful of government run mills were 
among the largest and accounted for about 20-25 per cent of the 
industry's capacity and workforce.' [9] 
The textile industry has not been as efficient as expected. 
Considerable investment was made in the industry during the 4th and 
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5th Plans, which led to an increase in employment. However the bulk 
of employment in the industry was concentrated in the medium and small 
size privately owned mills. A survey carried out in Esfahan showed 
that most equipment was not in working order. Most spindles required 
repair and rebuilding, technical supervision was deficient, machines 
were improperly handled and labour discipline and moral was low. [10] 
New mills were built with new machinery whilst machinery in existing 
mills was not replaced or repaired. 
Now that actual investment has been discussed in some detail the 
efficiency of investment expenditure in industry will be examined 
next. 
4.4 EFFICIENCY OF INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE 
Table 4.6 gives some indication of how efficient the various 
sectors of industry have been during the 1971-75 period when both 
private and government investment expenditures were at their peak. 
The industries stated above are the most important industries that 
have been established or developed since 1964 and give a fair 
representative picture of the industrialisation strategy of the state. 
The table shows that textiles had the largest total output in the 
group of modern, but not necessarily recent, manufacturing industries. 
By 1975 the oil revenue explosion of 1973-74 had altered this trend 
significantly. The share of the motor vehicle industry had increased 
very rapidly to 21 .6 per cent whilst textiles lost its dominant 
position with a share of only 13.5 per cent. The new industries had 
very little export potential. The future prospects of these 
industries were rather gloomy and totally dependent on the domestic 
market which in turn depends on the income from oil revenue as well as 
Year Textiles 
2 
1971 19.7 17.8 
1972 22.2 17 .o 
1973 25.0 16.4 
1974 26.8 15.0 
1975 28.0 13.5 
1 
2 
'000 m Rials 
% share 
Motor Sugar 
vehicles 
1 2 1 2 
16.2 14.6 11 .3 10.2 
20.6 15.8 11.4 8.7 
26.3 17.3 11.9 7.8 
35.0 19.5 12.9 7.2 
44.8 21.6 13.2 6.3 
TABLE 4.6 
OUTPUT OF SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 1971-76 
(1969 Constant Prices) 
Basic Tobacco Home Vegetable 
metals appliances oil 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
9.8 8.8 9.6 8.6 7.0 6.4 7.0 6.4 
12.8 9.8 9.5 7.3 8.7 6.7 7.6 5.8 
14.1 9.3 9.9 6.5 11 .4 7.5 7.8 5.1 
16.0 8.8 10.9 6.1 13.5 7.5 9.7 5.4 
19.5 9.4 12.0 5.8 17.3 8.3 10.7 5.1 
* 'Others' are ten more industries taken together. These are in descending order of the value 
of their output in 1971: shoes, tyres, electrical accessories, drugs, paint, leather products, 
non-alcoholic beverages, alcoholic beverages and glassware 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Report, 1975-76 (Persian Edition) Table 50 
Cement Radio, TV, Petro- Toiletries Others* 
Telephone chemicals 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
4.0 3.6 3.8 3.5 3.6 3.2 3.3 2.9 15.5 14 .o 
4.8 3.7 4.8 3.7 4.8 3.7 3.9 3.0 19.3 14.8 
5.0 3.3 6.4 4.2 5.9 3.9 4.3 2.8 24.2 15.9 
6.6 3.7 9.2 5.1 5.7 3.2 5.3 3.0 27.6 15.4 
7.8 3.8 10.0 4.8 5.9 2.8 5.8 2.8 32.8 15.8 en -l> 
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the state's strategy in dispersing this revenue. 
Total employment in the above stated industries grew from less 
than 120,000 persons in 1971 to over 170,000 employees in 1975. This 
is however only a small proportion of the total workforce which has 
been 2.5 million on average since 1971. Modern manufacturers employed 
an average 150,000 workers, or 6 per cent of the industrial labour 
force. This is a strong indication that modern, especially new, 
industries, were significantly capital-intensive. The traditional and 
semi-traditional industries contributed 35 per cent of manufacturing 
and mining output, and employed 65 per cent of the total industrial 
workforce. 
Relative efficiency in industry can be measured by using the 
ratio of output to labour employed. This has been done in Table 4.7 
over the 1971-75 period. 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
TABLE 4.7 
RELATIVE EFFICIENCY IN INDUSTRY AS MEASURED BY 
THE RATIO OF OUTPUT TO LABOUR EMPLOYED 
(US$, $ = 72 Rials) 
Annual 
output 
1 
15,389 
18,111 
21 '138 
24,889 
28,861 
% change 
17.7 
16.7 
17.7 
16.0 
Number of 
workers 
2 
128,365 
137,955 
149,811 
161,114 
170 '999 
% change 
7.5 
8.6 
7.0 
6.1 
Ratio 
1 X 100 
2 
12.0 
13. 1 
14. 1 
15.5 
16.9 
SOURCE Based on Table 4.6 and Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Reports 
1971-78 
The ratios over the 1971-75 period are fairly high indicating 
that the ratio of machines to men is most likely to be high also. In 
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other words these industries are capital-intensive rather than labour 
intensive. Table 4.7 shows that industry is relatively efficient. 
However, when considering the large increase in investment in the 
sector during the 1973-74 period it is quite clear that these 
increases did not give an immediate rate of return. The reason for 
this is that the capital equipment purchased was often complicated to 
use and there was not a sufficiently skilled workforce to operate them 
efficiently. Secondly, investment was directed into heavy industry 
such as petrochemicals which was very costly and would not give an 
immediate rate of return. 
Table 4.8 gives a further indication of how Iranian modern 
industries have developed from the workers point of view. 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
TABLE 4.8 
OUTPUT PER WORKER AND EARNINGS PER WORKER IN 
MODERN MANUFACTURING, 1971-75 
Annual output 
per worker 
1 
11 '988. 4 
13 '128. 3 
14,110.0 
15,448.0 
16,877.9 
(US$, $ = 72 Rials) 
Annual earnings 
per worker 
2 
1,230.3 
1,414.4 
1 ,670.1 
2,022.0 
2,756.1 
Weekly earnings 
per worker 
3 
23.7 
27.2 
32.1 
38.9 
53.0 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Reports, 1971-77 
Ratio 
2 X 100 
1 
10.3 
10.8 
11.8 
13. 1 
16.3 
The first column shows labour productivity and the second and 
third refer to the workers' annual and weekly earnings. Column three 
shows rather impressive results but how realistic are they? There 
appears to be an increase of 123.6 per cent over the period in weekly 
earnings, that is workers' earnings increased from $23.7 in 1971 to 
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$53.0 in 1975. But these figures can be misleading. First of all, 
the data used for workers earnings were not adjusted for the high rate 
of inflation during this period which was not less than 150 per cent 
over the five year period. Secondly, the inflation rate for food and 
accommodation on which the workers spent most of their income was 
considerably higher than the general rate of inflation. Thirdly, the 
data used for average earnings was for all employees from directors to 
doorkeepers, hence including the abnormally high salary earnings of 
the managerial, administrative and technical staff. The average 
earnings of the ordinary unskilled worker were much lower than the 
third column indicates. This is particularly the case during the 
latter years of the stated period when modern skilled personnel became 
even more scarce, hence strengthening their bargaining position. 
Lastly, the figures used refer to total wages and salaries as well as 
all other benefits like bonuses and shares in the firm's profits. 
However, Table 4.8 does give some indication of the distribution 
of the product between capital and labour in a few selected industry. 
Column four shows the workers' annual earnings as a percentage of 
annual output. The workers' share increased from 10.3 per cent in 
1971 to 16.3 per cent in 1975. These figures indicate that the 
workers share has increased no more than the rate of inflation over 
this period since the output data used was in constant 1969 prices 
whilst earnings data reflected the purchasing power in each individual 
year. To summarise the worker's share was about 10 per cent of 
output. These results are far from showing any significant increase 
in efficiency in industry. In fact, the increase in earnings to 
output ratio may reflect inefficiency within the manufacturing 
industry. The industries used in this analysis were the most 
privileged and fastest growing industries. Considering the amount of 
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investment put into these industries one can conclude that the rate of 
return for the economy as a whole has not been very high. There are 
no accurate figures on profits in Iranian industry available but both 
Iranian (private) and foreign investors did benefit considerably from 
the growth of industry. Iranians made sure they utilised the 
governments facilities as much as possible and as far as foreign 
investors are concerned they reported rates of return up to 40-50 per 
cent per annum on Iranian ventures. 
The question of whether the optimum investments were made in 
terms of benfiting the economy as a whole will be discussed in the 
following section. 
4.5 INVESTMENT PRIORITIES 
The Iranian government stressed the broadening of the process of 
industrialisation by developing heavy capital-intensive industries 
which the private sector could not set up by itself due to the 
enormous amount of capital required to do so. The government believed 
that by doing this it would simultaneously provide incentives for the 
private sector to invest in consumer durable industries that required 
less capital. 
Whether the government's policies were the correct ones or not 
can be debated. The main form of expansion of industry took place in 
capital-intensive import substitition industries but the small 
labour-intensive units remained dominant in employment terms. By 
1976, a mere 17 per cent of the labour force worked in 6,000 
manufacturing units with ten or more people. The development of 
modern industry led to a move from labour-intensive units to 
capital-intensive ones, yet the major industrial expansion took the 
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form of a rapid expansion in the artisanal sector despite government 
policies. The government had discriminated against the artisan sector 
which was a part of the bazaar economy. In spite of this 
discrimination this sector showed considerable growth, which is a 
strong indication of its vitality to the Iranian economy. In contrast 
the protected modern sector did not perform well. The artisanal 
sector used its labour effectively although productivity per workers 
was low as a result of the high contribution of labour to the final 
product. There appears, however, to have been considerable wastage in 
the capital-intensive sector. A good example of this is that whilst 
it takes 25 hours to assemble a GM Chevrolet in West Germany, it takes 
45 hours in Iran. 
However, what may be of economic disadvantage may be of social 
advantage as in the case of the artisanal sector. Socially the 
employment creation brought benefits although economically too many 
people were employed, which resulted in high factor costs. In the 
artisanal sector wages were low and due to discrimination against the 
sector, people began to move into other areas in search of higher 
wages. These were provided in the government sector and the modern 
industries. If this trend had not taken place the artisan sector may 
have been even more prosperous than was the case. 
The industrial sector had been protected by very high tariffs. 
However, instead of using this to allow domestic industry to establish 
itself so that it could eventually compete in the international 
market, these tariffs became more of a permanent feature than a 
temporary measure. It cannot be denied however, that the tariff 
protection did have positive effects on Iranian industry. 
Nevertheless Iranian manufactured goods tended to be more expensive, 
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25-33 per cent higher in 1972, than the average world price. The 
post-1973 inflation rate increased this gap even further. 
An official West German report, published in 1974, gave the 
following judgement on Iran's high import component in industry: 
'Iranian industry produces at too high a price and is not 
internationally competitive. The reasons for this lie in the high 
dependence on imports, low level of value added, inappropriate plant 
size and inadequate project planning. Whereas the intention was to 
replace imports and to save foreign exchange, the establishment of 
enterprises that are restricted to the technologically relatively 
simple final stages of production, such as the assembly of cars, 
radios and electric domestic appliances, had led to a disproportionate 
increase in the need to import the necessary components.' [11] 
This inefficiency represents a significant and permanent loss of 
resources for the Iranian nation and it most certainly has reduced the 
possibilities of increasing exports to meet foreign exchange 
requirements when oil revenue falls. This has been the main weakness 
of Iranian industry. One problem was that Iran's imports of consumer 
non-durables increased rapidly. The reason for this is that 
government policies favoured, since the 1960s, private production of 
relatively expensive consumer durables. Hence, domestic demand for 
basic consumer goods, such as food etc. had to be met by increasing 
imports. 
As far as the capital-intensive industries were concerned Iran 
experienced a considerable shortage of skilled labour. This resulted 
in a large inflow of foreign technicians and workers. The skilled 
foreigners were paid higher salaries than Iranians and they pushed up 
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the price of scarce housing. This led to great resentments in the 
country. What Iran needed were massive training programmes to be set 
up by the private sector and government, in order to step up the 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of labour training. 
In spite of all these inadequacies and inefficiencies the 
government policies did produce some positive results. The rate of 
industrial growth, during the 1960-74 period, was one of the highest 
in the world and with the impact of increased oil revenue in 1974, the 
growth rate was even greater. However, the question was how long was 
this trend to last. The government's policy priorities, to continue 
its emphasis on western style industries, does not seem to have given 
very encouraging long term results. Small crafts and industries that 
contributed to production and employment were not developed, hence 
leading to an increased import bill. What would have benefited the 
Iranian economy more was if the government had emphasised the 
development of existing industries as well as the inauguration of 
modern lighter industries by taking advantage of its large labour 
force rather than heavy capital-intensive industries that led to minor 
increases in the level of employment. 
The Iranian government had taken on a too difficult task in its 
attempt to develop heavy industries in an economy which did not have 
sufficient management and technical know-how. Also the import 
substitution policy pursued led to increased imports rather than 
reducing them. The reason for this was, as stated above, that 
expensive consumer durables were produced instead of basic consumer 
goods which the government should have invested in on a large scale 
and developed. In other words there was a case of misallocation of 
finance. Emphasis should have been placed on developing more 
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traditional industries which were the comparative advantage industries 
in the case of Iran rather than new industries. The latter were at a 
cost disadvantage and Iran most certainly lacked expertise in these 
fields. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Now that investment in industry has been examined it can be 
concluded that the government's attempt to develop the sector has had 
both positive and negative effects. The positive effects were that 
industrial growth rates in Iran were amongst the highest in the world, 
many new industries were established such as petrochemicals, which 
supplied the domestic market with produce which otherwise would have 
been imported. The negative effects were that most of the newly 
established industries were highly capital-intensive, and hence did 
not create sufficient employment for the local population. There was 
an increasing need for skilled workers in order to operate these 
highly capital-intensive industries and foreign skilled workers had to 
be 'imported'. 
The various schemes set up to encourage and assist in developing 
the industrial sector benefited mostly larger firms, and small 
businesses were not given any signficant assistance to enhance their 
activities. Oil revenue found its way both directly and indirectly 
into the industrial sector. Directly through the lending institutions 
like ICB anbd IMDBI and indirectly through the private sector. 
There was a noticeable increase in investment after the 1973-74 
oil price boom both in the private and public sectors. There was a 
large increase in investment in the automobile industry in particular, 
as well as in other heavy industrial activities. Investments in 
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sectors such as the food industry did not, however, increase on the 
same scale. This is the area the government should have concentrated 
more upon. Instead of wasting valuable funds on nuclear power 
stations that were never put into use, investment in the basic 
consumer goods industry should have been emphasised. The government 
had set out to develop industries that would provide future export 
potential, but by the end of the 1953-77 period there were no signs of 
this aim being achieved. The sector's output was only sufficient to 
partly supply the domestic market, let alone compete on an 
international level. Iranian industry has far to go yet before it can 
substitute for the income that the oil sector provides. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE 
Iran's agricultural sector remains the least developed sector of 
the economy. Out of the country's total land area of 165 million 
hectares a mere 12 per cent has been cultivated, and of this up to 
half has been left fallow at any time due to the persistence of 
traditional farming methods. A mere 5 per cent, 8 million hectares, 
was permanently cultivated. Some Iranian officials did claim, 
however, that 20 million hectares were cultivatable without taking 
into account the shortage of water. Estimates have shown that a mere 
500,000 hectares enjoy complete irrigation and that only 4.5 million 
hectares are potentially irrigable. [1] 
The main factors that have limited the scale of agricultural 
production are inadequate infrastructures (i.e. road and rail 
communications that limit access to markets) primitive production 
techniques as well as poor seed, and finally inadequate investment. 
Agriculture received low priority in development plans, even in the 
Fifth Plan (1973-78). Actual investment in the sector was mostly 
absorbed in several major dam systems that were designed mainly to 
meet urban needs. As well as this type of investment, public 
expenditure was diverted after 1963 to the land reform programme. The 
main objective of the Shah's White Revolution was the termination of 
the prevailing land tenure system. The land reform was carried out in 
three phases and led to the transfer of titles to almost 800,000 
families. In addition to the land redistribution aspect, the land 
reform programme aimed to stimulate agricultural growth by increasing 
productivity and replacing old subsistence farms with new 
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market-orientated enterprises. Also, the joint stock Farm Corporation 
Bill, which the parliament passed in December 1967, sought to merge 
smallholdings into large units. One of the main weaknesses, however, 
of the land reform was that it did not provide land for those landless 
farm workers who were not farm operators. 
Roughly half of the country's 35 million population live in the 
countryside in approximately 60,000 villages. About three quarters of 
these rural dwellers occupy family-owned land which is typically 
between four and ten hectares. By contrast, farming units of 52 
hectares or more support a mere 7 per cent of rural farm families and 
account for 16 per cent of all agricultural land. Out of the 5.7 
million rural workforce about 60 per cent are engaged in agricultural 
activities, highly seasonal work with a low income. Many also seek 
employment in crafts and construction. 
More and more farmers have been drawn into the cash economy but 
at the end of the 1953-77 period, the majority of farmers still 
produced at or near substantial level. There were limited 
opportunities for mechanisation or modern system of seeding, 
irrigation, harvesting or marketing. This was partly because 
settlements were scattered, and holdings small and fragmented. [2] 
Four different types of organisations were established during the 
implementation of land reform to overcome the problem of smallholding 
size and assure sufficient economic organisation. These were the 
rural co-operative societies, farm corporations, agribusinesses, and 
production co-operatives. 
As the institutional environment determined both the way in which 
funds were disbursed, and investment efficiency, it is perhaps 
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appropriate to say something about the organisation of agriculture at 
this point. At the start of the land reform, priority was given to 
the setting up of rural co-operative societies as an instrument for 
organising small farmers. The major functions of these societies were 
to provide credit facilities at relatively low rates of interest, to 
build local and regional warehouses for storing and distributing 
consumer goods, agricultural inputs and outputs. The co-operatives 
also purchased the surplus production of their members and sold it in 
major wholesale markets in order to protect individually weak sellers 
from excessively unfair dealings with middlemen. 
The farm corporations were based on large scale consolidation of 
lands and exploitation of land and water with intermediate or high 
level technologies depending on the type of production as well as the 
availability of manpower. The farm corporations were set up by asking 
the farmers to exchange their titles to lands for shares in the 
corporation. The amount of shares issued to members depended on the 
value of each farmers land. These corporations were operated and 
managed on a similar basis to that of industrial corporations, the 
only difference being that the managers, technicians and accountants 
were employed by the government. The government financed the 
investments in modern irrigation, drainage, and road building as well 
as other village infrastructure and technical training. As compared 
with the rural co-operative societies, the farm corporations required 
considerably more govenment involvement in terms of capital and 
technical manpower. [3] 
Agribusinesses were established to solve the problem of water and 
soil management in arable lands under new dams. They were large 
undertakings of a strictly commercial nature. The government granted 
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30 year leases, based on the 1968 Law Governing Establishment of 
Companies for the Developmpent of Lands Downstream of Dams, to foreign 
and domestic agribusiness companies. [4] Areas recognised as an 
'agricultural pole of development', which were basically lands under 
the dams or group of wells that could be developed through a modern 
irrigation system, were provided by the government with a general 
master plan for development including the production pattern. Small 
farmers had to sell their land to the government for land 
consolidation, land levelling and construction of irrigation canals. 
Having done that the government would either rent the land to private 
agribusiness companies or organise state companies for its 
exploitation. Most areas which were allocated to private or state 
agribusiness had relatively low population/land ratios. With the 
emphasis on capital, technology and management, Iranian agribusinesses 
attracted foreign investors. 
Finally, production co-operatives are similar to that of the farm 
corporation model in terms of its objectives, cultivation methods and 
the level at which the government is involved. The only difference 
between these two is the farmer's right of ownership. In the case of 
production co-operatives the farmer keeps his title to the land he 
owns. [5] In spite of the establishment of these various 
organisations it was within the traditional sector of agriculture that 
the peasantry was located, and this comprised 55 per cent of the 
population. 
Before proceeding with the discussion of investment in 
agriculture during the 1953-77 period it should be mentioned that 
Iran's agriculture consists mainly of crop production. The livestock 
sector accounts for slightly less than a third of the gross value of 
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farm output and for about a seventh of that of agricultural exports. 
Wheat and barley are the principal grains although cotton is the main 
cash crop and the major agricultural export. [6] 
5.2 FUNDING OF INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE 
Historically, the agricultural surplus has been the main source 
of finance for the Iranian economy. The state was an agent of 
exploitation that took the village surplus but apart from this left 
the village community undisturbed. However, once the state began to 
use oil revenue as its main source of finance the authorities began to 
control, if not destroy, the village community. The state was no 
longer interested in developing the agricultural sector and was only 
interested in creating a small modern agriculture via the means of 
agribusiness and farm corporations and turning the majority of the 
rural population into urban wage labour. In early 1973 the Shah 
proudly announced that by 1980 there would be no more than 2 million 
people living on the land. The question is how were the various 
changes that took place during the period financed? Did oil revenue 
find its way into the sector or were other sources of finance used? 
Commercialisation and modernisation of agriculture took place 
more rapidly due to the land reform programme and as a result there 
was an increasing demand for credit. The financial needs of farmers 
increased considerably over the 1953-77 period as a result of the 
drastic changes that took place in the sector but the credit 
institutions were unable to meet all their demands. Table 5.1 
indicates that the agricultural credit institutions were only able to 
provide 31 per cent of the total credit requirements in the 1963-72 
period. Commercial banks provided 20 per cent and the remaining 49 
per cent was provided by traditional money lenders and bazaar 
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merchants. The credit obtained from private sources carried high 
rates of interest, was not production-orientated, was short-term in 
nature (6-12 months) and on many occasions included the sale of the 
crops at disadvantageous prices, particularly in the case where 
traders were lenders. [7] 
TABLE 5.1 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS SOURCES OF 
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT, 1963-72 
(estimated average) 
Institution 
Agricultural Co-operatives 
Rural Co-operative Societies 
Agricultural Development Fund 
Tea Board 
Other Institutions and 
Total Agricultural Credit Institutions 
Commercial Banks 
Non-institutional Credit 
Amount 
(billion 
rials) 
9.0 
6.0 
0.4 
0.1 
5.0 
20.5 
13.2 
33.7 
32.3 
66.0 
SOURCE: FAO, Perspective Study of Agricultural Development 
for Iran, Rome: FAO, 1975 
% 
13.6 
9.0 
0.6 
0.2 
7.6 
31.0 
20.0 
51.0 
49.2 
100.0 
The most important institution in the formulation of agricultural 
policy was the Plan and Budget Organisation. 'The basis for the 
Budget Organisation's involvement in agricultural policy is through 
its review of budget requests from ministries and assessment of their 
compatibility with larger development plans and priorities.' [8] Table 
5.2 shows the disbursements of the Plan Organisation for agriculture 
and irrigation. In the case of irrigation, which could be regarded as 
TABLE 5.2 
DISBURSEMENT OF PLAN ORGANISATION FOR AGRICULTURE AND IRRIGATION 
(Million Rials) 
Year Irrigation Land Agricultural Research and Improvements Conservation Animal Rural Large Agr icul tu ral Marketing 
reform credit extension of of natural husbandry and development agricultural services 
agricultural resources veterinary units 
products 
1962* 2,034 506 423 4 164 33 37 112 N/A N/A N/A 
1963 3,729 709 1 ,098 67 277 86 111 207 N/A N/A N/A 
1964 2,888 1 ,441 2,698 117 586 128 146 636 N/A N/A N/A 
1965 3,494 1 ,598 1 ,387 122 735 144 343 1 '1 06 N/A N/A N/A 
1966 3,766 954 497 69 1 '199 246 336 1 '402 N/A N/A N/A 
1967 5,611 892 731 72 1 ,372 405 309 1 ,326 N/A N/A N/A 
1968 4,821 813 1 ,010 367 170 411 595 3111 911 1 ,096 338 
1969 6,648 510 900 308 431 562 367 373 1 ,302 298 732 0 
0 
1970 7,604 391 1 ,288 366 451 707 401 1 ,014 1 ,379 232 566 
1971 1 o, 155 577 1 ,684 908 684 1 ,600 449 3,006 1 ,967 377 791 
1972 12,629 1 '173 4,574 993 821 2,458 700 4,348 2,756 703 1 ,310 
1973 11,953 N/A 3,863 566 900 698 182 2,048 2,422 1 '151 996 
1974 25,462 N/A 12,603 1 '124 2,236 1 '535 1 ,267 2,787 5,035 2,820 1 ,508 
1975 27,486 N/A 12,870 1 ,224 2,530 1 ,689 1,668 2,780 5,244 2,330 5,887 
N/A Not available 
* Figures for second half of 1962 
SOURCE PLAN ORGANISATION 
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one of the most important factors required for developing the 
agricultural sector in Iran, there was an increase of 226.8 per cent 
in the Organisation's disbursements in the 8 year period 1962-69, 
whilst in the 6 year period 1970-75 there was an increase of 261.5 per 
cent. These figures do not, however, give any indication of whether 
the agricultural sector as a whole benefited from these disbursements. 
The largest portion of the Plan Organisation's agricultural 
budget after irrigation and agricutural credits at the end of the land 
reform programme went towards the establishment of 34 agricultural 
units - corporations and agribusinesses. [9] In the case of the 
latter, they were set up on virgin land near dams or groundwater 
projects. The developmnent that took place was in the form of large 
agricultural units rather than overall development for the smaller 
units. 
Agricultural credit was given a large share of the Plan 
Organisation's budget at the end of the land reform to enable peasants 
to purchase their land. There was an increase of 282.5 per cent over 
the 1968-73 period which marked the final stage of the reform. 
The Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran, previously known as 
the Agricultural Bank of Iran, is the oldest and most widely 
represented credit institution for agriculture, operating through 170 
branches. The ACBI was established in 1934. It is 100 per cent 
state-owned and its main activities have been the provision of short, 
medium, and long-term credit to individual farmers and rural 
co-operatives. It also finances special government programmes for the 
improvement of agricultural production. Table 5.3 shows the 
distribution of loans ACBI during the 1963-74 period. 
* The 
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TABLE 5.3 
DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS GRANTED BY THE AGRICULTURAL 
CO-OPERATIVE BANK OF IRAN 
Year Number of Total amount % change 
loans of loans 
(million 
rials) 
1962 107,968* 1 ,381 
1963 319,570 3,427 148.1 
1964 603,454 4 '131 20.5 
1965 547,932 5,479 32.6 
1966 249,567 5 '167 - 5.7 
1967 327,233 5' 188 0.4 
1968 351 ,946 5,290 2.0 
1969 349,989 5,415 2.4 
1970 211 ,626** 8,909 64.5 
1971 232,685 9,582 7.6 
1972 N/A 14,381 50.1 
1973 N/A 19,993 39.0 
1974 N/A 31,116 55.6 
data for the 1962-69 period is according to data for the 
Agricultural Bank of Iran as the Agricultural Co-operative Bank 
of Iran was previously known 
** Methods of data collection according to the Agricultural 
Co-operative Bank for the 1970-74 period may differ slightly to 
that of data collected for the Agricultural Bank during the 
1962-69 period 
SOURCE Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran 
As the table shows, the number of loans over the period has 
decreased considerably which is most likely due to the fact that at 
the beginning of the period the ACBI lent to farmers on a lower scale 
whilst at the end of the period the loans were made to fewer parties, 
but in larger amounts. The main disadvantage of the ACBI's general 
lending operations for individual farmers is that the granting as well 
as the size of each loan is related to more collateral security 
offered than the economic viability, repayment capacity, or the 
intended purpose of the loan. The smaller farmers were therefore 
unable to obtain credit from ACBI. 
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The Agricultural Development Bank of Iran, established in 1968 
and 100 per cent state-owned, is another important institutional 
source of finance. The ADBI was set up to provide long-term financing 
for commercial agricultural projects with a minimum limit on loans of 
Rials 1 million. In addition to deposits, the ADBI took loans from 
the World Bank. Table 5.4 shows the projects approved by the ADBI 
during the 1968-74 period. 
TABLE 5.4 
APPROVED PROJECTS OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN 
(Million Rials) 
Year Number of Loans and Amount to Total 
projects participaion be paid investment 
1968 4 52 28 189 
1969 16 320 96 922 
1970 39 836 383 2 '157 
1971 56 1 '1 07 687 2,747 
1972 182 1 '745 1 ,062 5,840 
1973 310 2,650 1 ,508 5,725 
1974 530 15,660 6,995 30,836 
SOURCE Agricultural Development Bank of Iran 
In spite of its small share in the total volume of agricultural 
credit in the country, the ADBI handled the major part of the 
institutional long-term credit for agriculture. The table confirms 
ADBI's greatest weakness, that is, the large size of the loans for a 
very small number of projects. For instance, in 1974 Rials 15,660 
million were lent to finance 530 projects, i.e. an average 
Rials 29.5 million per project. There are several other disadvantages 
as far as the ADBI is concerned; lack of field organisation, inability 
to provide short-term credit and high rates of interest. The 
clientele of the ADBI was therefore limited to large commercial 
farmers or companies which only accounted for a small fraction of the 
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total spectrum of agricultural production units in Iran. 
Organised credit for Iranian agriculture was also supplied 
through the rural co-operatives which were, by 1972-73, 8,500 with a 
membership of 2 million. The rural co-operatives' main function was 
to provide medium and short-term loans. The resources that were 
available to the co-operatives included government capital, credit 
from the Plan Organisation, credit from ACBI and their own capital and 
reserves. The subsistence farmers were provided with credit, inputs 
and marketing outlets. 
As far as the commercial banks are concerned their lending to 
agriculture was in the form of credit to big agriculturalists, 
processors, merchants and exporters, who on occasions re-lent to the 
farmers at a higher rate of interest. The only commercial banks that 
were active in agriculture to any significant extent were Bank Melli 
and Bank Saderat. The loans provided by them were totally 
unsupervised, short-term and not orientated toward production 
purposes. [10] 
From these analyses it is obvious that the government did not 
make adequate provisions in its agricultural policy, to provide 
finance for the smaller farmers who make up the majority of the rural 
population. Instead they were pre-occupied with setting up the 
various financial institutions to provide the larger agricultural 
units with finance. 
Finally, oil revenue in relation to agriculture should be briefly 
discussed. As the various tables above show the credit finance for 
agriculture increased considerably in the early 1970s which is most 
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likely due to the rise in oil revenue. However, oil revenue has not 
been used on as large a scale as expected to enhance agricultural 
development but rather was used to finance the high import bill for 
the various agricultural products. In other words oil revenue has 
enabled Iranian agriculture to remain inefficient much longer than 
would have been possible for a country lacking oil without this 
provoking any political consequences. [11] 
5.3 ACTUAL INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE IN AGRICULTURE 
The investment requirement of Iranian agriculture has been, and 
still is, considerable. During the first four development plans, the 
government did not emphasise the development of the agricultural 
sector but instead was pre-occupied with the development of industry. 
Table 5.5 illustrates the fact that investment in agriculture was a 
mere fraction of total investment in the economy. The interesting 
point is that in 1974 after the 1973-74 oil revenue explosion the 
share of agricultural investment in total investment actually falls 
from 9.3 per cent to B.9 per cent in 1974. At a time when the 
problems of balance of payments are non-existent one would expect the 
government to increase its investment in the agricultural sector along 
with other sectors of the economy but this was not to be the case. 
Instead, with the aid of oil revenue the government 'bought time' and 
delayed the development of the agriculture sector. 
One of the major problems facing Iranian agriculture has been the 
scarcity of water and this has therefore led to substantial investment 
in irrigation facilities. Much fertile land remained undeveloped 
because of insufficient water supply. Modern irrigation systems in 
Iran were begun during the reign of Reza Shah in the 1930s when the 
irrigation department was set up and several dams were built. 
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However, World War II interrupted these activities but they were 
resumed again in 1955 under the Shah. Various agencies were set up, 
all of which had some jurisdiction over water. As Table 5.2 showed 
then, the share of the Plan Organisation's budget for irrigation was 
quite considerable. 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
TABLE 5.5 
SHARE OF AGRICULTURE IN GROSS DOMESTIC 
FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
(Billion Rials) 
Investment in 
agriculture 
Total Investment Ratio of 1 to 2 
(%) 
at 
current 
prices 
8.7 
10.6 
10.8 
17.4 
25.1 
36.3 
N/A 
1 
at 
constant 
prices 
7.9 
8.9 
9.0 
14.4 
25.1 
31 0 6 
36.3 
2 
at at at 
current constant current 
prices prices prices 
136.5 126.3 6.4 
156.4 131 .8 6.8 
167.3 139 0 7 6.5 
216.3 179.3 8.0 
287.4 287.4 8.7 
396.2 339.7 9.2 
N/A 406.1 
at 
constant 
prices 
6.3 
6.8 
6.4 
8.0 
8.7 
9.3 
8.9 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Reports, 1972, p 186; 1973 p 71, 
197 4' p 175 
During the Fourth Plan there was some shift in investment 
orientation from larger irrigation projects and other infrastructure 
projects to smaller ones with more immediate impact. Emphasis was 
placed on quick yielding investments to increase food production at a 
rapid pace. [12] The government invested a considerable amount in 
large-scale agricultural management units by way of agribusiness 
enterprises and farm corporations. New techniques were introduced, 
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mechanisation was encouraged and mixed farming was promoted within 
these units placed in areas irrigated by dams. By March 1976, 
investment in agribusinesses had exceeded Rials 21 billion, out of 
which 45 per cent was provided by the ADBI in loans and equities. As 
these large scale farms were located in areas of low 
population-to-land ratio the productivity was expected to be greater 
than small peasant farming. But the management of such enormous 
projects was very difficult, major technical difficulties occurred and 
the results have been mixed. [13] 
The traditional cultivation processes in Iranian agriculture were 
extremely primitive. Introduction of tractors and modern machinery 
began at a very slow pace up to the mid-1950s. Table 5.6 shows a 
significant increase in the importation of tractors and machinery 
after 1958. One should bear in mind that in 1958 new legislation was 
passed whereby farmers were able to purchase agricultural machinery on 
credit. 
Year 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
SOURCE 
TABLE 5.6 
IMPORTS OF TRACTORS AND AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, 1955-68 
(Weight in thousand metric tons, value in Million Rials) 
Tractors Machinery Total 
weight value weight value weight 
0.6 47 1.0 92 1.6 
0.9 69 0.6 32 1.5 
1.6 168 1.3 99 2.9 
6.3 621 4.8 369 11 . 2 
6.0 570 3.8 310 9.8 
6.4 717 3.6 353 10.0 
6.1 632 4.9 589 11.0 
4.3 478 4.0 429 8,3 
3.5 396 2.1 213 5.6 
9.8 1 '01 9 6.0 646 15.8 
9.8 1 '11 9 5.3 525 15. 1 
10.7 999 5.0 514 15.7 
14.2 1 '181 6.3 540 20.5 
13.2 1 '190 6.4 591 19.6 
Julian Bharier, Economic Development in Iran, 1900-70, 
f"'hrP'J'""\Y1~ Tln;unV"llco;+-u D'lf"').o. 1 ,, 
value 
139 
1 01 
267 
990 
880 
1 ,070 
1 ,221 
907 
609 
1 ,666 
1 ,644 
1 '513 
1 '721 
1 '781 
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By 1966, 16,000 tractors were in operation in the country as well 
as some 10,000 power filters in the rice growing areas. By 1971, 
there were some 23,000 tractors in operation, many of which were run 
by private contractors. However, in spite of this increase in the use 
of tractors the vast majority of farmers continued to use traditional 
animal-drawn or hand-operated tools that had virtually remained in use 
since ancient Persian times. At the beginning of the 1960s mechanical 
power was used on less than 10 per cent of land holdings and about 4 
per cent were fully mechanised. Approximately 75 per cent of all land 
holdings used animal power while 15 per cent used human power. By 
1974 most Iranian farmers were still using the iron-tipped wooden 
plough that did little more than scratch the soil. Steel ploughs were 
used by less than a tenth of the farmers. Few implements besides the 
plough were used and weeding was mostly done by hand. [14] 
The government did make considerable efforts to mechanise 
agriculture. An agreement was made in 1966 with Romania that called 
for the importation of some 20,000 tractors. This was implemented 
over a period of several years. The same agreement also called for 
the construction of a tractor assembly plant at Tabriz which, when 
established, produced 5,000 tractors per year. [15] The agreement did 
not, however, bring about the success the government had expected in 
modernising the sector as the tractor model they chose was an old type 
which was far from being efficient. 
Under the Fifth Plan, funding of agriculture increased as 
compared with previous plans. However, as Table 5.7 shows by the end 
of 1975 a mere 49.4 per cent of the planned Rials 310 billion had been 
invested. This planned figure was the lowest investment figure given 
to any of the sectors, and although it was higher than in previous 
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budgets, it was insufficient. Much of it was being allocated to rich 
peasants in order to meet their relatively short-term requirements. 
TABLE 5.7 
ESTIMATED AND REALISED TOTAL FIXED INVESTMENT 
BY MAIN SECTORS, 1973-77 
(Billion Rials) 
Sector Estimated Realised 
1973-77 1973 1974 
Agriculture 310 28 53 
Oil and Gas 791 N/A 49 
Industry and Mining 846 56 119 
Housing (Construction) 925 N/A 121 
Transportation and 
Communication 492 N/A 1 01 
Other 1 ,334 N/A 120 
TOTAL 4,698 363 563 
SOURCE Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet 
1 975' p 34; 1 976' p 8 
1975 
72 
106 
235 
210 
234 
243 
1 '1 00 
The government had hoped for a combined public and private 
enterprise investment, during the Fifth Plan, in order to expand food 
production and processing. Both sectors were allied in many of the 
country's 400 meat, dairy and poultry complexes with several of them 
fully integrated food industries. The government also made a major 
effort to encourage private investment in fertilizer and pesticide 
factories as well as agribusiness enterprises. But despite the 
government's support and in part due to its interventions, the 
agricultural sector did not attract private capital. The sector 
accounted for only a small fraction of the impressive 95 per cent 
increase in private investment recorded during 1975-76. Agriculture 
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calls for long-term commitments by investors which is a striking 
contrast to the quick and lucrative returns that existed in the 
industrial sector. 
The level of investment in agriculture can therefore be said to 
be quite insufficient in order to develop the sector sufficiently for 
it to provide at least the domestic market with the agricultural 
products demanded. As a result of this insufficient investment in the 
sector there was a considerable increase in the level of imports of 
agricultural products which weakened the sector even further. 
5.4 EFFICIENCY OF INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE IN AGRICULTURE 
Now that the funding and actual investment have been discussed 
the efficiency of these investments shall now be considered. Despite 
the land reform, some major irrigation projects, and experiments with 
modern forms of farm organisations, Iranian agriculture has not 
performed well. Iranians did come to realise that the agribusinesses 
they so much favoured did have a number of serious disadvantages. One 
of the greatest disadvantages being that they are capital intensive 
businesses rather than labour-intensive. When the majority of the 
Iranian population lived in rural areas this system of operation was 
far from being suitable. There was a great influx of people from the 
rural areas into the urban centres in search for work. Iran did not 
have the resources to absorb the large number of farmers who were 
moved off their land to make way for the large farming units. 
Table 5.8 can give some indication of how efficient investment 
was during the 1959-72 period by using agricultural growth rates 
during this period. The table shows that there has not been any 
significant increase in growth rates, although in the 1965-67 to 
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1970-72 period in most instances the growth rates have been greater 
than in the 1959-61 to 1965-67 period. In the case of agricultural 
value added per person the growth rate for the rural population was 
low even though many moved off the land and the growth in the 
agricultral workforce was well below population growth. 
TABLE 5.8 
AGRICULTURAL GROWTH RATES, 1959-72 
Average annual growth rate 
(%) 
Value added in agriculture 
current prices 
constant prices (1959) 
Production of selected commodities 
wheat 
barley 
rice 
red meat 
milk 
Population 
rural 
total 
Agricultural value added per person 
rural population 
total population 
1959-61 
to 
1965-67 
5.5 
3.1 
2.5 
2.9 
4.2 
2.0 
-0.2 
1.7 
2.9 
1.6 
0.4 
1965-67 
to 
1970-72 
7.5 
4.4 
3.5 
-0.4 
4.0 
3. 1 
2.7 
1.9 
5.4 
2.3 
0.9 
1959-61 
to 
1970-72 
6.4 
3.7 
2.9 
1.4 
4.1 
2.5 
1.1 
1.8 
3.1 
1.9 
0.6 
SOURCE Iraust, Kermanshahan Agriculture and Livestock Development 
Project, Final Report (Tehran Iraust, 1974) 
Agricultural production rose by at most 2.5-3 per cent per annum 
since the early 1960s and in some years by as little as per cent. 
This is less than the rate of increase in population of 3 per cent and 
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well below the combined rate produced by the rise in population and 
income. The demand for agricultural produce was rising by 12.5 per 
cent per annum by the mid 1970s and was expected to reach 14 per cent 
during the following decade as incomes rose over a wide spectrum. The 
demand for red meat, which is highly income-elastic, has been 
particularly responsive to the rise in income: per capita consumption 
of 8 kilos increased to 18 kilos per annum in the mid 1970s and was 
expected to rise even further by the 1990s. In the case of Tehran, 
where the better off were mostly located, there was an increase of 100 
per cent in the consumption of red meat over the 1974-75 period. 
Initial shortfalls in agricultural production is a common 
phenomenon in the aftermath of land reform. In the case of Iran 
however this weakness continued long after the short-term disruption 
of the reform had worn off. The Iranian government met increased 
demand by way of imports rather than by trying to impose constraints, 
and to avoid discontent a food subsidy programme was implemented which 
ran up a very high bill. As stated previously, oil revenue enabled 
the government to meet those increasing imports and at the same time 
allowed the agricultural sector to continue to be inefficient for a 
considerably longer period of time than otherwise would have been 
possible. [16] 
Table 5.9 shows production indices of the sector during the 
1961-73 period. Total agricultural production appears to have 
steadily grown during the period with the exception of a slight fall 
in 1969 to 128 from 133 in the previous year and in 1971 when the 
index fell by 3.1 per cent from the previous year. The average growth 
during the period was a mere 3.8 per cent which was clearly 
insufficient to meet the increased demand for food as well as the 
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increase in population. The table also shows that per capita 
agricultural production has increased by a mere 0.9 per cent on 
average which is a very low figure. 
TABLE 5.9 
PRODUCTION INDICES OF IRANIAN AGRICULTURE, 1961-73 
Year Total agricultural production Per capita agricultural 
production 
( 1 00 = 1961-5) % change ( 1 00 = 1 961 -5 ) % change 
1 961-5 100 100 
1964 97 94 
1965 105 8.3 99 5.3 
1966 110 4.8 1 01 2.0 
1967 122 10.9 109 7.9 
1968 133 9.0 115 5.5 
1969 128 - 3.8 108 - 6.1 
1970 131 2.3 107 - 0.9 
1 971 127 - 3.1 100 - 6.5 
1972 133 4.7 102 2.0 
1973 135 1.5 1 01 - 1 .0 
SOURCE US Department of Agriculture, Iran: Agricultural Production 
and Trade, 1974, p 11 
The reasons for this shortfall in output are as follows: firstly, 
there are absolute limits on raising output, i.e. the major part of 
Iran is not cultivable. Secondly, in spite of changes in the pattern 
of ownership no automatic change for the better in cultivation methods 
took place. Thirdly, the lack of capital injections, throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, into the rural sector. Fourthly and finally, the 
absence of a peasant movement and the failure to convert peasant 
acceptance of the state into an active, mobilised commitment to raise 
production. The bureaucratic character of the land reform was 
emphasised by the failure to produce enough food. [17] 
But what is the position of agricultural output as compared with 
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the other sectors of the economy? Table 5.10 shows the output and 
employment of the three major non-oil sectors of the economy. The 
table shows that although the share of agriculture in employment was 
33.3 per cent in 1977-78, its share in total output was only 14.7 per 
cent. Hence it was the least productive sector, which is 
disappointing considering that at one stage Iran was largely an 
agricultural economy. The largest employment sector in the same 
period was the service sector which also contributed the greatest 
output or 55.6 per cent of the total. What is of interest here is 
that the share of services in output is considerably higher than its 
share of employment whilst the share of agriculture in output is very 
much lower than its share of employment. The reason for these 
differences can be analysed with the aid of Table 5.11. 
TABLE 5.10 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE NON-OIL ECONOMIC SECTORS TO OUTPUT 
AND EMPLOYMENT, 1977-78 
Sector Output Employment * 
'000 m Rials % of total m % of total 
Agriculture 339.0 14.7 3.0 33.3 
Industry 684.3 29.7 2.8 31.3 
Services 1 ,281 .3 55.6 3.2 35.6 
Total 2,304.6 100.0 9.0 100.0 
* excluding official unemployment 
SOURCE H. Katouzian: Political Economy of Modern Iran 1926-79, 1981 
Table 13.3, p 260 
Sector 
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TABLE 5.11 
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE PRODUCT PER WORKER 
IN VARIOUS ECONOMIC SECTORS 
1962-63 1977-78 
Product Relative Product 
per worker product per worker 
Relative 
product 
per worker per worker 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Services 
Total non-oil 
output per 
worker 
( '000 
rials) 
1 
24.2 
42.1 
75.6 
40.2 
( '000 
rials) 
2 3 4 
0.60 105.9 0.45 
1.00 267.3 0.88 
1.90 380.3 1.62 
1.0 233.6 1.00 
SOURCE H. Katouzian: The Political Economy of Modern Iran, 1926-79, 
1981 ' p 261 
Columns 1 and 3 show the productivity per worker for the three 
sectors in the two periods. Columns 2 and 4, on the other hand, show 
the relative product per worker in the same sectors. When the figures 
in columns 2 and 4 are compared, the relative product per worker in 
both periods is considerably lower for agriculture and greater for 
services. The 1977-78 figures indicate that the position of 
agriculture had worsened as a result of the decline in the relative 
product per worker as compared with the other sectors. [18] 
In conclusion to this section it can be said that there has not 
been a great efficiency in investment expenditure in Iranian 
agriculture. There are various reasons for this, one being that the 
investment priorities of the government have been the wrong ones. 
Section 5.5 will now consider the government's investment priorities 
in more depth. 
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5.5 INVESTMENT PRIORITIES 
Agriculture deserves an important place in the planning effort of 
developing countries, yet because many governments are over-concerned 
with industrial growth, they have failed to place sufficient emphasis 
on agricultural planning as a part of the national planning effort or 
to realise the critical relationships between agricultural growth and 
overall economic development. More recently, the poor performance of 
agriculture and its drag on economic development has forced greater 
attention to be paid to agriculture. This has been the case in Iran. 
The most obvious reason for agriculture's importance in national 
economic planning is its sheer dominance. In most less developed 
countries it is the major industry as well as the major source of 
livelihood. Iran is no exception. With over half of the population 
engaged in agriculture during the 1953-77 period the sector can be 
regarded as the main source of livelihood for the majority although in 
the 1970s oil revenue has become the major source of finance. 
However, as far as the oil sector is concerned only a small proportion 
of the labour force is engaged in the sector. 
Once the decision to enhance development through conscious 
efforts has been made, the agricultural sector could become a source 
of relatively inexpensive, yet important gains. As compared with the 
investment costs of achieving increases in many industrial activities, 
increased agricultural output is relatively inexpensive. As far as 
Iranian agriculture is concerned the planners could concern themselves 
primarily with a 'closed system' largely unaffected by foreign trade. 
This means that since the oil industry provides the nation with 
foreign exchange, there is no desperate need to develop the 
agricultural sector on a level of export requirement but rather 
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concentrate on developing the sector to supply the domestic market 
with the required food products. 
Therefore, one constraint is removed in the development of 
agriculture, that is the need to develop it to an export level is 
unnecessary. From the previous analysis in this chapter it is quite 
clear that the government's investment priorities did not suit the 
Iranian agricultural sector. Its aim to develop small commercial 
sectors with about 2 million people living on the land failed. The 
large farming units did not succeed due to lack of management skills, 
insufficient technical knowledge etc. 
Investment in smaller agricultural units would have most likely 
benefited the sector better. The problem was that an attempt was made 
to develop the sector too quickly. The development of agriculture 
requires a long-term commitment by the investors and in the case of 
the government there was not enough consistency in its investment 
strategies. Instead of adopting more labour-intensive techniques in 
which Iran had a comparative advantage, capital-intensive techniques 
were adopted. 
There was an obvious need to mechanise the sector. An agreement 
was made with the Romanian government to purchase tractors which were 
desperately needed to increase efficiency and output. By using 
tractors the farmer could plough deeper and therefore utilise the soil 
more efficiently. However, the type of tractors that were purchased 
from Romania were old large scale models that did not prove to be as 
efficient as expected. A smaller type of tractor is likely to have 
been more efficient. Since the Iranian government chose to provide 
the sector with this kind of intermediate mechanisation it might have 
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been more advantageous to provide the farmers with mechanical 
rotavators instead of large inefficient tractors. This case clearly 
illustrates the lack of careful consideration for the development of 
the sector. 
The lack of investment in the appropriate areas of the sector 
explains the reasons for low output and therefore the high level of 
imports of foodstuffs which were necessary. A sector, which could be 
highly beneficial to the development of the country, if invested in 
and developed properly, has been more or less wasted. Emphasis was 
placed on developing the industrial sector and promoting it to a level 
of that of the industrialised countries. This did not suit Iran. 
There was a lack of technical skills, as was the case in the 
agribusinesses and farm corporations that were set up in the 
agricultural sector, whilst Iran required the enhancement of the 
labour-intensive techniques in its economic sectors. There was a 
clear urban, consumer bias on the part of the government and until 
that is removed and the state sets its priorities right, the 
agricultural sector cannot be developed successfully. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The Iranian agricultural sector is of immense importance to the 
Iranian economy. With over half of its population located in rural 
areas up to the 1970s there was a great need to develop the sector in 
order to raise incomes of those living on the land and to meet the 
growing demand for foodstuffs. 
Attempts were made to mechanise and develop the sector by means 
of creating large agricultural units. These units used less labour 
intensive techniques than the smaller farms did, hence there was a 
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considerable influx of people from rural areas into the urban centres. 
In adopting these large units the planners had obviously not taken 
into account where they were going to place those rural immigrants who 
came to the cities in search of work. 
As far as financing of the investment in the sector was 
concerned, there were adequate credit facilities created to meet the 
demands of the larger farming units whilst the smaller farmers did not 
have any access to these facilities. 
The government tried to attract private investors to invest in 
agriculture but did not have any great success. The sector accounted 
for only a small fraction of the impressive 95 per cent increase in 
private investment in the 1975-76 period. The reason for this lack of 
interest was most likely due to the fact that investment in 
agriculture requires a long-term commitment and does not provide the 
investor with quick returns. 
The efficiency of investment in the sector has been low. An 
average growth rate of 2.5-3 per cent has not been adequate especially 
when taking into account the rate of increase of population and 
income. 
It is quite clear that the investment priorities in the sector 
have been neither appropriate nor adequate. If the sector is to be 
developed for the benefit of the people living in the rural areas, 
while at the same time minimising urban problems, more investment is 
required. This must be tackled while there is sufficient oil revenue 
available to finance this task. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER DUALISTIC CONDITIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis in the previous chapters has shown that considerable 
economic growth has taken place within the Iranian economy. This 
growth was a result of increased oil revenue and its allocation to the 
various sectors of the economy, in particular the modern industrial 
sector. The meaning of economic growth here is more output derived 
from greater amounts of inputs and to some extent greater efficiency 
within the modern sector as a result of greater mechanisation. 
However, although the terms 'growth' and 'development' are sometimes 
quite acceptably used synonymously in economic discussion, these two 
terms have separate meanings here. Development implies both more 
output and changes in the technical and institutional arrangements by 
which it is produced and distributed. In this chapter some aspects of 
economic development in the Iranian economy will now be discussed. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the various factors that contribute to a 
country's underdevelopment. Some of these factors apply to Iran 
although the 1955-77 period saw some improvements. In it the three 
primary components of underdevelopment are low standards of living, 
low esteem and limited freedom - the latter two being social aspects. 
The arrows indicate general lines of causation. The upper half of the 
chart relating to the determinants of standard of living illustrates 
the main economic aspects of underdevelopment. The employment aspect 
will be discussed in detail in this chapter in order to examine 
whether there have been any improvements in this field in Iran up to 
1977. Specific emphasis will be placed on employment opportunities 
created as a result of increased government oil revenue, incomes and 
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wages of the Iranian labour force and finally the regional differences 
- where rural-urban migration will be examined. 
Before economic development from the employment point of view 
will be discussed, linkages between the various sectors of the economy 
will be examined. The Iranian economy has strong dualistic 
characteristics where a modern dynamic sector exists alongside a 
traditional sector. The modern sector is composed of oil fields and 
large scale industries with a very limited degree of technical 
substitutability of the factors of production, i.e. capital and 
labour. The traditional sector is dominated by peasant agriculture 
and handicrafts as well as very small industries (usually small family 
enterprises). A wide range of production techniques can be used 
within the traditional sector and alternative combinations of labour 
and capital can be made. The traditional sector is a labour-intensive 
sector as opposed to a capital-intensive modern sector. 
These strong dualistic conditions within the Iranian economy were 
promoted by increased oil revenue expenditure. Rather than enhancing 
the development of the country for the benefit of all, there appears 
to have been a tendency for the abundant revenue supply to worsen 
these dualistic conditions. In the 1910-50 period the Iranian oil 
sector remained divorced from the rest of the economy. However, 
during the post-1951 period, after the nationalisation of the 
industry, this changed. The government's oil revenues were channelled 
into what were believed to be productive investments - especially in 
promoting the modern sector. How productive these investments were 
and how they contributed to the development of the country remains to 
be answered. It should be noted at this point that the Iranian case 
is somewhat different from other dualistic economies found in the 
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existing literature. One difference was that instead of shifting the 
economy's centre of gravity from the static to the dynamic sector, the 
growth-stimulating effects of the dynamic sector should spread 
throughout the traditional sector by transforming the dynamic centre 
into an engine of growth. [1] This mechanism was thought important 
because of the scale and breadth of Iran's traditional sector. 
6.2 LINKAGES 
In the previous chapters the impact of oil revenues on the 
various sectors of the Iranian economy were dealt with. In this 
section the relationship between the oil sector and the various 
economic sectors through backward and forward linkages will be 
analysed. Also, linkages between the modern sector and the 
traditional sector will be discussed. 
Forward linkages between the Iranian oil industry and the other 
sectors of the economy are represented by the flow of low cost fuel 
from the oil sector to the national economy. This low cost fuel 
provided an inducement for the Iranian economy to utilise oil as a 
source of energy in place of other energy resources and to establish 
petroleum-based industries. By 1972 the oil industry supplied 70 per 
cent of domestic energy requirements. [2] This clearly demonstrates 
that 'some' integration between the oil industry and the national 
economy did take place in the post-1951 period. But has this 
integration been adequate? Considering that the oil industry has 
provided the main source of finance for the development of the 
country, its forward linkages to the rest of the economy such as 
agriculture have not been sufficient. The reason for this is simply 
that due to the nature of Iranian agriculture, low-cost fuel is not of 
much use within a sector that is not greatly mechanised. However, 
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even if the agricultural sector had been fully mechanised, and greater 
forward linkages existed, it would possibly have benefited 
economically the country but not necessariy been socially beneficial. 
Output would possibly have increased in the agricutural sector but 
employment would have been likely to fall. Migration from rural to 
urban areas would have increased even more than it already did. 
However, forward linkages could be said to benefit the country in the 
case of this link with the modern sector as the low cost fuel would 
lead to lower unit costs. In Iran such forward links were 
non-existent with the agricultural sector. 
The flow of resources from the domestic economy into the oil 
industry represents the backward linkages. These types of linkages as 
far as capital expenditure is concerned have been particularly weak in 
Iran. The domestic economy has been unable to provide the capacity 
required to provide the oil industry with its highly sophisticated and 
costly machinery. The oil industry is very capital-intensive and that 
intensity has been increasing over the 1955-77 period. The only time 
the domestic economy has provided the industry with capital goods was 
in 1968 when the Ahwaz pipe mill was constructed. The plant produced 
pipelines for oil products and crude oil in various parts of the 
country. In spite of a recognition from the American Petroleum 
Institute which authorised the plant to use the standard mark of the 
API, the pipes made in this plant were more costly than pipes 
available on the international market. [3] 
The Iranian oil industry provided financial linkages with the 
rest of the economy, in particular the establishment of the modern 
manufacturing sector. Like the oil industry, manufacturing industry 
was highly capital-intensive. This led to high levels of imports of 
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capital equipment. These modern industries were set up despite the 
fact that the existing industries were not able to provide the inputs 
required for such sophisticated plants. 
Table 6.1 shows clearly that Iran was increasingly becoming more 
dependent on the import of intermediate goods during the 1959-74 
period. In 1959 intermediate goods accounted for 49.2 per cent of all 
imports, of which 40 per cent were intermediate goods for industry and 
mines and a mere 0.3 per cent for the agricultural sector. This shows 
that the newly established industries were not suitable for the 
Iranian economy. By 1974 the imports of intermediate goods had 
increased to 64.5 per cent of total imports, of which 50.3 per cent 
went to the industry and mining sector and 1 .8 per cent to 
agriculture. Although the share of industry in these imports has 
fallen slightly, the imports of intermediate goods for industry alone 
are greater than the total imports of capital and consumer goods added 
together. Hence it can be said that when taking into account the high 
cost of capital goods for the modern sector (including the oil sector) 
the total import of intermediate goods for industry is considerable. 
This high level of demand for intermediate goods which was met by the 
importation of the goods implies that the local multiplier was 
minimal. 
These results clearly demonstrate that there was a total lack of 
linkages between the modern and traditional sectors, whether they were 
financial or production linkages. The traditional sector, if 
encouraged and invested in, would have probably been able to supply 
the modern sector with a large portion of the required intermediate 
goods. However, there were no moves made to encourage such 
production. To illustrate this point it is worth looking at the 
TABlE 6.1 
CCM'ffiiTICN CF JMPCmED CIXDS, 1959-74 
($ rnillims) 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
INI!':ll£)IA1E CIXDS 267.5 324.6 329.9 313.2 285.1 400.0 518.2 558.2 711.0 856.5 97f373 1,068.5 1,336.3 1,596.2 2,273.7 4,266.4 
(49.2) (42.2) (53.4) (57 .2) (55.9) (55.0) (57 .7) (57 .9) (59.7) (61.7) (64.0) (63.7) (64.8) (62.1) (60.8) (64.5) 
Industries and Mines 217.7 261.9 260.6 234.9 221.9 317.9 410.1 444.5 545.3 641.7 737.4 845.0 1,110.9 1265.8 1,912.0 3,324.5 
Ccnstruction 26.2 40.4 35.5 49.8 34.8 58.8 69.2 74.7 120.8 147.0 152.7 145.8 138.5 204.3 237.8 375.8 
Services 22.1 19.9 29.1 23.5 22.1 24.7 30.7 31.3 30.9 52.1 64.8 52.7 57.8 97.4 76.3 444.1 
Agrirulture and livestock breeding 1.5 2.4 4.7 5.0 6.3 6.6 8.2 7.7 14.0 15.7 32.4 25.0 29.1 28.7 47.6 122.0 [\) 
--.l 
CAPITAL CIXDS 112.1 167.1 129.8 114.9 104.4 162.4 223.0 260.7 329.3 376.3 3f37 .2 391.6 482.9 642.6 906.0 1,330.9 
(20.6) (24.3) (21.1) (21.0) (20.3) (21.9) (24.8) (27.1) (27 .7) (27 .1) (25.1) (23.3) (23.4) (25.0) (24.2) (20.1) 
Industries and mines 60.1 84.1 74.8 81.0 54.0 72.8 132.1 160.1 230.2 239.1 316.2 263.7 316.6 411.9 560.3 770.4 
Services 33.1 39.1 29.4 20.6 26.7 117.7 55.8 63.9 71.5 103.8 30.9 91.2 132.7 168.4 273.0 464.6 
Agrirulture 19.0 13.9 25.6 13.3 23.7 111.9 35.1 36.7 27.6 33.4 40.1 36.1 33.6 62.3 72.7 95.9 
cx::N:U£11 CIXDS 161<.6 196.6 156.9 119.5 124.0 171.9 157.2 144.8 150.0 156.4 168.2 2,171.1 241.7 331.6 557.4 1,016.4 
(30.2) (28.6) (25.5) (21.5) (24.2) (23.2) (17 .5) (15.0) (12.6) (11.3) (10.9) (12.9) (11.7) (12.9) (14.9) (15.4) 
TOTAL 544.6 688.3 616.6 547.6 513.5 7112.3 898.11 963.7 1,190.3 1,389.2 1,542.7 1,676.6 2,060.9 2,570.11 3,737.1 6,613.7 
SJJRCE Bank M311<azi, Iran, Annual Reports and Balance Sheet, varicus issues 
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Iranian car industry. The car assembly plants imported most parts of 
the vehicle from the body-frame to the smallest bolt required for the 
assembly. This, most definitely, could have been provided by the 
traditional sector especially as metal working had been long 
established in Iran. This is, of course, a very crude example but 
because of the total neglect by the government the traditional sector, 
which in all likelihood would have been a potential intermediate goods 
producer, did not provide the modern sector with these goods. Hence 
they were imported. 
In its production of consumer goods the modern sector has been 
supported by means of tariff protection, public subsidies and publicly 
sanctioned high retail prices designed to ensure profitability. The 
plan was to provide protection for these heavily imported-dependent 
industries until these new industries began to mature and expand 
sufficiently. [4] By the end of the 1955-77 period, this had not 
materialised adequately to remove these protection barriers. As Table 
6.1 shows the level of consumer goods imports decreased constantly 
from 30.2 per cent of total imports in 1959 to 10.9 per cent in 1969, 
but by 1974, it had increased slightly to 15.4 per cent of the total. 
Tariff protection was not given to intermediate goods. This did 
not provide encouragement for the traditional sector to expand in this 
area. Such protection might have strengthened domestic linkages, as 
some metal goods could have been provided by the sector, given 
traditional skills in metal working. 
From this analysis it is clear that there was a lack of linkages 
between the oil sector and other sectors of the economy with the 
exception of a financial link with the newly-established modern 
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sector. The same applies to the relationship between the modern 
sector and the traditional sector where there was a total lack of 
linkages. Clearly, the ability of the traditional sector has not been 
taken advantage of whilst new western types of industries were 
established which were clearly totally unsuitable for the Iranian 
economy. 
6.3 LABOUR ISSUES 
What is of crucial importance in the evaluation of Iran's 
development and its ability to utilize oil revenue for the betterment 
of the people, is the extent to which economic growth in Iran has 
created new job opportunities. This will now be examined. 
Table 6.2 shows the Iranian labour force by major economic 
sectors during the 1962-76 period. The agricultural sector employed 
43.6 per cent of the total labour force in 1970-71, industry 27.8 per 
cent, services 28 per cent, and oil a mere 0.6 per cent. By 1975-76 
agriculture employed 34.3 per cent, industry 34.5 per cent, services 
30.4 per cent and the share of employment in the oil industry 
increased only slightly to 0.9 per cent. 
These results obviously show that although oil has dominated the 
Iranian economy, the industry has been a factor of small importance as 
far as employment is concerned. Very few people are employed in the 
direct process of oil production - in exploration, production, 
refining and loading. Moreover, in the case of Iran as in so many 
under-developed economies, the oil sector established few linkages 
with the local economy. This is due to the fact that as it brings its 
technology and capital goods from abroad, it fails therefore to create 
employment elsewhere in the economy. 
130 
TABLE 6.2 
LABOUR FORCE BY MAJOR ECONOMIC SECTORS, 1963-78 
(thousands) 
Year Agriculture Industry Services Oil Total* 
1962-63 3,672 1 ,372 1 ,584 36 6,664 
1967-68 3,861 1 '947 2,020 46 7,874 
1970-71 3,720 2,370 2,390 50 8,530 
1971/72 3,535 2,570 2,730 50 8,885 
1972-73 3,515 2,685 2,790 50 9,040 
1973-74 3,495 2,950 2,870 50 9,365 
1974-75 3,470 3,220 2,950 90 9,730 
1975-76 3,445 3,460 3,050 90 10,045 
1977-78 3,200 3,300 3,379 60 9,939 
* Official estimates based on the labour force of 12 years old or 
older individuals give the total labour force in 1975-76 as 8.5 
million of which more than 8.3 million were reportedly employed. 
SOURCE Estimates from figures released by Iran Statistical Centre and 
Bank Markazi, Iran 
The agricultural sector is undoubtedly the largest employment 
sector in the economy. Although Table 6.2 shows a decrease in the 
labour force within the sector over the 1970-76 period, the share of 
agriculture in employment is still high. Allowance should be made, 
when considering these figures, for the large female population in the 
agricultural sector which is not accounted for in the data. 
Employment in the manufacturing sector has increased 
significantly in the past two decades and as Table 6.2 shows there was 
a 46 per cent increase in industrial employment. However, this 
increase has not entirely taken place within large-scale industry but 
gone together with a multiplication of smaller scale enterprises. The 
'core' industrial labour force in Iran are those employed in 
industrial units of over ten people. This was estimated at about 
700,000 or about 7 per cent of the total economically active 
population. The numbers in genuinely large enterprises will be even 
smaller. [5] 
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At this point Arthur Lewis' model of development should be 
briefly discussed in relation to the dualistic structure of the 
Iranian economy. In his model Lewis assumed two sectors existing in 
the economy, a capitalist sector and a traditional sector. The 
capitalist sector was believed to have no relationship with the 
traditional sector apart from absorbing labour from it. He also 
stated that an unlimited flow of labour could occur in countries where 
the population is so large relative to capital and natural resources 
that 'there are large sectors of the economy where the marginal 
productivity of labour is negligible, zero or even negative'. Lewis 
was impressed by the widespread, existence of 'disguised unemployment' 
in family farms, and in small retail trading. In these areas of work, 
each individual gains a limited income for his effort and if some 
migration occurs, those remaining behind could easily work a little 
harder so that total production would remain the same. 
The central problem in the theory of development is seen by Lewis 
as being how to understand how a community previously saving and 
investing some 4 or 5 per cent of its national income, or less, 
becomes one where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15 per 
cent or more. The main issue in development is that the distribution 
of income is altered in favour of the classes that do save, i.e. those 
that receive profits and rents. Savings and investments are minimal 
if not non-existent in the subsistence economy, not as a result of low 
average incomes but due to a small share of profits in income. As the 
share rises, so do savings and investments. 
In his model Lewis further assumes that employment in the 
capitalist sector increases with a continuing inflow of labour from 
the subsistence sector, as capital formation occurs. The LDC will 
132 
eventually become a MDC when the supply of labour out of disguised 
employment dries up. [6] 
Having briefly outlined Lewis' model the question of how 
appropriate the model is to the Iranian economy remains to be 
answered. The Iranian economy as previously stated has very strong 
dualistic characteristics as the model requires. Iran has seen a 
large flow of labour from rural areas to urban areas because it has a 
very large population in relation to its private capital. But, as far 
as natural sources are concerned it is questionable whether it can be 
said that Iran's population is large relative to its resources of oil. 
Within the agricultural sector the marginal productivity of labour is 
close to zero. Disguised employment in Iran exists on a considerable 
scale. All these factors apply to Lewis' model. However, what should 
be noted is that the capitalist sector has not been able to absorb all 
the workers coming from rural areas. The capitalist sector required 
skilled labour and most of the migrants did not have the appropriate 
skills. Therefore the capitalist sector was unable to absorb labour 
from the traditional sector as the model assumed. This clearly 
illustrates that Lewis' model could not be applied to the Iranian 
situation. 
The modern sector of the Iranian economy experienced a 
persistent, and growing shortage of skilled labour required to carry 
out the expanding production activities in the sector. Shortages of 
skilled workers, foremen, technicians and qualified managers were said 
to impede the growth of manufacturing industry. This shortage of 
skilled workers does not necessarily mean that if the labour had been 
available that the sector would have been able to absorb all of the 
available labour force. In fact the modern sector only provided a 
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small proportion of the total available workforce with employment. 
The majority of the workers remained employed within the traditional 
sector where their skills could be utilised in small workshops 
employing less than 50 people. They however received a much lower 
wage than in the larger modern factories. 
Table 6.3 shows the occupational pattern of employment in Iran. 
The number of agricultural workers has decreased only slightly during 
the 1956-72 period. Employment in industry decreased over the 1966-72 
period which could indicate the increasing use of capital equipment 
rather than human capital in production. What the table indicates is 
that jobs were created at the higher end of the spectrum rather than 
the creation of lower paid jobs. Agriculture did however still employ 
almost half of the country's labour force by 1972. Another of Lewis' 
assumptions that applies to Iran is the disguised employment factor 
within the agricultural sector. This is significant as the 
agricultural sector remains by far the greatest employer in the 
economy, even in 1972. At the same time there was a considerable 
outflow from the agricultural sector into urban areas. In general 
these were young people in search of employment and a better life. In 
many cases these young people had not been actually involved in 
agricultural production, and possibly could be regarded as part of 
disguised employment, and hence not enumerated in the statistical 
records. 
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TABLE 6.3 
OCCUPATIONAL PATTERN OF EMPLOYMENT 
(%) 
1956 
Professional, Technical and Related 
Workers 1.0 
Administrative, Managerial and 
Clerical Workers 3. 1 
Sales Workers 5.8 
Service Workers 7.7 
Agricultural Workers 55.6 
Industrial Production Workers 22.6 
Workers not elsewhere classified 3.6 
Total 100.0 
1966 
2.9 
3.0 
7.1 
7.2 
47.1 
29.0 
3.7 
100.0 
SOURCE F. Aminzadeh: Iran: Past, Present and Future: 'Human 
Resources Development: Problems and Prospects' 
1972 
3.5 
4.3 
8.5 
6.3 
48.5 
28.7 
0.2 
100.0 
As far as national savings are concerned in Iran, it was very low 
during the 1955-77 period. In spite of the increase in oil revenue as 
well as in the income of the upper classes, there was no great 
increase in savings as expected. In most cases people in the higher 
income groups tended to invest their savings abroad rather than in the 
domestic economy. Savings were therefore a very minor source of 
development finance. Savings were non-existent within the low-income 
groups. Lewis describes this trend as 'What is lacking in most of 
these countries is not the means but the will'. [7] This implies that 
if the government was willing to, it could raise the rates of savings 
in order to enhance economic development. This increase would however 
require major economic, political and social changes but the Iranian 
government was unwilling to undertake these changes. This is perhaps 
the best indicator of a lack of a serious will to promote rapid 
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economic development. Consequently little progress was made as far as 
creating employment opportunities for most of Iran's population was 
concerned. Having not succeeded in creating employment in the economy 
how effective was the government in improving the distribution of 
income, through the expenditure of oil revenue in the domestic 
economy? This will be examined in the next section. 
6.4 INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
One of the most disputed topics surrounding the rapid rates of 
growth achieved by the oil countries, such as Iran, has involved 
changes in income distribution. However, reliable data for historical 
comparisons of the distribution of income are one of the most 
difficult to obtain for most countries, in particular, developing 
countries. In spite of this difficulty several obvious trends have 
been detected in the distribution of income. 
Table 6.4 shows that between the period 1959-73 the inequality in 
the distribution of income worsened. In 1959 the share of the top 20 
per cent was 51 .8 per cent, the share of the middle 20 per cent was 
27.5 per cent and the share of the bottom 20 per cent was 13.9 per 
cent. By 1971 these figures were 55.5 per cent, 25.5 per cent and 
11.7 per cent respectively. These figures illustrate a clear increase 
in the inequality of the distribution of income. However, during the 
1971-73 period there was a tendency for the inequality of household 
expenditure (and therefore income distribution) to stabilise or even 
fall slightly. Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 show how these above stated 
figures have been translated into a Lorenz-curve which is often used 
in the calculation of measures of inequality. The increased 
inequality in the distribution of income in Iran during the 1959-73 
period is clearly illustrated in these figures. The Lorenz curve 
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moves further away from the 45° line (which indicates an absolute 
equality) showing further inequality. The gini-coefficient as stated 
in Table 6.4 is the shaded area between the observed Lorenz curve and 
the line of absolute equality as a proportion of the total area under 
the line of absolute equality. A gini-coefficient of 0.4552 in 1959 
indicates a fairly unequal distribution and by 1971 the coefficient 
had incresed to 0.5051 and although the coefficient fell again to 
0.4946, Table 6.4 shows that there is considerable inequality which is 
on the increase. 
TABLE 6.4 
MEASURES OF INEQUALITY OF EXPENDITURE IN URBAN AREAS, 1959-73 
(%) 
Year Gini Share of Share of Share of 
coefficient top 20% middle 20% bottom 20% 
1959 0.4552 51.79 27.54 13.90 
1969 0.4710 52.91 26.96 12.99 
1970 0.4849 54.30 26.05 12.71 
1971 0.5051 55.48 25.49 11 .65 
1972 0.4916 55.33 26.29 11 .88 
1973 0.4946 55.56 26.06 11 . 96 
SOURCE Compiled from Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Survey of 
Household Expenditures (Tehran: Bank Markazi, Iran, 1959, 
1969, 1970, 1971' 1972, 1973) 
What now remains to be considered is what the possible reasons 
are for this increase in inequality within urban areas. 
Simultaneously, income distribution in the rural areas will be 
considered. Table 6.5 shows family incomes in urban areas according 
to the various average income groups and by comparison Table 6.6 shows 
family incomes in rural areas. What is interesting here is that in 
1959, 61 per cent of the urban population belonged to annual income 
groups of up to Rials 50,000. This trend changed to 39.9 per cent by 
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1967-68 and it was estimated to be 26.5 per cent by 1975-76. Data is 
not available to confirm whether this figure is correct but if one 
considers the great influx of income earners into the urban areas from 
the rural sector in the 1970-77 period this decrease in income earners 
under Rials 50,000 is unlikely. Most of the migrants from rural areas 
were the young and in the majority of cases unskilled. When starting 
off in the urban areas, they were therefore unlikely to earn an income 
greater than Rials 50,000. Hence the estimated figure of 26.5 per 
cent is likely to have been slightly higher in the 1975-76 period. 
* 
TABLE 6.5 
FAMILY INCOMES 
DIVISION OF URBAN FAMILIES ON THE BASIS OF VARIOUS 
AVERAGE INCOME GROUPS 
Annual income groups % 
(urban areas, rials) 1959-60 1967-68 1975-76* 
Up to 30,000 35.6 19.9 2.5 
30,000 to 40,000 14.1 10.7 9.0 
40,000 to 50,000 11.3 9.3 15.0 
50,000 to 75,000 16.2 19.2 26.0 
75,000 to 100,000 7.8 13.8 16.5 
100,000 to 150,000 6.9 12.5 15.0 
Over 150,000 8.1 14.6 16.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Estimated 
SOURCE Tehran Economist Magazine (1959-60 and 1967-68) 
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TABLE 6.6 
FAMILY INCOME IN RURAL AREAS 
Annual income groups % 
(rials) 1970-71 1971-72 1975-76* 
Less than 60,000 76.6 68.2 60.0 
Between 60,000 and 120,000 18.1 24.3 31.5 
Over 120,000 5.3 7.5 8.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* Estimated 
SOURCE Central Bank of Iran, Annual Reports 
As far as the rural sector is concerned 76.6 per cent of families 
had an income of less than Rials 60,000 in 1970-71 and it was 
estimated that by 1975-76 60 per cent of families in the rural sector 
had an income of less than Rials 60,000. These figures show that low 
income families are in a majority within the rural sector whilst 
within the urban sector there was an increase in the middle income 
classes. There is also a strong indication in the above data that the 
inequality in the distribution of income within the urban sector is 
greater than within the rural sector where income is more evenly 
distributed within the lower income spectrum. In the urban sector the 
rich have become richer and although the poor are benefiting from 
economic growth, the wealthier class is becoming wealthier at a much 
faster rate. 
These differences in the distribution of income can be partially 
explained by wage differentials within the Iranian economy. Detailed 
information about wage rates in Iran is very difficult to obtain and 
even where information did exist the government rarely published any 
of it. The Iranian regime and its spokesmen claimed that wages had 
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increased enormously since 1974. An example of these exaggerated 
claims is when the Economic Councellor of the Iranian Embassy in 
London claimed in 1977 that 'workers' earnings in Iran had risen by 
600 per cent in the past three years. [8] The annual publication Iran 
Almanac is less ambitious, as Table 6.7 shows, claiming that in the 
six year period 1970-76 the annual wages in the Tehran area increased 
by about 275 per cent, 175 per cent, and 120 per cent for manual, 
semi-skilled and skilled workers respectively. Although these 
increases imply that wage differentials between the manual, 
semi-skilled and skilled workers have been reduced, one should bear in 
mind the enormous gap that existed between them. The increase in 
wages of manual workers was insufficient to close this gap to any 
extent. Considerable wage differentials still existed although the 
rate of increase in wages of supervisors and department heads were 29 
per cent and 26 per cent respectively. The shortage of skilled 
workers meant that wages were pushed up and this contributed to an 
even greater gap between the unsksilled and the skilled and department 
heads. The cash income of Iranian workers has undoubtedly increased 
considerably since 1974 but whether real incomes have increased is a 
different matter since wage increases have constantly been eroded by 
inflation. At best it is assumed that real incomes have increased 
only slightly. 
Stating wage figures without giving any indication of the cost of 
living is not of much use. The cost of living in Tehran, where the 
above wage figures were taken, was probably higher in the 1971-77 
period than in London. Food prices were roughly the same as in 
Britain but were constantly being raised as a result of severe 
shortages and rial depreciation. Rents in Tehran were high due to the 
rise in population and property speculation brought about an enormous 
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increase in rents. Many urban families are reported to have been 
spending 60-70 per cent of their income on rent. 
TABLE 6.7 
WAGES OF WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE INDUSTRIES AND 
SERVICES IN 1970 AND 1976 AT TEHRAN, BASED ON DIFFERENT 
LEVELS OF SKILLS AS WORKED OUT BY THE PLAN ORGANISATION 
Wages per annum 
(US$) 
1970 1976 % change 
Non-skilled 312 - 437 1 ,248 - 1 ,560 275 
Semi-skilled 437 - 811 1,560- 1 ,872 175 
Skilled 842 - 1 ,435 1 ,872 - 3' 120 120 
Mechanics 1 ,026 - 1 '927 3,240 - 4,200 152 
Laboratory analysis 1 ,309 - 1 ,505 3,240 - 4,200 164 
Supervisors 3,168- 4,752 4,200 - 6,000 29 
Department heads 6,336 - 7,920 7,800- 10,200 26 
SOURCE Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, 1976, 15th Ed. Echo of Iran 
Since data is not available for the rural areas it is not 
possible to compare wages in the two areas. However, one can assume 
that although the cost of living in the rural areas is less than in 
the urban sector it is unlikely that those living in the rural sector 
were better off. It is most likely that wages in the agricultural 
sector were lower than in the urban sector and were stagnant during 
the 1970s. 
Finally, it can be said that the standards of living of a section 
of the working class did show some improvements over the 1971-77 
period. As well as that, the government's subsidy policies, however 
shortsighted in overall economic terms, have prevented food prices 
from rising as fast as they would otherwise have done. Still most 
wage earners suffered from increasing costs in housing and other 
services and the gap between the unskilled workers and the better paid 
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has widened even further. These factors contributed to a wave of 
strikes in the mid-1970s and the wider outburst of discontent in 1978 
which eventually led to the revolution in 1979. 
To conclude this section it should be stated that although per 
capita income increased from $192 in 1959 to $717 by 1974 the 
distribution of income worsened during the same period. This 
indicates that theoretically increased oil revenue benefited the 
Iranian economy whilst in practice, although improvements were made, 
the gap between the rich and the poor widened even further after the 
oil revenue explosion of 1974. 
6.5 REGIONAL DISPARITIES 
There were considerable regional differences in all the 
before-mentioned aspects - in terms of employment opportunities, 
incomes and wages as well as in terms of linkages. As with other 
areas of the economy there is a lack of reliable data to give a 
historical picture of the development of these regional differences. 
Table 6.8 gives some indication of what the regional differences were 
in 1971 in terms of the decile distribution of household expenditure. 
TABLE 6.8 
DECILE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES, 1971 
(%) 
Decile Urban areas Rural areas 
(lowest to highest) 
1 2.17 2.79 
2 3.56 3.82 
3 4.56 5.04 
4 5.96 5.90 
5 6.66 6.98 
6 7.67 8.14 
7 9.35 9.56 
8 11.74 12.10 
9 16.21 14.48 
10 32.12 31 . 19 
SOURCE Compiled from Statistical Centre of Iran, Survey of 
Expenditures (Tehran: Plan and Budget Organisation, 
Total 
1.96 
3.51 
4.37 
5.14 
6.24 
8.39 
8.51 
11 .88 
15.80 
34.20 
Household 
1973) 
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The table shows that household expenditures are more unequally 
distributed in urban areas. That is, the bottom 20 per cent of urban 
households in 1971 was 5.7 per cent, whilst it was 6.6 per cent in 
rural areas. Simultaneously, the share of the top 20 per cent of 
households in urban areas was 48.3 per cent while the same share in 
rural areas was 45.7 per cent. The ratio of urban to rural 
expenditure, government development expenditures as well as the 
overall educational attainment of household is said to have an 
important influence upon other distribution of income in Iran. It 
follows that a policy which puts emphasis on decreasing the gap 
between the rich and poor regions through balanced regional 
development expenditures is one likely way to reduce income 
inequalities in Iran. Further measures such as setting up an 
educational programme with a wide regional coverage are likely to lead 
to an an improved distribution of income. Income inequality in urban 
areas could also be decreased by creating relatively well paid jobs 
for the unskilled and semi-skilled workers in small urban centres. 
However, even though some attempts may have been made to carry some of 
these measures out they clearly did not succeed in reducing the income 
distribution inequality on a regional basis. 
Only a few years ago, rural-urban migration was regarded as 
beneficial to a country's development. Internal migration was 
believed to be a natural progression where surplus labour was 
gradually withdrawn from the rural sector to provide the required 
manpower for urban industrial growth. This process was thought of as 
socially beneficial since human resources were being moved away from 
areas where their social marginal productivity was often zero to areas 
where this marginal product was not only believed to be positive but 
also rapidly growing due to capital accumulation and technological 
progress. 
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This view of regarding rural-urban migration as beneficial is no 
longer favoured by economists. In the 1970s rural-urban migration 
became a major contributing factor to urban surplus labour. It was a 
force which aggravated the already serious urban unemployment problem 
that had been caused by growing economic and structural imbalances 
between urban and rural areas. It can therefore be said that 
migration is both a sympton of, and a contributing factor to, the 
underdevelopment of the Iranian economy, as is the case in most Third 
World countries. 
To go even further into the discussion of rural-urban migration 
in Iran lets look at Todaro's model. His model aimed at understanding 
the causes and determinands of rural-urban migration and the 
relationship between migration and relative economic opportunities in 
urban and rural areas. This model has been named as the 'expected 
income' model of rural-urban migration. Todaro's model can be seen as 
an extension of Lewis' model. In Lewis' model people migrated from 
the countryside to the city in response to assured urban employment, 
and without a real wage differential. However, in Todaro's model 
these two paramaters became variables. Both the (estimated) real wage 
on income differential as well as the (estimated) probability of 
finding a job determine the individual's migration decision. Todaro's 
model does seem to apply to migration in Iran as far as providing the 
reasons for the increasing rural-urban migration. People's 
expectations were high in that they moved to the urban centres because 
they believed that their future would be secure and that they would be 
better off. There was a considerable proportion of reasonably 
educated young people that dominated the migrant stream. They tended 
to swell the growth of urban labour supply and at the same time 
depleted the rural areas of valuable human capital. As far as 
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Todaro's model is concerned it has not been possible to test whether 
the migrants 'expectations' have been met. The model assumed that all 
the migrants will find a suitable job in the 'formal' sector whilst, 
as stated earlier in this chapter, a vast number of these migrants 
obtain employment within the 'informal' sector. [9] How far Todaro's 
model can take this trend into account can be of some debate. The 
model would have to either take into account in its framework the 
'formal' sector alone or include the 'informal' sector. However, in 
the latter case testing is virtually impossible because counting those 
with 'informal' jobs would be an enormous task and in many cases 
'jobs' in these occupations may not be full time or entail any cash 
transactions but rather payment in kind. 
Having discussed the migration aspect of rural-urban 
differentials a few points should be made on the regional geographic 
dimension. During the 1955-57 period the Shah aimed at centralising 
the economic system. The large industries were set up in very few 
provinces and as Table 6.9 shows the largest growth pole was Tehran. 
Other main areas were Isfahan, Eastern Azarbaijan (Tabriz) and 
Khuzistan, the oil producing region. The question 'what the 
advantages and disadvantages were in locating the industries in these 
areas' can be raised. A common criterion in locating industry is 
placing them on coastal sites to enable easy transport. However, 
neither Tehran nor any of the above-mentioned regions are located on 
coastal sites. Therefore the most likely criterion used in the 
location of industry in Iran was locating them close to the market. 
These industries were mostly market-orientated. As far as Tehran is 
concerned the distribution of income was greater than in any other 
regions hence most industries were located there. The number of 
workers per plant was the highest in Tehran where the majority of the 
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industrial labour force was based. These results clearly illustrate 
why there was a tendency for the influx of workers from the rural 
areas who were attracted to these growth poles. 
TABLE 6.9 
DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES IN DIFFERENT PROVINCES 
Province Indstrial units 
2 
Population units 
(millions) 
Tehran 
Isfahan 
Eastern Azarbaijan 
Khuzestan 
Gil an 
Khorasan 
Mazandaran 
Fars 
Yazd 
Western Azarbaijan 
Kermanshahan 
Kerman 
Sistan and Baluchestan 
Hamad an 
Lures tan 
Kurdestan 
All others 
Total 
SOURCES 
1 ,698 
272 
239 
230 
198 
185 
170 
105 
69 
61 
49 
44 
43 
41 
42 
12 
28 
3,483 
(48.7%) 
(7 .8%) 
(6.9%) 
(6.6%) 
(5.6%) 
(5.3%) 
(4.9%) 
(3.0%) 
(2.0%) 
(1 .8%) 
( 1 .4%) 
(1 .3%) 
( 1 .2%) 
( 1 .2%) 
( 1 .2%) 
(0.4%) 
(0.7%) 
(100%) 
6.79 
1.98 
3.17 
2. 11 
1.57 
2.96 
2.52 
1.97 
0.31 
1.37 
1.02 
1.06 
0.56 
1.04 
0.97 
0.73 
2.37 
32.5 
Number of industrial units employing more than ten people 
(figures from 1973-74 Industrial Census) 
(20.9%) 
(6. 1 %) 
(9.6%) 
(6.5%) 
(4.8%) 
(9. 1 %) 
(7.6%) 
(6.1%) 
( 1 .0%) 
(4.2%) 
(3.2%) 
(3.3%) 
( 1. 7%) 
(3.2%) 
(3.0%) 
(2.3%) 
(7.3%) 
(1 00%) 
2 Population of province figures 1973-74 from Statistical Office 
of Iran 
The great concentration of the type of industries set up in these 
few centres brought about external diseconomies such as that of 
congestion and pollution. These industries did not provide any 
spin-off economies as they relied mostly on imported materials. 
However, although industries were concentrated in urban areas, out of 
33.6 million population in 1976, 15.7 million were living in urban 
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areas whilst 17.9 million in the rural areas. This emphasises the 
importance of developing the rural areas which during the 1955-77 
period were more or less neglected. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
In the development of a country like Iran that has strong 
dualistic conditions, strong likages between the two sectors, the 
modern sector and the traditional sector, are necessary. But, as the 
above analysis has shown, these linkages were non-existent within the 
Iranian economy. Even linkages within each sector were minimal apart 
from a relatively important financial link between the oil industry 
and other modern types of industries set up. If it was not for the 
oil revenue the modern industries would not have existed at all. The 
reason is that the flow of resources from the domestic economy into 
the modern sector was very weak during the 1955-77 period. 
The importation of intermediate goods increased rapidly during 
the period illustrating that the newly-established industries were not 
suitable for the economy. Although these types of industries may have 
been suitable for Western economies, the Iranian economy was 
underdeveloped, in particular its infrastructure. Also it had been 
hoped that technological expansion would take place with the setting 
up of these industries, but that was not to be. Capital and 
technology were imported and therefore its benefits did not spread to 
the rest of the economy. 
The growth of the Iranian economy did not lead to increased job 
opportunities. Because of the neglect of the agricultural sector, 
labour flowed into urban centres in search of work and better 
opportunities. But not everyone found what they had hoped for in the 
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cities. Due to a mismatch of skills there was a considerable increase 
in the level of unemployment. Many of the unemployed drifted into the 
'informal' sector or went back into traditional employment. As far as 
the modern sector was concerned there was a shortage of skilled labour 
and this pushed up wage rates that resulted in an even greater gap in 
the income of manual workers and the skilled. This shortage indicates 
strongly that the new industries did not suit the Iranian economy. 
The majority of the workforce remained in the traditional sector, in 
particular, agriculture. 
The inequality in the distribution of income worsened over the 
1959-73 period. The majority of people living in the rural sector 
earned below Rials 60,000 whilst there was a decrease in this income 
group in urban areas during the same period. This is an indication of 
the inequality between the two sectors, the poor did benefit in the 
urban sector but the rich became richer at a much greater rate, hence 
widening the gap even further. 
Information on wage differentials between regions was 
unobtainable but data on wages paid in Tehran gave some indication of 
this. The lower earner groups saw a considerable increase in their 
wages in percentage terms. However, although the higher wage groups 
saw less increase during the same period, an enormous gap still 
existed between them. No wage rates were available for the 
agricultural sector but it is likely that wages were very low there 
and better paid work was believed to be one of the factors determining 
rural-urban migration. Looking at wage rates in isolation does not 
give any indication of the real increases and having briefly examined 
the cost of living and the level of increase in wages, it was clear 
that the real increase was only minimal. 
149 
Tehran was obviously the main growth centre with 48.7 per cent of 
total industrial units based there and it had the greatest number of 
workers per unit although the large industries did not provide any 
significant employment. The majority of workers, even in Tehran, 
worked in smaller workshops. 
The influx of workers from rural areas was believed to be 
beneficial by economists but they soon realised that this influx led 
to an increasing problem of urban unemployment. The construction 
industry could not keep up with the demand for housing and rents were 
pushed up. Other solutions had to be found. 
Finally, it can be said that although considerable economic 
growth took place during the 1955-77 period, the economic development 
of the country in the same period was not as significant as expected. 
Successful development requires capital accumulation (to employ the 
labour) in industry, technological progress in industry (preferably 
labour-using) and increased farm productivity (whose absence would 
slow down industrial growth by raising real wages). Take-off into 
self-sustaining growth occurs when industrial demand for labour 
becomes so strong that landlords in the rural sector must bid for 
labour and pay labour's marginal product rather than the old 
institutional wage. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis the development of the Iranian economy has been 
discussed with particular emphasis on the implications of oil revenue 
allocation for the major sectors of the economy. 
During the 1953-77 period there was considerable growth in the 
Iranian economy. Oil revenue was of great significance for the 
economy and it enabled the government to pursue certain policies which 
otherwise would not have been possible. However, the question of 
whether the allocation of oil revenue was to the country's advantage 
in terms of enhancing its development can be answered on the basis of 
the analysis made in this thesis. The share of oil revenue in 
development finance in Iran increased from 59 per cent in 1963 to 80 
per cent in 1972 which clearly illustrates the revenue's importance 
for the government in carrying out its ambitious industrialisation 
programme. However, what is of interest is that after the 1973 oil 
price increases the share of oil revenue allocated to development 
planning decreased. 
Although the Shah maintained that he was going to transform Iran 
through rapid industrialisation into a major economic and military 
power before the country's oil reserves were exhausted, he may have 
been close in achieving the latter but the former lagged far behind. 
The reasons for not succeeding in making Iran a major economic power 
are many. It is quite obvious that misallocation of resources did 
take place. To illustrate this point better one should consider the 
amount of oil produced during the 1973-77 period when oil prices were 
at their peak as compared with oil production in the 1955-69 period. 
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In the five year period 1973-77, 10,500 million barrels of oil were 
produced as compared with production of 8,355.3 million barrels in the 
15 year period 1955-69. Oil revenue increased from Rials 556.3 
billion to Rials 2,951.6 billion respectively. This vast increase in 
oil revenue removed completely the financial constraints most 
developing countries have. But why has Iran during the period under 
discussion not leaped far ahead of other develping countries that have 
not been in such an advantageous financial position? Countries like 
Egypt and Turkey have been able to develop substantial industrial 
bases for themselves without the financial advantages that Iran had. 
This may be due to the misallocation of resources in Iran. 
The problem that Iran was faced with was that its infrastructure 
was unable to cope with the sudden influx of revenue that occurred as 
a result of increased oil prices in 1973. Since the Shah decided to 
take advantage of the oil price rise, production increased 
considerably during the 1973-77 period. Simultaneously, this policy 
to develop the economy as soon as possible brought exhaustion of oil 
reserves closer. Iran required this increase in revenue in order to 
eliminate the budget deficit that existed in the 1972-73 period and 
the greatest need for increased oil revenue was for the development of 
the country. However, since the development that actually took place 
was on a relatively modest scale compared with the available oil 
revenue the great increase in oil revenue over the 1973-77 period was 
much more than was actually needed. Production could have been at a 
substantially lower level, and Iran could still have been able to 
maintain a balanced budget. 
During the 1953-77 period Iran's role as an oil producer in the 
Middle East increased steadily. Iran was the main advocate of the oil 
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price increases in 1973 which were regarded as a necessary step to 
increase OPEC's members oil revenue and power. Oil companies feared 
that these increases would eventually curtail the demand for oil. By 
1976 Iran had difficulties in marketing its oil. Demand was indeed 
curtailed as a result of these price increases, although elasticity 
estimates did not indicate this would happen. The price elasticity of 
demand for Iran's oil was estimated in order to analyse how responsive 
the demand for oil was to price. The results showed that for the 
1957-67 period fluctuations in prices only explained 12 per cent of 
fluctuations in demand. For the 1967-77 period the results pointed to 
different conclusions as they show that demand rose irrespective of 
increased prices. An estimated price elasticity for the whole of the 
1957-77 period showed similar results to the latter period. Post 1974 
demand was curtailed largely through negative income effects rather 
than because of the price increases, although the latter may have 
caused a lagged demand response which only manifested itself after the 
end of the period under consideration here. 
Oil revenue was allocated into areas believed to promote economic 
growth and prosperity. But how successful was the Shah in doing this? 
Over the 1953-77 period there was increasing emphasis placed on 
investment expenditure rather than current spending and this was 
expected to raise the rate of economic growth. However, it is very 
difficult to measure how effective investment was in promoting growth. 
Oil output accounted for an increasing proportion of GNP and it was 
the value of the oil output itself rather than the revenue from oil 
that increased the growth rate. Iran was able to borrow a great deal 
from the outside world using its oil reserves as collateral. Many 
western countries were willing to "do business" with Iran as it was 
believed to be a reliable partner. 
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The government's marginal propensity to consume in relation to 
oil revenue was estimated. The results showed that as oil revenue 
increased, government consumption increased by over half as much which 
is considerable, but not on as great a scale as expected. Private 
consumption grew even faster. However, the greatest increase was in 
investment. The government's marginal propensity to invest was also 
estimated and the results showed that when oil revenue increased the 
government's investment expenditure increased by 70 per cent amount. 
The relationship between oil revenue and investment was even stronger 
when taking into account the fact that investments take time to 
implement. In this case oil revenue was lagged one period. 
Government spending made a significant contribution to inflation. 
Therefore Iran's inflation was not imported as the state often 
asserted, but self-inflicted. The reason was the country's buoyant 
demand over the period. The country's defence expenditure was the 
largest item in the budget. This spending produced no goods to 
satisfy the market place demand of consumers while at the same time it 
removed productive capacity from the civilian economy. As a 
consequence of these factors the country's level of inflation was 
higher than that of other major oil exporters. In addition Iran 
became a more open economy than the other large Middle Eastern states, 
with a much higher level of imports. The estimated marginal 
propensity to import indicated that there existed a considerable 
import leakage in the system but not as great as might be expected 
taking into account Iran's import requirements in the 1970s. This 
relationship was lagged one period. 
The increased need for imports during the 1970s can be explained 
by looking at the way in which oil revenue was spent. As stated 
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earlier the government firstly put great emphasis on developing the 
country's physical infrastructure and secondly its major investment 
was in capital-intensive heavy industries. However, oil revenue was 
not directly used in funding these investments. The Iranian 
government set up several financial institutions during the 1953-77 
period. The bulk of the industrial investments were undertaken with 
the assistance of these financial institutitions. Private investment 
was only minimal in these capital-intensive industries. The factor 
that motivated the development of Iranian industry was the 
neo-classical explanation of easy finance rather than the level of 
demand in the economy as suggested by Keynesians. Demand was 
stimulated by oil revenues but development finance was channelled into 
heavy industries such as metal (steel), chemicals and petrochemicals, 
mechanical industries and mining rather than consumer goods 
industries. The level of oil revenue had a significant impact on the 
level of investment in industry especially after the oil price 
increases. Iran was heavily dependent on the importation of machinery 
as the domestic market was unable to produce the required machinery. 
The car assembly industry is a good example. 
The efficiency of these investments was very low. Iran had an 
abundant supply of labour but was developing highly capital-intensive 
industries that were unable to employ any significant number of 
people. The domestic economy was not even able to supply these 
industries with material and equipment. There was a large increase in 
investment in these industries in the 1973-74 period but investments 
made in that period did not show any immediate rate of return. The 
analysis made in this thesis shows industry to be relatively 
inefficient. The main form of expansion that took place within the 
industrial sector was in capital-intensive import-substitution 
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industries but the small labour-intensive units remained dominant in 
employment terms. The major industrial expansion took place in the 
artisanal sector despite government discrimatory policies against the 
sector. This growth despite the government's policies indicates the 
vitality of the sector to the Iranian economy while in constrast the 
modern sector did not give a very good performance. 
Protection was given to the newly-established modern industries. 
This allowed domestic industry to establish itself without any outside 
competition. The monopoly element increased as these tariffs became 
more of a permanent feature than a temporary measure. However, this 
protection did have some positive effects on industry although Iranian 
manufactured goods tended to be more expensive than the average world 
price. The reasons for these high prices are due to lack of 
competitive pressure, the low level of value added, inappropriate 
plant size (too large) and inadequate project planning. Inefficiency 
in this sense represents a significant and permanent loss of resources 
for the Iranian nation and it most definitely reduced the possibility 
of increasing exports to meet foreign exchange requirements when oil 
revenue eventually decline. This was the main weakness of Iranian 
industry. 
In spite of these inefficiencies and inadequacies, Iranian 
industry grew significantly over the 1960-74 period and with the 
impact of increased oil revenue in 1974 the growth rate was even 
greater. Nevertheless some of the output increases were at the 
expense of the traditional industries. As not all the output of the 
latter was enumerated, the extent of net output increase may be 
exaggerated in the official statistics. The government's emphasis on 
a Western type of industry gave poor long-term results. Small crafts 
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and industries that contributed to production and employment were not 
developed which led to an increasing import bill. The Iranian economy 
is more likely to have benefited if emphasis had been placed on 
developing existing industries and establishing lighter consumer 
orientated labour-intensive plants to create employment and meet 
domestic demand requirements. At the same time they would have been 
able to save foreign exchange. 
The one important sector that was totally neglected was the 
agricultural sector. The sector remains the least developed sector of 
the economy. Yet it is one of the country's most important sectors as 
about half of the country's 35 million population live in the 
countryside. The land reforms that were carried out by the Shah did 
not bring about the changes that had been hoped for. The aim was to 
decrease the population to 2 million in rural areas by 1980. There 
was a considerable influx of labour into urban areas from rural areas. 
This however did not decrease the population of the rural areas to any 
extent and it created the problem of an excess supply of labour in 
urban areas. Iran's cities were unable to handle this sudden increase 
in their population. Various social problems arose from this. The 
little investment that was made in the agricultural sector was handled 
in a similar manner to that in industry. Large commercial farms were 
set up and the intention was to mechanise agriculture in order to 
increase production. However, the large agribusinesses were not 
effective due to bad planning and the lack of skills in organising and 
running these modern establishments. The local farmers did not 
co-operate with the government and without their support there was no 
way of succeeding. 
As with industry the government set up some financial 
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institutions to enable the development of the sector but their 
effectiveness in contributing to agricultural development was only 
minimal. Finance was not provided to the smaller farmers who made up 
the majority of the rural population. Private investors were 
unwilling to invest in the sector which partly explained the lack of 
investment in this important sector. Oil revenues could have been 
used on a much larger scale in the development of the sector than they 
actually were. This would have simultaneously reduced the large 
import bill for agricultural products. The fact that investment in 
agriculture fell in the 1973-74 period whilst there was an explosion 
in the government's oil revenues shows the attitude the government had 
towards the sector, that of neglect. There was insufficient 
investment in the sector to enable it to develop sufficiently to at 
least meet its domestic demand requirements. Also, the actual 
investment that was made was mostly to set up irrigation dams but 
these were very large and costly and mostly benefited the large 
commercial farms. Smaller irrigation projects are likely to have 
benefited more people. 
Agricultural production increased by at most 2.5-3 per cent per 
annum from the early 1960s which was less than the rate of increase in 
population of 3 per cent and well below the combined rate produced by 
the increase in population and income. This is a strong indication of 
how important the need to develop the sector was. As compared with 
other sectors of the economy the agricultural sector was the least 
productive sector which is upsetting when taking into account that 
Iran, at one stage, was largely an agricltural economy. At the same 
time the sector provided during the 1977-78 period the second largest 
level of employment, after services, in the economy. What was 
actually needed was the enhancement of labour-intensive techniques in 
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the sector. In other words utilise the existing skills instead of 
applying techniques that required technical skills which were not 
available in Iran. 
Iran, with its strong dualistic conditions, has not succeeded in 
developing for the benefit of all but rather its abundant supply of 
oil has worsened the gap between the modern sector and the traditional 
sector. What was needed in Iran was to adopt policies whereby 
labour-intensive methods were put into use rather than a Western-style 
development. What is clear is that before Iran had the oil revenue it 
was an under-developed country with all the conditions that go with 
that and the attempt to bring it on a level with a Western type of 
economy was taken in a too large a step. The country did not have the 
infrastructure to cope with all the Western style of demands that were 
created in the process. Although Iran may have become slightly better 
off than previously, the misallocation of its resources meant that an 
opportunity was lost to bring about greater prosperity for all, over a 
longer period of time. The shock was too much for a nation with a 
very strong cultural and religious background. This misallocation is 
likely to have contributed a great deal to the revolution that took 
place in 1979. Many Iranians believed that they were being led in the 
wrong direction and that their country was being used for the benefit 
of a few. Instead if the agricultural sector had been better catered 
for and its labour-intensive industries had been developed, Iran may 
have been able to take a greater step forward towards development. 
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